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The purpose of this research is to explore the political role of a specific form of meta-
organisation in a highly politicised context such as the UK aerospace industry. 
Specifically, this study focuses on developing knowledge on the determinants of national 
and regional sectorial trade associations’ political role and political strategy, and how 
they exert influence to shape the political and regulatory environment.1 
An exploratory case study approach is chosen given the scarcity of qualitative empirical 
research, the sensitivity, as well as the lack of information on the formulation of political 
activities within trade associations. The original, primary data is mainly collected through 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with senior firm and trade association 
representatives. Industry experts are also interviewed to corroborate and triangulate the 
information gained. The selection of the aerospace industry is based on the strong and 
intertwined relations between the industry and government, as well as the political, 
military and economic strategic prominence that is bestowed on this industry. 
The findings suggest that to comprehensively understand what determines trade 
associations’ political role and political strategy it is necessary to acknowledge broad 
institutional characteristics as well as specific organisational attributes. Moreover, the 
findings indicate two main overarching conceptual dimensions: firstly, an embeddedness 
in the institutional environment which mainly emerges through strong interactions with 
other organisations and the necessity to tap into the policy agenda of decision-makers; 
secondly, associations’ activities build on those of other organisations and political actors 
to exert greater influence on the policymaking process.  
This study contributes to on-going debates in nonmarket strategy and corporate political 
activity literature, specifically on how sector specific trade bodies may have a crucial role 
in mediating the business-government relationship. This is particularly relevant for 
policymakers who have yet to fully acknowledge the advantages of collaborating with 
such organisations.   
                                                 
1 “Aerospace is politics with wings on it” is a quote extrapolated from a Business, Innovation 
and Skills select committee hearing in the House of Commons, by the former Head of Public 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Understanding the dynamics, processes and actors that entail the interaction between 
businesses and government has become an increasingly significant question following 
the growing influence that policymakers have on companies and the profuse efforts 
organisations undertake to influence their socio-political and regulatory environment 
(Doh et al. 2014). One of the key decisions firms face when interacting with policy-
makers and regulators is whether to interact with them individually, and/or collectively 
by collaborating with other organisations (Hillman and Hitt 1999). One of the main 
expressions of the latter approach is through trade associations.  
Trade associations, considered as “industry entrepreneurs, agents of collective identity, 
and political and social actors” (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017: 1), have acquired a 
pivotal political position in modern economies (e.g. Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015, 
Traxler and Huemer 2007) and play an influential role on firms, industries and societies 
as well as on the mediation of business-government relations (Wilts and Meyer 2005). 
However, despite their unique role there has been limited academic work that has 
addressed them (e.g. Baron 2016; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Berkowitz and Bor 2017; 
Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015; Reveley and Ville 2010; Tschirhart and Gazley 2014; 
Traxler and Huemer 2007), and particularly in the management domain, used them as the 
primary unit of analysis (e.g. Barnett 2017; Barnett, Mischke, and Ocasio 2000). 
The corporate political activity (CPA) and nonmarket strategy (NMS) streams of research 
have mostly focused on firms whilst investigating collective action (e.g. Barnett 2006; 
Jacomet 2005; Ozer and Lee 2009). Recent studies that have centred the level of analysis 
on trade associations, have mostly investigated the internal oriented functions of 
associations, such as how they help to structure an industry, the relations with firms, 
rather than examine the interactions with the political and regulatory environment (e.g. 
Buchanan and Marques 2017; Marques 2017). Correspondingly, Drope and Hansen 
(2009: 303) argue that scholars have concentrated more on firm political activities as 
opposed to trade associations’ political activities. The research to date has tended to 




rather than considering trade associations as independent entities (e.g. Greenwood, 
Suddaby, and Hinings 2002).  
Moreover, much of the research on CPA has rather focused on national level 
environments, whereas it must be acknowledged that a broad range of organisations 
undertake political actions on other levels as well, such as the local, regional and 
supranational levels (Rajwani and Liedong 2015: 281). A profuse number of studies have 
focused on the North-American context and the political, social and regulatory 
institutional frameworks that feature in such environment (Rajwani and Liedong 2015). 
These settings are unquestionably different to the UK in terms of the political structure, 
relationship between private and public actors as well as the role and nature of trade 
associations. This study is sensitive to these dissimilarities and in accordance with 
Aldrich (2017) is particularly cautious about drawing inferences from studies conducted 
in such a different context.  
Conjointly, these features have led to an inadequate understanding of trade associations’ 
strategy, structure, and dynamics of their establishment and development (e.g. Barnett 
2013; Barnett, Mischke, and Ocasio 2000). Despite the importance of these organisations 
there is still limited theoretical development and empirical knowledge (Parmigiani and 
Rivera-Santos 2011). Whilst this is true in general, it is particularly striking if we take 
into consideration nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity perspectives 
(Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015).  
Recently, there has been a renewed interest (e.g. Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017; 
Berkowitz and Bor 2017) in understanding a specific form of trade association, namely 
meta-organisations, which are associations whose members are other organisations 
(Ahrne and Brunsson 2008). Hence, the broad objective of this research is to explore the 
role and political functions of a specific form of meta-organisation, namely trade 
associations, in a highly politicised context such as the UK aerospace industry. The 
research focuses on developing knowledge on the determinants of sectorial trade 
associations’ political role and on how national and regional trade bodies undertake 




1.2 Research rationale 
The research rationale surfaces from the acknowledgement that business-government 
relations are frequently characterised by an involvement of intermediaries. Within the 
broad range of entities that sit at the interface of the private and public spheres, trade 
associations can be considered as key organisations, as firms join them to shape their 
political environment. Concurrently governments and policy makers can refer to them 
when seeking industry-specific expertise a collective input and a representative voice 
(e.g. Taminiau and Wilts 2006).  
It must be emphasised that the role, influence and effectiveness of business associations 
can vary depending on the industry and sectors in which they operate (Greenwood 2002). 
Hence, choosing an appropriate research context is particularly significant. The UK 
aerospace industry exhibits precise characteristics that are highly beneficial to 
understanding the role of associations and to the examination of the dynamics that govern 
private-public interactions. These characteristics, which can have an impact and influence 
on the nature and form of the relationship, can be recognised as institutional (e.g. the 
political and economic strategic importance that is given to this particular sector; Hartley 
2014), industry-specific (e.g. strong trade association involvement, highly regulated, and 
high industry concentration; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991; Rajwani, Lawton, and 
Philips 2015), and firm specific (e.g. strong government dependence/links; Hadani 2012; 
Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002). This unique industry can thus be considered 
strategic as its positive externalities can benefit the UK in economic, military and political 
terms, conferring it a privileged status (Hartley 2014). Given the historical levels of 
government support and intervention, it can be argued that governments have had a 
definite desire not to allow such a strategic sector decline since the defence of the state, 
as well as its geopolitical international weight are so dependent on it. Thus, investigating 
trade associations’ political role and political activities in such a politically sensitive 
industry can be considered of strong practical and theoretical value.   
This research problem, as well as the need to investigate this area, finds justification both 
theoretically and empirically. In terms of the former, the problem is in line with Rajwani, 
Lawton, and Philip’s (2015: 225) call to develop a clear “understanding of their [trade 




society more broadly that reflects their unique role and special characteristics”. Moreover, 
Rajwani and colleagues (2015) state that there are three main theoretical areas of research 
within the management domain, which are still limited in terms of associations: 
institutional theory, collective identity, and nonmarket strategy. This research is 
positioned within the nonmarket strategy domain, and specifically that of corporate 
political activity. In terms of the empirical justification, during the Aerodays 2015 2 
conference where initial ideas of this research were presented, top-level firm and 
association managers, as well as experienced professionals operating in the industry 
provided positive feedback acknowledging a strong need to address this issue. Moreover, 
following several discussions with key informants the researcher gained information on 
other entities that in addition to trade associations have a crucial role in acting as 
intermediaries within the business-government interface (Doh and Teegen 2003). These 
entities include amongst others, think tanks, charities, NGOs, as well as ad-hoc 
partnerships, and even though it has been acknowledged that these actors serve as tools 
and platforms for businesses to relate with institutions, there is limited research on trade 
associations’ relationships with these entities (Barley 2010).  
Finally, this research is developed integrating insights from disciplines such as 
management, international business, political science, sociology, political economy and 
business history. In order to comprehensively address this research problem and 
understand the political role that trade associations play within the business-government 
dialogue, one disciplinary lens is not sufficient to single-handedly address the multiple 
issues and facets that characterise these complex organisations. This theoretical and 
disciplinary integration, which has often been overlooked within academia, is both 
necessary and beneficial as it is valuable from preventing conceptual and methodological 
myopia. There are a growing number of scholars in the broader business-government 
relations domain who draw on various theoretical lenses and call for an integration of 
different perspectives (e.g. Barron 2010; Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani 2012; Kingsley, 
                                                 
2 Aerodays2015 was the European flagship event in Aviation research and innovation that took 
place on 20-23 October 2015 in London. There is an Aerodays event during each EU Research 
Framework Programme. The goal is to share achievements of collaborative research and 
innovation in Aeronautics and Air Transport within Europe and in worldwide international co-
operation. The Young Researcher Competition is aimed at students as an excellent experiential 
learning opportunity to share their research with their peers and the aviation community 




Bonardi, and Vanden Bergh 2012; Lawton and Rajwani 2015; Mellahi et al. 2016). Van 
Schendelen (2002) and Vogel (1996) stress the importance of incorporating management 
and political science perspectives while investigating business-government relations. In 
line with this perspective, Barron and Hultén argue that management and political science 
literatures “have considerable potential to learn from each other” (2014: 964). Mellahi et 
al. (2016: 167) state that there has been an “overreliance on single theoretical lenses in 
empirical research”, call for “greater theoretical micro-macro integration”, and argue that 
nonmarket strategy literature has rather underlined the complementarity between 
different lenses rather than the tensions among them. This is echoed by John and Lawton 
(2017: 23) who mention the need to integrate the different domains, i.e. resource and 
capabilities, institution-based view and resource dependency. 
Hence, merely considering the components that constitute the business-government 
equation, it is clear that there are several spheres involved which cannot be fully 
understood and appreciated if analysed exclusively from one perspective, as critical 
features that characterise them would be neglected. It should be acknowledged that an 
external reader could initially consider the adoption of such a diverse range of 
perspectives as superficial, although as justified above and throughout this study, the 
benefits gained from such a theoretical flexibility clearly outweigh possible drawbacks.  
1.3 Research approach 
Business-government relations and corporate political activity are sensitive topics, and as 
Frynas (2006: 326) argues “political behaviours are often covert in nature”. It is thus 
common that organisations’ political activities are frequently not open to investigations 
and rather kept in confidentiality within organisational walls. Moreover, it is extremely 
difficult to retrieve information on political behaviour and activities from secondary 
sources (Hillman and Wan 2005). These features may be valid for any sector but are 
particularly applicable to the aerospace industry (including both civil and military 
sectors), which has historically enjoyed extremely strong links with national governments 
in the UK and across other developed economies.  
To understand the complex dynamics that characterise the interactions between trade 
associations, firms and political actors it was necessary to gain a position, which would 




frequently relied on quantitative methods and broad surveys to explore features linked to 
collective action (e.g. Battisti and Perry 2015; Bombardini and Trebbi 2012; Knoke 1990; 
Spillman 2005), a case study design was considered to be the most appropriate approach 
and was developed utilising qualitative methods. This is coherent with Barnett’s (2013: 
231) call to develop rich insights that are only achievable through the investigation of 
small sample sizes. This choice was further advocated by the exploratory nature of this 
thesis.  
The research methodology embraced in-depth semi-structured interviews, informed by 
secondary data such as company, trade association, consultancy, NGO and institutional 
documentary sources, as well as indirect observations. The openness gained from the 
semi-structured interviews was extremely beneficial as adopting a more structured and 
predetermined approach would have restricted the conversations and prevented the 
surfacing of interesting and counterintuitive insights (Patton 2002). The informants were 
purposively selected from different backgrounds to provide different perspectives on the 
studied phenomena, offering a balanced picture (Partington 2002). These included three 
main categories: senior-level firm and trade association representatives, and industry 
experts. Whilst the first two were selected as directly involved in the development and/or 
execution of trade associations’ political activities, the latter were selected to corroborate 
and triangulate the gained information. Moreover, the informants included in this study, 
pertain to the category of elite interviews, as they mainly occupied senior management 
positions and had significant input in the organisations’ decision-making. This feature 
increased the value and richness of the collected data, which can be considered as a clear 
strength of this research. 
Additionally, during the duration of the PhD the researcher engaged in an immersive 
interaction with industry stakeholders by attending numerous events, workshops, trade 
fairs, which other than being conducive towards developing relations with key actors - 
that in various occasions acted as gatekeepers - also supported a profound comprehension 
of trade associations’ role and their interactions with the political arena. These 
observations can be considered as an additional source of data that complemented the 
interviews and documentary sources. The adoption and triangulation of multiple sources 
of methods, data and information have been necessary to provide a robust methodological 




The data was analysed and interpreted utilising rigorous methods that entailed several 
stages, which assisted a progressive shift from an empirical level to a higher level of 
abstraction (Coffey and Atkinson 1996; Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 2012). Moreover, 
as is common in qualitative research (e.g. Dubois and Gadde 2002) the data collection 
and the data analysis were not considered as stand-alone phases of the research, rather 
they were undertaken through an iterative approach. 
1.4 Originality and contributions to knowledge 
The originality of this study lies in the investigation of a specific form of trade association 
in a unique context such as the UK aerospace industry. The questions raised within this 
thesis are important as they specifically focus on trade associations as organisations in 
their own right (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017), and are worth examining given the 
prominence collective action, particularly through third-party organisations, is gaining 
towards tackling increasingly complex and wide-ranging issues that impact the business 
environment.  
A further element of originality relates to the levels of examination as this research 
explores national as well as regional trade associations. Previous studies on trade 
associations have mostly investigated the national level (e.g. Bell 1995; Dalziel 2006; 
Reveley and Ville 2010; Wilts and Quittkat 2004) and the supranational level (e.g. Beyers 
2004; Greenwood 2002), and apart from notable exceptions (e.g. Coleman and Grant 
1985; Dixon 2006; Valler and Wood 2004) there is a lack of enquiries on trade 
associations on different levels of analysis, which has included multi-level consideration 
of trade associations. Moreover, the majority of these studies focus on national trade 
associations or cross-industry organisations and their sub-national divisions, as opposed 
to sectorial trade associations that exclusively operate on the local/regional level.  
Finally, another element of originality concerns the unique period in which this research 
took place. This study is undertaken between the lead-up to the United Kingdom 
European Union membership referendum in 2016 and the first stages of the negotiations 
following the decision to leave, a turbulent period characterised by strong political and 
economic uncertainty. The particular timeframe of this research is important for two main 
reasons. On one side, governments are usually dependent on business actors when 




Brexit this is even more relevant and visible given the need for policymakers to consult 
industry actors in order to acquire complex information and industry-specific expertise. 
On the other side, the potential implications of such a significant event on the business 
environment, has further driven business actors to interact with policymakers, represent 
their interests and attempt to influence the policymaking process. Hence, it is reasonable 
to argue that this event has intensified the business-government interactions and 
benefitted the examination of trade associations’ political activities. Together, these 
notions are extremely valuable towards developing an understanding and policy-relevant 
knowledge on how developing frameworks may influence future interactions between 
business and government.  
The findings of this study are important as they further our understanding on the role of 
key business actors and their interactions with policymakers and regulators during periods 
of structural changes and political and economic uncertainty. The insights developed 
from this research are extremely valuable towards informing both managers and 
policymakers on how to deal with such situations. Moreover, even though it can be argued 
that the findings may be applicable to other settings, it is important to note that, as is 
common in qualitative studies (Blaikie 2009; Sarantakos 2009), generalizability to other 
contexts is rather restricted. 
The essential contribution of this research lies thus in the in-depth and empirical 
exploration of trade associations’ role and political strategy determinants and activities 
undertaken towards influencing the political and regulatory environment in a specific 
context. The contributions to knowledge of this study are set in the business-government 
relations field and specifically in the nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity 
arenas. Overall, this thesis argues that trade associations’ political involvement and 
political activity development cannot be comprehensively understood with the adoption 
of single theoretical lenses. The complexity of these organisations and the structure and 
dynamic nature of their environment must be both taken into consideration. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis  
The thesis is structured in seven chapters, and following this introductory chapter, the rest 




Chapter 2: Reviewing the literature on corporate political activity and trade associations, 
discusses the literature fields of nonmarket strategy, and corporate political activity, as 
well as literature on collective action and trade associations. The critique of existing 
literature is helpful towards providing a conceptual background of the CPA field. The 
chapter underlines the gaps in the literature and proposes three research questions. 
Chapter 3: Research setting – An overview of the UK aerospace economic and political 
environment, describes the UK economic and political context as well as the UK 
aerospace industry. The chapter briefly portrays the development of trade associations in 
the UK and maps the national and regional trade associations currently active in the 
aerospace industry. Finally, it provides the rationale for choosing this particular context 
for the purposes of this research.  
Chapter 4: Research approach, describes the research design and methods developed to 
tackle the research problem and the research questions. Moreover, it provides a detailed 
explanation of what data was collected, as well as when and how it was collected. It 
concludes by underlining how the data was analysed, and proposes the data structure, 
which forms the foundations of the findings chapter. 
Chapter 5: Findings, presents and discusses the analysis and findings based on the data 
structure, which involves two main overarching aggregate dimensions. Therefore, the 
chapter is divided in two sections: the first section highlights trade associations’ 
embeddedness in the institutional environment, whereas the second presents the findings 
related to trade associations’ efforts to influence the policy-making process. 
Chapter 6: Discussion, extends the narrative of the findings and discusses how the 
empirical findings relate to extant literature on corporate political activity and nonmarket 
strategy. The chapter is structured according to the three research questions. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion, concludes the thesis by highlighting the contributions to 
knowledge as well as the implications of this study for trade association and firm 
managers, and for policymakers and politicians involved in the interactions with the 
business community. Finally, it highlights the limitations of this research and proposes a 




Chapter 2  Reviewing the literature on corporate political 
activity and trade associations  
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter is divided in three main sections. First, section 2.2 reviews the 
extant literature on corporate political activity in order to create a solid theoretical and 
conceptual foundation to this thesis. The notions of business-government relations, 
nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity are described, including the theoretical 
and historical development of this particular field of study. Second, section 2.3 extends 
the notions of corporate political activities to trade associations, as these are one of the 
main organisations through which firms undertake collective corporate political 
activities. Hence, the section begins by considering the reasons behind firms’ choices to 
engage in the nonmarket context through individual and collective political activities. 
Whilst keeping in mind that literature on collective action is exceedingly extensive to be 
covered within this manuscript and that the unit of analysis are trade associations as 
organisations in their own right, it is nevertheless necessary to understand the core reasons 
that drive firms to work in co-operation with other organisations, and eventually become 
members of trade associations. Subsequently, the key intermediary organisations that 
pervade the social, political, and regulatory arenas will be contemplated, as well as trade 
associations’ main characteristics, their roles in the business-government relations 
discourse, and their political activities. Finally, the chapter ends with section 2.4, which 
highlights the research gaps and provides the research questions that will be answered 
within this thesis. Hence, the literature review is developed in a ‘funnel shape’ as it begins 
broadly when considering political activities and nonmarket strategy generally, and ends 
by narrowing these concepts down to a specific organisation, i.e. trade associations.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and as will be reiterated in the following chapters, this study 
draws on insights stemming from different disciplines and theoretical frameworks that 
have been used to analyse political activities and trade associations. Whilst this openness 
is advantageous for the researcher as it promotes a richer understanding of distinctive 
nuances and perspectives, it is nonetheless key to include and critique the literature that 
is directly pertinent to the study’s scope.  Hence, the review of extant literature is 




in the fields of CPA and NMS, as well as in research on trade associations. These papers 
were identified thanks to the researcher’s prior knowledge of corporate political activity, 
through an extensive search, as well as through in-depth discussions with leading scholars 
in these research fields (which continued during the entire research). Secondly, the 
bibliography of these papers was intensively analysed and new papers were found. This 
manual search led to the inclusion of a wider range of scholarly work in the literature 
review. As the objective of this literature review is to combine different discussions, i.e. 
on organisations’ political activities and on the role and specificities of trade associations, 
the researcher searched for work in a wide range of scientific journals covering disciplines 
such as management, international business, public affairs, political geography, sociology 
and business history. Thirdly, given the limitations of this search approach, namely that 
some studies might have been missed, the researcher identified a list of key words. These 
key words were used in management databases such as Business Source Complete 
(EBSCO) and ABI/INFORM Complete (ProQuest), available from Locate; Coventry 
University’s library online search tool.  
This process, which was undertaken iteratively and throughout the PhD as new work was 
added to the literature review, generated a comprehensive list of papers, both published 
and unpublished (e.g. forthcoming papers) in peer-reviewed journals, as well as books 
and conference proceedings. Nevertheless, only studies that were directly relevant, 
instructive towards understanding the specific field of enquiry, and which offered a 
recognised contribution were included in the literature review. Other work, which was 
nonetheless helpful for the researcher to gain a broad understanding was not included in 
this thesis.  
2.2 Outline of corporate political activity 
To fully comprehend the features that characterise the dynamic interactions between 
private and public actors, it is key to acknowledge the notions, concepts and theoretical 
lenses that have been used to investigate corporate political activity as this field highlights 
organisations’ actions, procedures and behaviour in the interaction with the political, legal 
and regulatory environment. These notions emphasise organisations’ participation in the 
political, legislative, normative and regulative processes. Corporate political activities 




several scholars (e.g. Baron 2016; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999; Hillman and 
Wan 2005; Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2008; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002) they 
can have significant effects on a company’s value, market and economic performance. In 
sharp contrast, other academics have expressed the view that political activities could 
have detrimental (Puck, Rogers, and Mohr 2013) and negative consequences on public 
policy outcomes and firm performance (e.g. Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, and Snyder 
2003; Hadani and Schuler 2013; Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan 2016; Hersch, Netter, and 
Pope 2008). Rajwani and Liedong (2015) argue that diverse perspectives on the outcomes 
of corporate political activities can be partly explained by the different environments in 
which these activities are implemented. They point out that the external environment has 
a key role on firms’ choice and approach to political action, as well as on the outcome.  
Companies operating within a broad variety of different industries and sectors - including 
energy, defence, aerospace, telecommunications, pharmaceutical, financial and extractive 
- incorporate political activities in the design and development of their overall strategy 
and intervene in the political and regulatory arenas for a variety of reasons (Lawton, 
McGuire, and Rajwani 2013). The reaction to institutional pressure, the necessity to 
reduce general environmental or political uncertainty, which can lead to an increase in 
transaction costs, are amongst the main drivers that affect the implementation of such 
activities (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman 1999). Moreover, the influence that policy 
and regulations have on firms, as well as their willingness to change the rules of 
competition, are additional reasons that may drive firms towards an involvement in public 
procedures (e.g. Keim and Baysinger 1988; Mahon and McGowan 1998).  
Notwithstanding that any firm can undertake political activities, the costs of entering and 
operating in the social and political arena are substantial and not all firms have the 
appropriate resources or are necessarily aware of the importance of nonmarket action. 
Companies that operate in heavily regulated industries, have strong institutional links and 
are highly dependent on government - i.e. in terms of contracts and sales - will probably 
have a strong tendency to undertake political action and participate in the policy process 
(Hillman and Hitt 1999; Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen 1997). Stressing this point, 
Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim state “firms are most likely to engage in political activity 
when government significantly affects their business” (2005: 397). Schuler’s (1996) 




demonstrates how great levels of institutional interdependence affect companies 
operating in this particular sector. The European airline industry is another ideal example 
as it features high levels of regulation and institutional control and exhibits a strong 
private involvement in the political arena (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013). 
Similarly, the historical background of the global aerospace industry, and the particular 
development of key firms, provides a clear illustration for this argumentation3.  
Furthermore, firms will undertake political action to moderate political and 
environmental risk (Frynas and Mellahi 2003; Keillor, Wilkinson, and Owens 2005), and 
though this could occur within any institutional context it is mostly common in 
developing countries 4  (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 2005). Scholars (e.g. Henisz and 
Zelner 2010; Puck, Rogers, and Mohr 2013) agree that business operations in emerging 
markets present an augmented level of risk and propose that firms should acknowledge 
the nonmarket arena and develop appropriate political strategies. Despite these 
distinctions, Schuler (1996) argues that a firm’s competitive advantage could be 
adversely affected if it does not consider the importance of political resources and the 
political environment.  
It is important to highlight that in many industries the successful engagement with 
decision-makers is as necessary as success in the business environment, to the extent that 
relations with public institutions can substantially alter firm benefits and economic 
profits. Thus, having access to the political arena enables companies to “increase overall 
market size, gain an advantage related to industry competition, and increase their 
bargaining power relative to suppliers and customers” (Hillman and Hitt 1999: 826-827). 
Through political activities firms have the ability to unlock market opportunities, enter 
new markets as well as provide benefits to the entire industry (Baron 1999). Finally, the 
employment of political activities and the effective design of a structured political 
strategy could be the only method to preserve and obtain connections with key 
stakeholders that do not necessarily operate within industry boundaries (Baron 1999). 
                                                 
3 Airbus and Boeing are two key examples that demonstrate how strong interdependencies with public 
institutions have assisted their development leading to the duopoly that can be seen nowadays. 
4 Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha (2005: 4) describe that emerging and developing countries are characterised 
by institutional voids, which can be defined as environments in which there is an “absence of specialized 




2.2.1 Defining corporate political activity 
The literature provides various definitions of corporate political activity, which can vary 
from being very broad and general to narrow and specific. Epstein’s influential work 
(1969:142) argues that “political competition follows in the wake of economic 
competition”, indicating that firms could benefit from interactions with entities and 
structures not strictly related with business-market operations, such as political 
institutions. Earlier studies analysed the impact of policy outcomes on the business 
environment, focusing on the relations between business and public policy, portraying 
firms as merely reactive (Oliver 1991). In sharp contrast, research addressing a 
management perspective, directed the emphasis towards the firm, acknowledging its role 
as a primary and proactive stakeholder in the political environment, thus contributing to 
the definition of public policy (Preston 1986). The shift towards firm-specific matters has 
provoked a growth in the analysis and research of scholars towards firms’ political 
strategies and actions (e.g. Getz 1997; Shaffer 1995). The investigations on corporate 
political activity have been prompted to better understand how organisations compete and 
perform in the political arena (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004).  
A common and widespread definition defines corporate political activity as corporate 
attempts to shape government policy in ways favourable to the firm (Baysinger 1984; 
Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004). In addition, Baysinger claims that “the ultimate 
objective of business political activities is to influence electoral, legislative, regulatory 
processes so that the outcomes of these processes better reflect the internal goals of the 
organisation” (1984: 249). Shaffer (1995) concentrates on firm responses to government 
regulation and how public policies influence a firm’s competitive environment. Here, 
responses are not considered as mere reactive behaviour towards government 
intervention, but also as active and proactive efforts in influencing the decision-making 
process. Lawrence (1999: 186) argues that political activities are institutional strategies 
that organisations can use to realize competitive advantages and shape rules to their own 
benefit. Similarly, Baron broadens the view and aligns political activities to political 
strategy, defining the latter as “a concerted pattern of actions taken in the nonmarket 
environment to create value by improving its overall performance” (1995: 47). The 
concept of nonmarket environment is significant in Baron’s work as he underlines that 




is composed of two distinct segments: the market and the nonmarket environment (Figure 
1). The first is generally characterised by relations amongst firms, suppliers and 
customers which include economic transaction, whereas the second relates to interactions 
between companies and nonmarket actors such as governments and public institutions 
(Baron 1997: 291). 
Figure 1: A depiction of the market and nonmarket environments 
Source: Liedong et al. (2015) 
 
A crucial insight in Baron’s work is that firms can pursue competitive advantage through 
political actions, even if ultimately the alignment of both strategies is necessary (Baron 
1997). One of the critical differences between market and nonmarket strategies is that 
whilst in the first collective action in collusive terms is not admitted, in the latter it is a 
common form of participation (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994) and permitted by the law 
(Baron 1995). De Figueiredo (2009: 1) argues that corporate political strategy is “a natural 
extension of the traditional tools of strategic management” and that it “addresses how a 
firm interacts with political institutions to change the competitive landscape and obtain 
competitive advantage”. Additionally, Baron (1999), Marsh (1998) and Schuler (1996) 
state that some of the nonmarket actions can have positive effects for other companies; to 
the extent they can provide the entire industry with benefits (Liedong et al. 2015: 417). 
Moreover, Lawton and Rajwani (2012) stress that effective implementation of nonmarket 
strategies can lead companies to competitive advantage. However, if not dealt with 
appropriately, they can occasionally lead to counterproductive effects. 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged 




A curious yet key feature in Baron’s (1999) work, which is morally5 aligned with the 
concept of a general distribution of benefits, is mentioning that nonmarket strategies 
should be characterised by a responsible involvement in the public process. It is important 
to recognise this aspect as it provides the sensitivity and awareness that managers and 
companies may not simply be motivated by concerns of competitive advantage but also 
by personal views and gains of business leaders. These notions are in line with Mantere, 
Pajunen, and Lamberg (2009) who contend that the ethical dimension should not be 
excluded in the examination of political activities. This perspective is key when the 
consequences towards the overall external setting are considered as a firm’s political 
behaviour could be oriented towards a sole individualistic outcome, i.e. profit 
maximisation, harming the entire social and business environment. Martinez and Kang 
(2014) provide an insightful description of how the integration of market and nonmarket 
strategies is fundamental for firms’ management of the external environment. It must be 
highlighted that political activities are only one type of strategy that firms, and other 
business organisations can undertake in the nonmarket environment, as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) is another approach that entails interactions with social, political and 
economic actors (e.g. Den Hond et al. 2014; Matten and Moon 2008; Scherer and Palazzo 
2011).  
Getz (1997: 32-33) deliberately narrows the definition, isolating actions from strategies 
and defines corporate political activities as “any deliberate firm action intended to 
influence governmental policy or process”. Getz’s definition diverges from other scholars 
(e.g. Shaffer 1995) as it explicitly states that political actions are not to be considered as 
responses to government action, rather as a specific political behaviour. Getz (1997) 
presents an additional distinction emphasising how political strategy and political action 
do not correspond, as the latter could be advanced without an attentive consideration of 
the global business strategy. Moreover, a firm’s political strategy implementation 
requires the inclusion of its resources, and Mahon (1989: 51-52) describes it as “the 
organisation’s resources to integrate objectives and to undertake coherent actions directed 
                                                 
5 Building on disciplines including sociology and psychoanalysis, Mantere, Pajunen, and Lamberg (2009) 
underline the importance of concepts such as political virtues and ethics whilst considering political 




toward the political, social, and legal environment in order to secure either permanent or 
temporary advantage and influence over other actors in the process”.  
In evident contrast with Mitnick (1993) who does not include any mutual benefit in the 
business-government relationship, but rather underlines how political behaviour is 
deliberately directed towards private ends, Useem (1984) argues that the relation is 
characterised by a bi-directional process. This two-way relationship indicates that on one 
side, businesses try and influence public decisions, and on the other side institutional 
actors have the capability to alter the business environment. 
Reviewing the literature on corporate political activity is challenging due to the different 
theoretical lenses and different levels of analysis. Nonetheless, Shaffer (1995), Getz 
(1997; 2001), Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004), Skippari et al. (2005), and Lawton, 
McGuire, and Rajwani (2013) have skilfully managed to critically review extant literature 
in order to generate clearer understanding around the topic. Their work has offered 
scholars and practitioners an integrated framework of the widespread concepts 
surrounding the areas of nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity. Hillman, 
Keim, and Schuler (2004) categorise previous work by firstly, concentrating on the 
antecedents, secondly, highlighting the different activities, and thirdly, describing the 
possible results and outcomes in implementing these activities. Lawton, McGuire, and 
Rajwani (2013) succeeded in classifying the broad range of literature in three major 
perspectives: first, resources and capabilities; second, institutions and political 
environment; third, they concentrate their attention on understanding how firms’ 
involvement in the political arena can translate in performance outcomes, such as policy 
change and financial profits. Rajwani and Liedong (2015) further attempt to review the 
most important literature on political activities, focusing on the impact on firm value in 
different international environments. 
2.2.2 Processes and concepts 
The antecedents of corporate political activity have gained profound relevance amongst 
academic literature and can be considered as a natural starting point in the consideration 
of this field of study. Several approaches have been used in the examination of internal 
and external factors that influence corporate political activities. For instance, Boddewyn 




by firm, industry and environmental factors” (1994: 121). Whereas Getz (1997: 60), 
underlines five levels: firm, industry, environmental, issue and relational. Hillman, Keim, 
and Schuler (2004) have categorised the conditioning factors in four levels: firm, industry, 
issue and institutional. The first level considers structural, organisational or operational 
firm characteristics that are crucial in managing the political environment. Two key 
assumptions for this level are that firstly, there is a deliberate organisational strategic 
decision to undertake political activities directed towards achieving benefits for the firm. 
Secondly, that the decision is based on specific resources (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 
2004).  
Examining the firm level, strategic management scholars (e.g. Barney, Wright, and 
Ketchen 2001; Wernerfelt 1984) claim that internal features have a key role on a 
company’s political success. This view can be associated to the resource-based view 
(RBV), which has gained ample resonance within the analysis of firms’ political activities 
(e.g. McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory 2002). The resources that should be considered 
comprise firm size, firm dependency on government, firm slack, diversification level, and 
ownership (e.g. Hadani 2012; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004). Firm size is a critical 
feature as it has a considerable impact on the design and execution of political activities 
(Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Rehbein and Schuler 1999). Large firms will have greater 
tangible and intangible resources6 at their disposal and may be able to act independently 
(Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani 2014). Furthermore, large firms have sophisticated public 
policy necessities and will be more inclined to act politically as changes in policy or 
regulations will have strong consequences on them (e.g. Epstein 1969; Schuler, Rehbein, 
and Cramer 2002). Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman (2006) underline how firm specific 
political resources are critical in achieving first mover advantages. On the other side of 
the relationship, governments and institutions, will value large firms’ participation: 
firstly, because of their significance and weight in relation to issues pertinent to the whole 
country, including the strategic importance to national economy (e.g. number of 
employees) and to national security (e.g. firms which produce security and defence 
related products). Secondly, because large firms have the financial resources (e.g. in terms 
                                                 
6 Barney, Wright, and Ketchen (2001) describe tangible resources as physical and organisational (e.g. 





of subsidising parties and politicians, creating specific offices and departments that relate 
with institutions) or technical information, that are fundamental for the policy-making 
process. In terms of the latter, business can help governments to avoid drafting ineffective 
or detrimental policies (Grant 2000). 
Dependency on government is another prominent driver that strongly defines a firm’s 
political behaviour and strategy (e.g. Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Hadani 2012; Hillman 
and Hitt 1999; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002). It is a particularly relevant factor in 
the aerospace industry, as this sector has historically been distinguished by a close 
connection between companies and national governments, particularly in terms of 
regulations. Similarly, government sales, intended as the share of profits that firms derive 
from selling their products and services to public institutions (e.g. government 
procurement) can have important effects in terms of political action. This feature could 
lead the firm to a concrete dependency towards governments, which will need to be 
managed with the implementation of effective political activities (e.g. Burt, Mackay, and 
Perchard 2013; Hart 2001; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011). The notion of path-dependence 
stresses the negative relation with institutional actors, which could lead the firm into 
obligations and detrimental outcomes (Barnes, Gartland, and Stack 2004). Furthermore, 
scholars (e.g. Schuler 1999) have argued that the level of exports is another key 
determinant in firm’s choice to operate in the political environment. Again, this 
characteristic is extremely relevant to the UK aerospace industry given the high level of 
industry exports (Rhodes 2017).   
In terms of the industry level, extant literature underlines how industry factors have an 
impact on the development of corporate political activities. Stemming from Porter’s 
(1991) analysis on how performance and competitive advantage is given by industry 
competitiveness, scholars (e.g. Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Getz 1997; Hillman and 
Keim 1995; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002) have underlined how industry features 
such as size, profitability, concentration, structure and level of regulation affect firms’ 
political behaviour, activities and strategy. With regards, to nonmarket strategies Bonardi 
et al. (2006) underline how the attractiveness of a particular market will have an effect on 
the political activities of firms, thus on their performance. In terms of industry 
concentration, there are contrasting views in relation to the benefits and firms’ level of 




companies operating in concentrated industries will be inclined to participate in the public 
policy process as well as combine different tactics to influence it. The opposite view 
suggests that several existing studies fail to present a well-defined methodological 
approach (Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991), accurate measurement and consistent 
results (Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope 2005).  
As previously mentioned, sectors and industries that are strategically relevant and feature 
high levels of institutional intervention will be characterised by companies with strong 
involvement in the political and nonmarket arena, as demonstrated by in-depth 
investigations of the British aluminium industry (Perchard 2012), the U.S. high-tech and 
communications industry (Hart 2007), as well as the U.S. steel industry (Schuler 1996). 
Likewise, the aerospace industry features significant levels of business-government 
interaction and is considered as an economic and military strategic industry (Hartley 
2014). These notions will be covered in more detail in Chapter 3. Moreover, examples of 
institutional involvement include strategic support of ‘national champions’, 
overprotection of the industry from foreign competition and ad-hoc regional and national 
policies. The interrelation between private and public spheres in the aerospace industry 
has culminated in international governmental disputes, such as the Airbus and Boeing 
WTO case7. 
Furthermore, diverse scholarly work focuses on issue factors as determinants of corporate 
political activities. Vogel (1996) brings forward the notion that the salience of a specific 
matter will be a principal factor to condition the involvement in the nonmarket arena. A 
noteworthy analogy can be made with the notion of political salience8 examined by 
scholars such as Bonardi and Keim (2005), Culpepper (2011), and Schuler and Rehbein 
(1997). This concept posits that firms’ political behaviour is highly influenced by external 
pressure stemming from public policies; the more companies are affected by a particular 
policy the more they will be inclined to develop political activities.  
                                                 
7 Boeing and Airbus, started a legal contention in 2004 within the World Trade Organisation, concerning 
financial support they were receiving from their respective governments. Both companies accused each 
other of altering competition (Newhouse 2008). 
8 Culpepper (2011) introduces the concept of ‘quiet politics’, in which he underlines that managers are able 




Lastly, the fourth level appertains to the institutional features that influence political 
activity formulation. These features are extremely relevant, as they constitute the context 
in which companies operate, as well as define firms’ political opportunities, for example, 
nations with weak institutions will enable firms to operate more easily within the political 
arena (North 1990). In the field of strategic management, Peng (2002) has been a strong 
promoter in acknowledging the importance of institutions in order to understand firms’ 
means towards competitive advantage. Peng et al. (2009) define this perspective as the 
third pillar of the strategy tripod. This view is necessary to grasp how diverse 
environments and their features can influence a firm’s nonmarket behaviour and strategy 
formulation. It has been highlighted that firms adopt different political activities 
according to the different environments in which they operate (e.g. Wright et al. 2005). 
This is a critical aspect, and Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani (2012) point out that frequently, 
companies fail to acknowledge the prominence of institutions and how to interact with 
them appropriately, leading to the formulation of ineffective strategies. General Electric’s 
failed acquisition of Honeywell International in 2001 (European Commission 
2004/134/EC) and British Airways’ lost alliance with American Airlines in the late 90’s 
(Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani 2012: 27; Kyrou 2000) are perfect examples of failures to 
consider the different institutional levels and peculiar features characterizing them9. 
2.2.3 Approaches to political action  
The strategic behaviour and political actions through which firms can relate with 
policymakers have been analysed and categorised by several scholars. Weidenbaum 
(1980) considers three main approaches to the political arena, which differ in terms of the 
firm being active or reactive to public policy: passive reaction, positive anticipation and 
proactive public policy shaping. The first, as the name emphasises, is characterised by a 
strong passive conduct to changes in public policy. In this case, firms tend to wait for 
variations in policy that affect them and if necessary modify their operations. Boddewyn 
and Brewer (1994) refer to strategies that entail compliance or circumvention. The second 
features a higher involvement, as the firm will actively monitor the political environment 
                                                 
9 Kyrou (2000) describes in great detail how Bob Ayling former CEO of British Airways who resigned in 
2000, following a dispute regarding the acquisition of take-off and landing slots at Heathrow Airport, didn’t 
acknowledge the EU’s institutional level. Hence, the manager failed to interact and relate appropriately 




so that it is able to foresee change and adapt its operations and strategy. Keim and Hillman 
argue that following this approach firms attempt to direct regulation towards a business 
opportunity (2008: 51). The latter implies the greatest level of participation, as the firm 
will proactively endeavour to influence the public policy process. Moreover, Keim and 
Hillman (2008) contend that firms undertaking the first two approaches and not 
participating directly will concede other firms more liberty in conveying their own 
interests. Similarly, Baysinger (1984) lists quasi identical approaches of how firms can 
be politically active: the first is domain management where a company pursues private 
interests; the second is domain defence where it tries to handle public policy; and the third 
is domain maintenance where it tries to proactively influence public policy. Oliver and 
Holzinger (2008) enlarge the array of different approaches towards the political 
environment as they present four strategies: proactive, defensive, anticipatory and 
reactive. However, in contrast with Keim and Hillman (2008) their theoretical perspective 
concentrates on the effective management as opposed to any general approach that a firm 
could undertake. 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) influential paper concentrates exclusively on how firms 
proactively engage in political behaviour, implying that they have deliberately chosen to 
undertake political activities instead of solely reacting to public interference. The authors 
propose a decision tree model of political strategy formulation and suggest that firms 
undertake two main decisions before they choose the specific strategy, which are 
influenced by internal and external variables. Firstly, the approach to political strategy, 
which can be divided in two tactics: transactional, when firms interact with policy makers 
on matters that specifically affect them, and relational, when businesses continuously 
undertake political activities and build relationships with institutions that span over 
different issues and an indefinite period of time. This will eventually become useful when 
a particular topic arises. The latter is particularly relevant as it implies that the firm is 
aware of the importance of the nonmarket arena and incorporates the political activities 
in its overall strategy. Moreover, firms that engage in durable relationships with 
institutions cultivate and develop political or relational capital (e.g. Hadani and Schuler 
2013; Shaffer and Hillman 2000). Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani (2012: 32) provide a 
definition of nonmarket capital as, “the ability of firms to influence political and social 




is clearly influenced by the type of institution that firms are relating with; for example, 
the interaction with elected institutions will have to be different than the interaction with 
regulatory agencies as the latter are not bound by elections and temporality but develop 
policy on a continuous basis (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2008).  
Secondly, the participation level, which underlines that firms are confronted with the 
choice of an individual versus a collective approach to corporate political action. Hillman 
and Hitt (1999: 831) highlight how this option can be associated to the competitive and 
cooperative strategies within the market strategy research. There are several approaches 
to collective action and the most common are through membership of trade associations 
and industry groups (e.g. Barnett 2006a; Bouwen 2002; Dür and Mateo 2012; Jacomet 
2005). The aerospace industry is particularly relevant in this sense as consortiums and 
collective action are common in the economic marketplace as well as in the political one. 
Collective action is particularly beneficial as it enables the development of economies of 
scale in political action: firms do not have to constantly monitor and relate with 
policymakers individually. There are several factors that influence this choice and 
anticipated benefits and firm specific resources can be considered as key features, as 
individual action is extremely onerous, and most firms will not have the ability to act 
individually (Cook and Fox 2000). The projected outcome in terms of private or collective 
benefits will influence the approach (Keim and Zeithaml 1986). De Figueiredo and Tiller 
(2001) argue that large companies are inclined to undertake individual activities to 
prevent other companies accessing private information. Due to their size, large companies 
can profit from higher proportions of the political benefits even if these are allocated 
across the entire industry. Barron’s (2011a) conceptual paper builds a bridge between 
cultural dimensions and corporate political activity and argues that the participation level 
is influenced by a culture’s individualistic or collectivistic nature. 
The vast literature on corporate political activities has underlined an extensive array of 
actions that can be implemented in the nonmarket domain including; lobbying, 
constituency building, financial contributions, coalition building, advocacy advertising, 
executive testimony (e.g. Baron 1999; Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim 2005; Getz 1997; 
Hillman and Keim 1995; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004; Keim 
and Zeithaml 1986; Lord 2000). Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) seminal work defines three 




comparison, Keim and Zeithaml (1986) propose the following: constituency building, 
coalition building, advocacy, campaign contributions and lobbying. Hillman, Zardkoohi, 
and Bierman (1999: 69) state “all these strategies are designed to help the given firm 
achieve access to key influentials and/or to directly influence policy outcomes”. Building 
on this view, Schuler, Rehbein, Cramer (2002) argue that to effectively participate in 
nonmarket action a combination of diverse activities will be implemented.  
Table 1: Corporate political activity strategies 
Source: Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
2.2.4 Historical development 
The development of the interactions between business and institutional actors can be 
associated to the development of capitalism and of corporations, in the sense that the 
growth and the increasing power and influence of private companies is aligning them to 
the same level as political and social institutions. Vogel describes this as the establishment 
of “non-governmental institutions” (1996: 147) that have become fundamental in 
managing critical and broad issues. Nevertheless, Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani (2014) 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 




highlight that prior to the development of modern capitalism in Europe, the interests of 
private and public entities were closely linked.  
During the 1960s, organisations acknowledged the growing role of public policy and its 
influence on operations and structure - which consequently - shaped their corporate 
behaviour (Gale and Buchholz 1987). However, it must be acknowledged that the entire 
twentieth century has been characterised by greater institutional influence in 
organisations’ environment (Hart 2007). Consequently, business actors recognised how 
the organisation of the economy, hence the competitive environment could be altered by 
government’s intervention, leading to uncertainty and loss of control over strategic 
resources (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004). Similarly, local and national macro-
economic policies, industrial strategies, and other institutional initiatives could have 
enormous effects on firms’ competitive advantage and profitability (e.g. Kim 2008; 
MacAvoy 1992; Murtha and Lenway 1994; Van Schendelen and Jackson 1987). 
Furthermore, companies acknowledged that public policy, legislation and regulations 
could alter the size and structure of markets, as well as change the cost structure of the 
industry and affect the demand for products and services (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Mahon 
and Murray 1981). For example, during the 1980s, the emphasis of pursuing liberalisation 
in the European air transport industry had been to alter the structure of the market in terms 
of regulations and general organisation (Holmes and McGowan 1997).  
Subsequently, the 1980s saw a rise in corporate political activities in a variety of different 
industries (e.g. Gale and Buchholz 1987; Keim and Baysinger 1988; Mahon 1989). This 
feature can be associated with the intervention of public influence in the business domain 
that evolved in an increase of regulations that highly affected firms’ activities and 
structure (Keillor, Wilkinson, and Owens 2005), as well as economic and financial 
outcomes (e.g. Lenway and Rehbein 1991; Weidenbaum 1980). Several episodes and 
events saw an increase in government influence, however one of the most important is 
the global financial crisis that started in 2007, which has had overwhelming effects on 
numerous national economies, has forced governments and supranational institutions to 
undertake actions that have influenced the business environment and economic affairs 
(e.g. Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 2012). This has led to an increase in the importance of 




argue that, in the US, there has been a rise in firms’ political activities since 2008, because 
of the increased economic involvement of federal and state institutions. 
Moreover, the development of newly formed national, international and supranational 
political and regulatory institutions is generating new environments in which firms can 
undertake nonmarket action (Keillor, Wilkinson, and Owens 2005; Lawton, McGuire, 
and Rajwani 2013). The formation of the European single market as well as the formation 
and development of the European Institutions has fostered these interactions (e.g. Coen 
1997; Richardson 2000; Wilts and Quittkat 2004). Following the upsurge of such 
institutions, Woll (2007) stresses that firms’ political activities are increasingly directed 
towards supranational institutions such as the WTO, leading to an involvement and 
interaction on different levels. Lawton and McGuire (2005) underline how rulings 
stemming from the WTO, affected the strategic choices of European companies in the 
textile and chemical industries. Thus, an in-depth examination of the dynamics that 
govern the relationship between the public and private sectors must entail different 
analytical levels as well as an international perspective (Blumentritt 2003; Mantere, 
Pajunen, and Lamberg 2009).  
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a considerable growth in the literature on this particular 
field of enquiry (Griffin et al. 2001) as well as a shift in the examination of corporate 
political activities (Getz 2001). Previous academics, especially in the management 
domain such as Epstein (1969) had concentrated in describing the phenomenon without 
developing theoretical concepts, whereas these two decades were characterised by the 
endeavours to analyse these activities through the lenses of social science theories. 
Subsequently at the turn of the century, researchers analysed areas which had not been 
examined in great detail in previous literature, such as the activities of small companies 
(e.g. Bengtson, Pahlberg, and Pourmand 2009; Cook and Barry 1993; 1995; Cook and 
Fox 2000; Hadjikhani, Pourmand, and Thilenius 2009) or institutional contexts such as 
the European Union (e.g. Barron and Hultén 2011; Beyers 2004; Bouwen 2002; 
Broscheid and Coen 2003; Coen 1997; 2007; Greenwood 2002). 
According to Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) and Vogel (1996), research 
and synthesis on firms’ participation in the political process has evidently increased, 




such as: the increase in the power of businesses as well as their public accountability, the 
intensified institutional interference in several aspects of the market environment and the 
larger accessibility of data on corporate political activities (Vogel 1996). Globalisation 
and MNEs’ internationalisation processes are additional sources regarding the growing 
attention to research this particular area (e.g. Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman 2006). 
A further reason for the expansion of research in this particular period has been the 
development of departments within organisations that dealt with the external regulatory 
and socio-political environment. Griffin et al.’s (2001) work focuses on the role of public 
affairs 10  and underlines the different contexts that public affairs relate to such as 
government, associations and the wider society including the public opinion. Moreover, 
their bibliographic review draws further attention to how the literature on this area 
developed, beginning from the 1960s and 1970s to an extensive amount of work which 
attempted to develop theoretical frameworks leading up to the turn of the century.  
Globalisation is playing a key role in the development of corporate political activities 
(Windsor 2007), as firms become increasingly politically active outside their domestic 
political settings (Barron 2011b). The growth of multinational companies and the 
expansion of activities into new business markets have forced them to interact with 
different social and political environments, which has led to the development of 
completely new dynamics in the government-business relations’ dichotomy. Keillor and 
Hult (2004) argue that international firms and their operations are subject to high levels 
of intervention from nonmarket actors. Consequently, they highlight how firm 
characteristics and market conditions influence the ability to undertake political activities.  
The European continent has seen an increase in the number of multinational companies 
originating from different parts of the world. The increase in foreign direct investments 
and choosing Europe as a major hub for their subsidiaries and their operations is leading 
companies to understand the diverse processes that characterise policy, decision making 
(McGuire, Lindeque, and Suder 2012) and how to relate with institutions (Hamada 2007).  
                                                 
10 Griffin et al. (2001: 11) indicate that there are several terms that can be juxtaposed to the area of business-
government relations and include: corporate affairs, public affairs, external affairs, external relations, 
government relations and public relations. This elucidation is necessary as different disciplines and strands 




Although this research concentrates on the UK context it is necessary to mention that 
there is a vast number of researchers (e.g. Khanna and Palepu 2000; Khanna, Palepu, and 
Sinha 2005; Henisz and Zelner 2010) that have focused on emerging markets. Emerging 
markets are a significant context to analyse since public-policy decisions are 
characterised by very volatile and subjective features (Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani 2014). 
Moreover, these environments are particularly important when considering firms political 
strategies, because even though they may present significant risks they offer several 
opportunities in terms of economic performance and political freedom (Henisz and Zelner 
2010; Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 2005).  
2.2.5 Theoretical foundations 
Corporate political activity is characterised by an interdisciplinary nature and is hence 
present in various research fields (e.g. Frynas, Child, and Tarba 2017; Hillman, Keim, 
and Schuler 2004). Its notions have informed diverse streams of scholarly and managerial 
literature and are examined in diverse academic fields of study such as international 
business, business history, economics, political science, sociology and strategic 
management (e.g. Barley 2007; Coen, Grant, and Wilson 2010; Decker 2011; Eising 
2007; Gourvish 2003; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1991; Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 
2004; Masters and Keim 1985). Consequently, academics have examined corporate 
political activities through the theoretical lenses of their own disciplines. Within the 
economics domain, academics such as Salamon and Siegfried (1977) have focused their 
attention towards the examination of industry characteristics such as firm concentration. 
Dissimilarly, political science studies have focused on distinctive political features 
relating to the political and institutional frameworks (e.g. Grier and Munger 1993; Coen 
2007; Eising 2007). Strategic management scholars such as (e.g. Hillman, Keim, and 
Schuler 2004; Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013; Shaffer and Hillman 2000) have 
concentrated on the antecedents and on emphasising that the efficacy of political action 
as well as company-specific performance should be further examined. The latter feature 
has witnessed several difficulties related to the measurement of performance outcomes.  
The following section does not aim to comprehensively cover each theoretical perspective 
in its entirety but emphasize how different theories that are applied in the field of 




argument can be exposed considering the resource-based perspectives, which concentrate 
on the internal organisational level (e.g. Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh 2006; 
Dahan 2005b; Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman 2006) stakeholder theory, and resource 
dependence theory (e.g. Hillman and Keim 2001; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), which 
concentrate on different players across environments, and institutional theory that brings 
into the equation broad, national and international institutional features (Lawton, 
McGuire, and Rajwani 2013).  
Getz (1997; 2001) underlines the main disciplines that have acted as academic umbrellas 
to several theories: political science, management, economics and political economy, and 
sociology. The theories that stem from these two papers include: interest group theory, 
resource dependency, agency, exchange, institutional, behavioural theory of the firm, 
collective action, public choice, and transaction cost theories. Griffin et al. (2001: 10) 
refine the selection of literatures and include amongst others international public affairs, 
corporate public affairs, political involvement activities and political strategy.  
Building on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) and Hillman, Keim, and Schuler’s (2004) work, 
Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani (2013) categorise the extant literature and theoretical 
concepts in four main areas. Their literature review differentiates three “main disciplinary 
domains” to present a structured approach to the examination of corporate political 
activities (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013: 89). The first two domains are based on 
the resource-based view and institutional theory, whilst the latter specifically focuses on 
the national political environments, culture and risk.   
Academics in the field of strategic management (e.g. Barney 1991; Barney, Wright, and 
Ketchen 2001; Wernerfelt 1984) stress that a company’s competitive advantage is 
determined by internal resources and capabilities in market environments. In relation to 
resources employed in the corporate political context several scholars have concentrated 
on internal (e.g. Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Epstein 1969; Fainsod 1940; Rehbein and 
Schuler 1999) and external (Baron 1995) resources and presented how companies employ 
their political resources to maximise their profits (McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory 
2002). Fainsod (1940) describes the importance of resources previously to the use of the 
resource-based theory not exclusively related to market and business operations, 




specific resources. These resources can be divided in three general categories: financial, 
human and political.11 Dahan (2005b) develops a broader selection of political resources: 
expertise, financial, relational and organisational resources, reputation, public image, 
support of stakeholders and recreational skill, and within this classification internal and 
external resources can be clearly defined, whilst John, Rajwani, and Lawton (2015: 118) 
refer to organisational, relational, public image, reputation, and financial. Rehbein and 
Schuler (1995) assert that resources are critical in the definition of how firms react to the 
external environment, whilst several scholars (Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hillman, Keim, 
and Schuler 2004; Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013) stress that the effectiveness of 
corporate political activities is highly reliant on firms’ resources. As previously 
mentioned, large firms will have more impact on shaping public policy, and Schuler, 
Rehbein, and Cramer (2002) link resources possessed by large firms to political activities. 
Bonardi (2011: 247) considers political resources as “a set of unique political assets and 
skills that might prepare firms to participate in policy debates, face the rivalry of 
competing interest groups and shape policy decisions”. The author challenges existing 
conceptions on the pure adaptation of RBV to the field of political activities, as political 
resources cannot be simply bound to the criteria of market resources. 
A serious effort to connect the RBV theory with the notion of corporate political activities 
has been proposed by Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani (2013) who examine and highlight 
the concept of dynamic political capabilities. The authors indicate that there is a lack of 
qualitative studies examining this concept within the nonmarket context and on how 
companies develop their political capabilities in different contexts. Stemming from the 
RBV the “dynamic capabilities framework” has gained great resonance amongst strategic 
management scholars (Barreto 2010). Dynamic capabilities indicate the “ability of firms 
to maintain or create firm value by developing and deploying internal competencies that 
maximize congruence with the requirements of a changing environment” (Oliver and 
Holzinger 2008: 496-497). Hence, the critical notion is that of market (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000) and nonmarket (McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory 2002; Baron 1995; 
                                                 
11 In Fainsod’s (1940) description, financial resources can be considered as financial support to political 
campaigns; human, as the use of specific actors such as lobbyists and lawyers that have the technical 
capabilities and knowledge to effectively relate with decision makers; and political resources, which relate 




Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh 2006) change. In comparison, political capabilities 
refer to “the organisational and strategic activities by which senior representatives or 
acting representatives reconfigure, leverage and release political resources to achieve new 
resource configurations that enable the company to adapt to, anticipate or even shape 
changes in the corporate political environment” (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013: 
230). 
Closely linked to the notion of political capabilities, Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 
(2013: 237) bring forward the importance of social networks and ties. Political networks, 
and relationships can affect a firm’s performance by increasing its access to information, 
resources, and opportunities, which will be utilised to monitor or influence decision 
makers. Dahan, Doh, and Guay (2006) underline how MNC’s can relate and interact with 
the institutional environment through political networks. Close ties and relationships with 
government officials, institutional representatives and decision makers can simplify the 
process of accessing the critical phases of policy-making as well as reducing the costs 
involved in these activities (Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman 2006; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and 
Bierman 1999). The relationships will be characterised by different features, although a 
critical element is the strength of the network, which depends on two factors: the 
regularity of interactions and the resources that are employed to build or maintain it. 
Institutional theories are key in the investigation of corporate political activities as 
institutions are precisely where businesses direct their resources when trying to monitor 
or shape public policy. Therefore, it is important to recognise to what extent firms are 
embedded within their institutional context and to what extent the formal and informal 
institutions affect firms’ political action and strategy (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 
2013). Marquis and Raynard (2015) underline that there is a dearth of consideration 
towards the ways firms increase their competitive advantage through their strategic 
interaction with the institutional environment. 
Hotho and Pedersen (2012) deliver a complete review of the different institutional 
theoretical branches that pertain to the field of international business and point out that 
there is a common understanding that three main approaches can be categorised: new-
institutional economics, neo-institutional perspectives, and national business systems. 




with the rise of emerging markets and that different institutional perspectives refer to the 
different understanding and interpretation of what institutions are made of (Hotho and 
Pedersen 2012: 29).  
The first lens is characterised by a strong connection with microeconomics and defines 
institutions as “the rules of the game in society, or more formally, as the human devised 
constraints that structure human interaction” (North 1990: 3). Keim and Hillman stress 
that institutions are considered as “humanly-created constraints that limit choices and 
shape the incentives of a society” (2008: 48). They can be divided in formal (laws, 
regulations and rules) and informal (norms, customs, culture and ethics), however this 
perspective concentrates on the former (Williamson 2000). The critical aspect within this 
theoretical framework is that uncertainty, mostly political and regulatory, can have 
significant effects on a firm’s strategic decisions (Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh 
2006) and competitive advantage (Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani 2012).  
The second is aligned to sociology and considers both typologies of institutions as it 
concentrates on organisational forms, practices and relationships. Hence, the concept of 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) is central as it elucidates why firms become 
politically active and how they tend to converge due to institutional pressure. Hillman 
and Wan (2005) align institutional theory with political strategy and international 
business to underline how MNE’s are affected from internal and external pressures. The 
authors highlight how the institutional lens is particularly relevant when the focus of a 
study is to understand how firms shape the institutional environment.  
The third perspective, national business systems (Jackson and Deeg 2008; Khanna, 
Palepu, and Sinha 2005; Whitley 1999), examines the existence of specific, exclusive 
economic and institutional features, which contrast the homogenising forces of 
globalisation12.  
Within the strategic management literature, Peng (2002) proposed the institution-based 
view as a third pillar of the strategy tripod, which is composed of the RBV and the 
industry-based view. The institution-based view is significant as it proposes that firms’ 
                                                 
12  Tempel and Walgenbach (2007) attempt to find connections between the institutional theories, 




resources should be analysed whilst considering a given institutional setting. Peng et al. 
(2009) underline that firms’ strategic choices are given by the dynamic interaction with 
institutions. Correspondingly, in the corporate political activity literature it is described 
how different institutional environments affect the formulation and implementation of 
political strategies (Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002) and relationships between firms 
and governments (Hillman and Keim 1995). 
Resource-dependency theory is key to disciplines such as strategic management (e.g. 
Hillman 2005; Hillman, Withers, and Collins 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) as it has 
been used as central feature in strategy formulation (Getz 2001). It posits that an 
organisation and its relationship with other organisations are highly dependent on 
resources that arise from the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Hence, 
external forces and the external context are central for firms as these are not self-sufficient 
(Griffin and Dunn 2004), and these elements could lead to dependence and develop 
uncertainty, which are critical determinants of firm behaviour (Getz 2001). A key feature 
within this theoretical concept is that firms have the possibility to oppose and influence 
these forces.  
Translating these notions to the field of political activities means that companies are 
dependent on other firms, decision makers, policy and regulations that will have an effect 
on their operations. Getz underlines that political activities do not have the power to 
moderate actual dependence; instead they “allow[s] the firm to reduce uncertainties 
related to the dependence, and thereby to reduce the likelihood that dependence will have 
negative effects on the firm” (2001: 313). In sharp contrast, Hillman, Withers, and Collins 
(2009) argue that firms are able to reduce dependence, as well as influence decision 
makers and policy to the extent of forging the external context, which would then be 
better aligned to their interests. The theory has been considered with regards to the various 
political strategies (Hillman and Hitt 1999) that companies can undertake. For example, 
high levels of dependency could lead to a relational and continuous interaction in time, 
whereas a low dependency could mean that firms approach policymakers on an issue-to-
issue basis. Collective action, such as participation in trade associations could be suitable 
for firms that are located in the middle of this spectrum (Getz 2001).  




the role of cultural dimensions in understanding corporate political activities. Building on 
Child’s (2000) argument that extant research had not included cultural components, the 
scholar’s efforts are directed towards aligning these two notions and presenting a 
conceptual framework. Although, previous research (e.g. Blumentritt 2003; Boddewyn 
2007) has recognised the importance that political activities are increasingly becoming 
more global, there is still limited work that has focused on understanding the influences 
that national culture has on firms’ political involvement in the nonmarket arena.   
2.2.6 Overcoming theoretical rigidity and fragmentation 
As evidenced the field of CPA is characterised by a multidisciplinary diversity and the 
adoption of a multiplicity of theoretical perspectives, which have been used to investigate 
organisations’ participation in the socio-political and regulatory arenas. There have been 
notions which have managed to cross academic boundaries and find resonance amongst 
different disciplines; such as the establishment and growth of organisational structures to 
develop political action, and the conception that political activity is a valuable approach 
towards managing the societal and external context (e.g. Lawton and Rajwani 2015; 
Mellahi et al. 2016; Shaffer 1995). However, for the most part, the consequence to this 
fragmentation has been the lack of conceptual and methodological cohesion and the 
proposition of completely different approaches to this area of research, leading to the 
fragmentation of the topic and the absence of an “integrated understanding” (Dorbantu, 
Kaul, and Zelner 2017: 115). Consequently, scholars (e.g. Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani 
2012; Van Schendelen 2002; Vogel 1996) have underlined the benefits of an 
interdisciplinary approach, as is the case of this research. 
Research on CPA has been further constrained and “developed in silos” (e.g. Hadani, 
Bonardi, and Dahan 2016; Mellahi et al. 2016) by what could be defined as theoretical 
rigidity, whereby scholars have relied on adopting single theoretical perspectives. 
Undoubtedly, the various theoretical perspectives present different paradigms as well as 
strengths and weaknesses, however these should be viewed as complementary as the 
absence of one major theory and limited theoretical integration, scholars cannot rely on 
one optimal theory (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011). Research on organisations’ political 




Barron 2013; Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan 2016; Hillman and Wan 2005; Mellahi et al. 
2016).   
Hence, this research is in line with previous studies that have sought to integrate various 
lenses. For example, building on Hotho and Pedersen’s (2012) work, Doh, Lawton, and 
Rajwani’s (2012) main argument is that in order to comprehensively understand the 
features that characterise firms’ political strategies that are directed towards the 
nonmarket environment it is necessary to combine the three theoretical dimensions with 
conventional strategy theory. The alignment of these different theories is helpful in 
capturing broad national and supranational perspectives as well as firm and industry 
specific features (e.g. Oliver 1997). Schuler (1999) and Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 
(2002) argued that the interaction between internal and external factors should be 
analysed. Similarly, Wang et al. (2012) underline the complementarity between internal 
resources and the external environment institutions. In relation to resource-based views, 
Capron and Chatain (2008) argue that researchers which have focused on the RBV have 
not comprised sufficiently the external environment and that there is the need for 
additional research linking this theoretical framework and political activities. Griffin and 
Dunn (2004) integrate resource dependency theory with institutional theory to understand 
firms’ allocation of resources, managers’ commitment and structural features of the 
Public Affairs departments, whilst considering institutional pressures (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983).   
2.3 Conceptualising the role of trade associations  
2.3.1 Collaboration in the political arena  
A firm’s decision to relate with the policy-making process and undertake political action 
individually or collectively is central towards the formulation and development of its 
corporate political activities and global strategy. Building on Olson’s (1965) work, 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) refer to this decision as participation level, and include choices 
made by companies and by individuals working in them. Individual activities are 
characterised by a firm’s solitary and independent action, whereas collective activities 
pertain to those actions that require collaboration amongst firms. Collective action among 
organisations is considered as a reality of growing importance given the necessity to 




(Berkowitz and Dumez 2016). Collaborative efforts are a common trait in the nonmarket 
environment, and as Coen, Grant, and Wilson (2010: 16) argue, “delegation is the most 
typical response of business to the political environment”, indicating that if firms want to 
be successful in modifying public policy they must act collectively.  
Several scholars within the fields of business-government relations, nonmarket strategy, 
sociology, history, international business and political science have looked at the different 
tactics undertaken in the political arena and have investigated the reasons behind firms’ 
individual and collective approaches. One of the main criticisms on work investigating 
the different approaches relates to the fact that this choice, rather than being viewed as 
“mutually reinforcing” (Coen 1997: 92) and substitutable and complementary (e.g. Baron 
2016; Jia 2014; Jia and Mayer 2016; Minto 2016), is frequently viewed as mutually 
exclusive (Ozer and Lee 2009). Nonetheless, there are studies (e.g. Barnett 2006b; Coen 
1997; 2007; Jacomet 2005; Pijnenburg 1998; Richardson 2000) that have focused on 
circumstances in which organisations undertake both types of activities. This latter 
perspective has exposed firms’ opportunity to choose the most appropriate and effective 
approach – individual, collective or a combination of both. The determinants affecting 
the choice of individual and collective action are closely linked, and at times overlap, 
with the factors influencing the wider decision to engage in the political arena. Hence, 
these features may depend on the institutional framework, on firm and industry-specific 
characteristics, on specific issues, as well as on broader geographic, cultural and 
environmental features (Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani 2014). 
An organisation’s size and array of resources it possesses are amongst the key factors that 
can encourage collective political action (Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani 2014). Given the 
high costs of individual political activity, small firms will generally not be able to act 
independently, they will share their resources and lobbying costs with other firms, and 
often rely on trade associations (e.g. Bennett and Ramsden 2007; Cook and Fox 2000). 
In the context of public policy focused on reducing companies’ environmental footprint, 
Collins and Roper (2005) contend that small firms do not possess the relative resources, 
capabilities and experience to deal with governmental regulation and to oppose this threat, 
they will tend to advocate their positions through trade associations. In contrast, 
Bengtson, Pahlberg, and Pourmand (2009) contend that small firms do not solely rely on 




political strategy discourse. It is nonetheless hard to disagree with the general notion that 
smaller firms will experience more difficulties in interacting with political actors than 
large firms, as the latter possess greater economic, financial and political resources and 
will be able to develop political capabilities (Lawton and Rajwani 2011). Large firms will 
thus be to simultaneously act individually, for example through establishing their own 
government affairs departments, or hiring external political consultants, and collectively 
with other firms (Bonardi 2011; Jacomet 2005). Moreover, firms that retain greater 
intangible resources, such as knowledge on how to gain access to and influence the policy 
process, will be able to act independently (Hillman and Hitt 1999). However, if the 
resources required for a particular outcome are held by several firms and are difficult to 
replicate within a single organisation, it will force them to act collectively (Minto 2016).  
Additionally, a company’s collective action may stem from the understanding that crucial 
resources and several types of capabilities13 span firm boundaries, and interfirm linkages 
deliver a source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998). Hence, large firms will 
tend to consider individual and collective approaches as complementary, and often will 
join various trade associations concurrently (e.g. Bennett and Ramsden 2007). 
Nevertheless, it must be considered that small firms will join several associations as well, 
as “substantial multiple memberships” will allow firms to meet their multiple needs by 
joining different associations (Bennett and Ramsden 2007: 51).  
Bouwen (2002) stresses that even though larger firms are inclined to undertake political 
activities individually, they will participate in collective action during times of economic 
distress. In a similar vein Barron (2013: 69) argues that during recessions, “firms are more 
likely to engage in collective political action when they have few financial resources at 
their disposal”. These notions are also present in Aldrich and Fiol’s (1994) view that trade 
associations play a key role in challenging times to defend an industry’s reputation. 
Additionally, previous examinations of trade associations have demonstrated the key and 
pervasive role these organisations play in times of high economic, social and political 
                                                 
13 For example, Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) argue that interfirm networks and collaboration 
help companies develop organisational capabilities, by integrating knowledge that resides both 




distress14. Sbrana (2012) undertook an in-depth examination of Confindustria, Italy’s 
main federation of employers, highlighting its functions and benefits to the Italian 
industrial context between 1969 and 1980, a period characterised by deep national and 
international transformations such as labour protests, the oil crisis and a broader 
redefinition of business interest representation.  
In relation to the industry level, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) consider that collective activities 
are common in industries in which products and services are easily imitable, as firms will 
collaborate to limit the emergence of new competitors and attempt to preserve the status 
quo. Dean, Vryza, and Fryxell (1998) echo this point of view and underline that collective 
corporate political activities, specifically PACs in the US manufacturing industry, result 
in policies that benefit incumbents rather than new entrants. Building on mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), scholars (e.g. Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 
2002; Tucker 2008) argue that firms act collectively merely to shadow other effective 
organisations and imitate their political actions.  
As with the individual engagement in the political arena, the level of industry 
concentration has also been subject to a debate regarding its relevance to the collective 
political approach and scholars have presented different results proposing radically 
opposed views. Grier, Munger, and Roberts (1994) suggested a direct relation between 
the communal approach and industry concentration. Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer (2002) 
underlined that organisations in concentrated industries will engage in multiple political 
activities including collective action, as they are able to propose a cohesive position. 
Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) measure, within the context of US trade policy, that firms 
operating in competitive and less concentrated sectors are expected to lobby collectively 
and join trade associations. In contrast, Ozer and Lee (2009: 15) argue against the idea 
that the level of participation in collective action solely depends on industry concentration 
and suggest that “even within concentrated industries, firms may prefer individual action 
to collective action when they seek firm-specific advantages”. This line of thought 
highlights the importance of acknowledging specific contextual conditions, rather than 
supporting broad generalisations, which do not take into account industry and firm-
                                                 
14 In contrast, Frandsen and Johansen (2017) stress that even though trade associations were not 
designed to combat crisis, they are in the process of redefining their organisational practices by 




specificities, such as for example the level of government contracts or long-term R&D 
investments (Ozer and Lee 2009).   
Moreover, at industry level, the national associational arrangement will impact firms’ 
choice, as the absence of effective representation given by the deficiency of highly 
structured, organised and powerful associations will force firms to act individually 
(Bouwen 2002; Wilson 1990) 15 . Similarly, an industry that is characterised by the 
presence of strong and organised unions, which have broad networks in the political 
arena, will favour the development of co-operative political actions between several firms 
and unions (Masters and Keim 1985).  
Extant studies (e.g. Barron 2010) find that national cultural characteristics have an impact 
on the type of approach, as managers that originate from countries with an individualistic 
culture will favour individual approaches, whereas managers from collectivistic cultures 
will tend to act collectively. This does not exclude that managers could also engage in 
political action that is not aligned with their cultural background. Through an empirical 
study analysing the impact of national culture on corporate political activity, Barron 
(2011a: 324) discovered that “managers’ preferred level of participation in the 
policymaking process (individual versus collective action) is influenced by negotiation 
behaviours, which are determined by culturally-conditioned attitudes towards achieving 
individual or collective objectives”.  
The structure of the political and policy-making system is another key institutional level 
feature, which may have an effect on the type of approach (e.g. Collins and Roper 2005; 
Hillman 2003). Extant literature indicates three main types: pluralism, corporatism and 
statism. These differ in relation to the leading public and private actors, their patterns of 
interaction (Kohler-Koch, Beate, and Eising 1999) and the “coordination of economic 
activities between stakeholders” (Story and Lawton 2010: 97). Organisations operating 
in pluralist political systems with extremely fragmented organised interests may have the 
inclination to act individually given the high level of division of the political power. 
                                                 
15 The national associations’ role is a key point in relation to the participation within European 
associations and federations. If these are not seen as effective at representing industry interests, 
firms, when possible, may opt to act individually by joining European associations directly or 




Whilst firms operating in corporatist systems characterised by centralised decision 
processes may prefer a collective approach that can present a broad consensus (Collins 
and Roper 2005; Hillman and Keim 1995; Hillman and Hitt 1999). In this latter 
arrangement, the system of key actors is fairly established and constant over time, which 
leads to a highly structured organisation of associations that work closely with state actors 
towards the development and enactment of rules. National cross-industry associations 
play a key role and “interest organizations assume quasipublic functions and intermediate 
between state and member demands” (Eising 2004: 218). The statist system is 
characterised by the dominant role of the state and interest groups are commonly involved 
in the latter stages of the policy-making process (Eising 2004).  
The first type of political organisational structure (i.e. pluralist) can be found in countries 
such as the UK, US, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Canada where firms relate with 
policymakers in a more informal role and can voluntarily join collective organisations 
(Bennett 1997a; Eising 2009). Trade associations operating in this context are usually 
smaller organisations with coordinating issues and limited policy capabilities (Spillman 
2012). The second arrangement (i.e. corporatist) is common in Germany, Austria, 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. In these countries “firms have a formal role in 
government policy […] and are included in associations of employers that consult 
formally on public policy issues prior to their adoption, and business participation is more 
often on a collective rather than an individual firm basis” (Keim and Hillman 2008). The 
latter (i.e. statist), is present in countries such as France, Greece and Japan (e.g. Grant 
1993; Quittkat 2002).  
From a political science perspective, Grant (1993) differentiates between: company, 
where direct firm action is common and legitimate; associative, where intermediaries and 
associations play a key role; and party state, a context that features the presence of a 
highly factionalised dominant party. Bell (1995) argues that national political and 
economic structures as well as entrenched public policy frameworks influence the role 
and functions of trade associations. The scholar highlights how in advanced capitalist 
states political structures can be divided in two categories: on one hand, a weak state 
where the business culture is centred upon the firm rather than collective activity, and 
consequently associations will be weak and largely depend on their members. On the 




seek to direct and strengthen trade associations (Bell 1995: 29). Similarly, Aldrich (2017) 
highlights that different institutional systems will have different methods, approaches and 
rules to which organisations representing their interests must abide. For example, the 
openness of the policymaking environment to lobbying and the extent to which policy-
makers are contingent on information offered by interest groups.  
An additional institutional level feature is revealed by the level of regulatory and 
government intervention in a given environment. Interestingly, both ends of the 
‘interventionist continuum’ favour the development of collective action. For example, in 
an environment characterised by a low level of regulatory intervention, organisations 
might undertake collective action to anticipate external and intrusive interference by 
proposing self-regulating mechanisms (King and Lenox 2000). In juxtaposition, the 
formation of trade associations is particularly high in industries where the threat of 
government intervention is high and lobbying activity is strong (Barringer and Harrison 
2000: 392).  
Finally, scholars have proposed that a firm’s general relation to political action in terms 
of its transactional or relational approach has an impact on the decision to work 
independently or with other firms (Hillman and Hitt 1999). This view contends that firms 
adopting a proactive relationship-based approach spanning over time will favour 
collaborative approaches with the intent of continuously broadening networks. In 
contrast, Collins and Roper (2005: 260) argue that election issues, i.e. those issues that 
have “high public and political visibility”, will have a stronger impact on the adoption of 
a collective strategy, than the overall relationship with political actors.  
As anticipated above, the literature on the different features of collective action is very 
broad, spans multiple disciplines and employs several theoretical perspectives. Scholars 
have analysed the benefits and disadvantages of collaborative relationships (Barringer 
and Harrison 2000), governance forms (Ring and Van De Ven 1992), the role of firm 
networks and their influence on firm performance (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 2000), and 
undertaken a meta-review approach to summarise such disparate literature (Parmigiani 
and Rivera-Santos 2011). The aim of this section is to acknowledge that collective action 
in market and nonmarket contexts can take various forms. For example, firms can work 




alliances, business groups, trade associations and interlocking directorates (e.g. Gulati 
1998; Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath 2002; Selsky and Parker 2005). Barnett (2006a) states 
that there are other means for firms to undertake collective action such as joint ventures, 
collusion and cartels. However, the latter approaches are tacit and illegal or are intended 
to favour only specific firms. Moreover, another form of collective action can be 
undertaken by firms’ individual managers, such as for example lobbyists and government 
affairs managers, who may join coalitions and alliances (e.g. Barron and Hultén 2014; 
Barron and Trouille 2016). 
Even though collective action through partnerships and joint ventures are common whilst 
undertaking market-oriented activities16, collaboration is more regulated in the market 
environment than it is in the nonmarket environment. Bearing in mind national 
differences, the market environment is generally characterised by a broad range of laws 
and regulations, for example antitrust laws, which prevent the formation of arrangements 
of collective action (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994) and alliances, unless formally 
recognised (Baron 1995). In juxtaposition, informal collaborations are common in the 
context of firms operating in the social and political arenas. Nevertheless, collective 
activities are managed by formal organisations, which include “trade associations, formal 
political coalitions, producer or agricultural cooperatives, research and development 
consortia, formal industrial alliances, associations of cultural organizations or 
government agencies, federations of trade unions” (Barnett, Mischke, and Ocasio 2000: 
326).  
A major issue with collective action, which forms the foundation of the collective action 
problem, is that of “free riding”, whereby firms that do not actively contribute to 
collective activities are able to benefit from the results of other organisations’ efforts in 
the political arena (Olson 1965). Several firms will be motivated to free ride as collective 
action requires active participation and the contribution of resources even though returns 
are unsure and frequently intangible (Barnett 2006a). Nevertheless, Jia (2016) argues that 
if firms want collective action to be successful, they will not be able to free ride 
                                                 
16 Aerospace is a particularly relevant example of an industry characterised by high levels of 
complex partnerships amongst firms, both nationally and internationally. A key example is given 





completely. There is thus a contraposition between the individual interests of a firm and 
the collective interests of a group of firms. Minto (2016) argues that there is a 
misalignment between the understandings of collective action in the corporate political 
activity literature given that Olson (1965) considered it as activities that produced a 
collective good, independently from the fact that activities are undertaken by one or more 
firms. Contrastingly, subsequent work considered collective action as activities advanced 
by several companies or through an association. In both cases, collective or public goods 
are by nature non-excludable and non-rival and can be characterised in various ways, 
such as for example the characteristics of a particular industry (Barnett 2006a) or public 
policy (Olson 1965; Tullock 1971).  
Hence, firms face the diametrically opposed standpoints of cooperation and competition, 
which can result in conflicting strategies (Bresser 1988). Moran (2006: 454) stresses that 
“enterprises are simultaneously united by common interests and divided by competitive 
struggles”. The scholar underlines that in the UK, firms have historically not been very 
successful in the organisation of collective interests due to cultural and institutional 
features such as institutional evolution and changes in political and social environments 
(Moran 2006). As Traxler and Huemer (2007: 14) emphasize, “companies face a complex 
coincidence of divisive and common interests in relation to other companies, something 
which makes it difficult for them to identify priorities as regards the choice between self-
interested and collective action”. Hence, firms need to complement their competitive 
strategies, which focus on distancing them from competitors, with communal strategies 
that focus on broader environmental outcomes (Barnett 2006a). Although, this inevitably 
creates tensions, as firms will have to distribute their resources between the two strategies, 
there are instances whereby a firm’s competitive advantage needs to be considered in 
light of “the outcome of collective struggles for control of the institutional environment” 
(Barnett 2006a: 1767). Scholars (e.g. Jacomet 2005) propose the notion that trade 
associations are one of the means through which the collective action issues can be 
overcome, given the restricted size of the group, and the particular bond reinforced by 
specific interests. Additionally, associations can provide members with special status, or 
develop other measures that benefit members’ collective action, including codes of 
conduct and group insurance schemes, which will limit the collective action problem 




Another issue involving collective action concerns the ability of trade associations to truly 
represent the collective voice17. While associations should represent the interests of all 
members, there is an existing debate on how internal dynamics, for example the number 
and power of large companies within an association, can influence its strategic direction 
to the detriment of other members. This underlines the contradiction that even though 
there is the general belief that trade associations operate in the collective interest of its 
members this is not always the case (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017). Minto (2016) 
underlines how the degree to which associations favour private interests is still uncertain. 
Guèguen (2002) states that at the European level, the large companies have a decisive 
influence on the inner workings of associations. This control is highlighted by several 
characteristics including: the chairman of the association is frequently a large firm’s 
manager, they have a major firms’ club within them and the choice of the General 
Secretary is influenced by the big companies. Whilst considering that small firms 
outnumber the large ones, Traxler and Huemer (2007) argue that the skewed power 
balance derives from the resource endowments, rather than the number of members. This 
‘large firm dominance’ can result in firms within a trade association advancing their own 
interests rather than interests of the entire industry (Barnett 2013). The big companies 
will have the opportunity of wearing the association’s hat when they have direct interests 
in doing so or undertaking their own individual actions when more beneficial. Hansen, 
Mitchell, and Drope (2005) inquire why firms join associations if their ultimate goal is to 
secure private goods. The scholars underline that a possible explanation could lie in the 
belief that large firms manipulate the association in the pursuit of individual gains.  
Firms that simultaneously join trade associations that have divergent goals, underline the 
notion that private interests reside within trade associations. Collins and Roper (2005) 
term this behaviour ‘strategic schizophrenia’. Firms will convey their messages through 
trade associations when they want to elude public opinion. This is particularly relevant 
for firms that rely on a strong public image and identity. In this way they will be publicly 
be seen operating in one way, whereas at the same time they will try and pass contrasting 
or unpopular messages through associations, “this strategic schizophrenia is apparently 
                                                 
17 Perry (2012) argues that trade associations should represent at least 60% of a given industry to 




based on the hope that their social political agenda, which relies on favourable public 
opinion, will escape scrutiny” (Collins and Roper 2005: 265). 
Notwithstanding the limitations, the benefits and incentives for engaging with the 
political arena through a collective approach are numerous. These include: exhibiting a 
unified voice, shaping the political environment, increasing the attractiveness of an 
industry, and calibrating the industry with the requests of its environment (e.g. Barnett 
2006a; King, Lenox, and Barnett 2002; North 1990; Ozer and Lee 2009; Traxler and 
Huemer 2007; Tucker 2008). Jacomet stresses that collective action can provide benefits 
and advantages to firms that can not be gained otherwise, for instance collective resources 
such as “democratic legitimacy, private interest government arrangements, unity among 
members, and trade-offs between different political goals of the collective” (2005: 81). 
Furthermore, Tucker (2008) highlights that trade associations are able to defend and 
increase the reputation of an industry as well as develop a context of credibility and 
confidence for several stakeholders. Dyer and Singh (1998: 676) argue that 
interorganisational relationships develop market rents through “relation-specific assets, 
knowledge sharing routines, complementary resource endowments and effective 
governance”, which will lead to a sustained competitive advantage. Hadani, Bonardi, and 
Dahan (2016) have undertaken a meta-analysis that examined the effectiveness, outcomes 
and impact of corporate political activity and trade association political activity. They 
argue that individual action has a limited effect on public policy outcomes, and only when 
companies are able to organise and coordinate action through trade associations will they 
be able to ensure some influence in the policy-making process. Moreover, from a 
sociological viewpoint, trade associations “provide an arena for social construction of 
meaning and to allow members to build a shared perspective on their market activities” 
(Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017: 3).   
2.3.2 Defining trade associations as “meta-organisations”  
The focus of this thesis is on trade associations, nevertheless in order to comprehensively 
understand their role in the business-government relations realm, it is necessary to briefly 
define intermediaries and draw attention to other organisations that operate in this 
environment, which may undertake intermediary functions. Boléat (2003) highlights 




associations but actually compete with them. These include industry research bodies, 
industry forums, employers’ organisations, promotional and professional bodies, trade 
unions, charities, professional and religious associations, public relation agencies, 
lobbying firms and consultancies, national chambers of commerce, and the media (Boléat 
2003). Frandsen and Johansen (2015: 257) define intermediaries as: 
An intermediary is an actor; that is, an individual, a group of 
individuals, an organization, or a meta-organization, that belongs 
to a specific area in society (e.g. a specific industry, a specific 
organizational field, and/or a specific sector), and whose primary 
function or mission is to mediate; that is, to represent an 
organization and/or a specific stakeholder group, and/or to 
intervene in the relationship between them either by furthering or 
by impeding the interests and activities of the organization in 
question and/or its stakeholders in a specific situation or over 
time.  
One of their primary roles is to connect firms and political actors, and their activities can 
be “task oriented”, such as direct support, which depends on the type of intermediary, and 
“long-term”, which entails representation (Bengtson, Pahlberg, and Pourmand 2009). The 
differences between these intermediaries and trade associations are, in terms of the latter, 
the resources they possess, the particular kind of members as well as their specific 
knowledge, activities and competences (Ahrne and Brunsson 2005). There are notable 
differences also in relation to the specific strategies for acquiring members that these 
collective organisations pursue. These range from generalist strategies, in which 
collective action is coordinated on a variety of issues by few large firms, to specialised 
strategies dominated by a limited array of objectives (Barnett, Mischke, and Ocasio 
2000). 
Within the broad range of intermediaries that form the complex system of business-
government relations, trade associations can be considered as one of the earliest 
arrangements of collective action (May, McHugh, and Taylor 1998), one of the most 
important entities, as well as the prevailing legal form of firm cooperation in the 
nonmarket arena (Barnett 2006a; 2013). One of the key differences between trade 
associations and other forms of collective undertakings is that in the latter firms manage 
their collective activities directly rather than having independent staff (Battisti and Perry 
2015), which can be elected or appointed. Common trade association characteristics 




actors (Spillman 2012), that trade association’s members will be represented in the 
governing structure (Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015) and that employees working in 
the trade associations are frequently seconded form member companies. The functioning 
of associations can comprise a voting system based on consensus or a system based on 
majority votes (Boléat 2003).  
These non-profit voluntary associations (Aldrich 2017) are a decidedly prevalent 
organisation in the economic and political environments18 as they are present in almost 
all sectors of the economy (Barnett 2013). Even though individual action dominates the 
field of political activities (Baumgartner and Leech 2001), it is common understanding 
that trade associations play a key role in political arenas around the globe and that their 
activities are major ‘contributions’ to managing industries (Barnett 2017), fostering 
economic growth (Doner and Schneider 2000) as well as contributing to public policy 
processes (Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015). Trade associations help companies 
decrease uncertainty and strengthen the collective interests by identifying common 
problems and connecting firms that are associated by shared interests (Ireland, Hitt, and 
Vaidyanath 2002). Contrastingly, Walker and Rea (2014) argue against these views, 
proposing that cooperative political strategies through trade associations have diminished 
due to the development of in-house government affairs departments and a fragmentation 
of business interests. According to the authors, there has been a decrease in the 
importance of associations backed by the shift from stakeholder to shareholder 
prominence. In accordance, Mizruchi (2013) underlines that firms prefer independent 
activities on specific issues rather than operating through associations. 
Nevertheless, there are several examples, which highlight the importance of these 
organisations. In the United States, associations such as PhRMA and the NRA19 have 
contributed towards informing and shaping public policy (Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 
2015) and curbing the implementation of legislation (Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan 2016). 
In the EU, the increase in the number of trade federations (Greenwood 1997; Knill 2001) 
                                                 
18 Aldrich (2017) refers to the US context, and it can be applied to the UK context as well. 
However, in some countries like Austria and Germany and to some extent France, firms are 
compelled to join local chambers of commerce or sector specific associations. 
19  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents the 
pharmaceutical industry in the US, and the National Rifle Association (NRA) represents the 




has been essential towards the development of strong business entities that could 
effectively relate with supranational institutions. In the UK, collective organisation 
through trade associations was initially encouraged by state actors because these needed 
to limit business fragmentation and sought a strong counterpart with which they could 
effectively relate in the business environment (Moran 2006). Moreover, even though 
business was well represented in government in various interwar administrations, a strong 
opinion for a collective voice emerged after WWI (Davenport-Hines 1984).   
Similarly to companies (Taminiau and Wilts 2006) trade associations provide specialist 
information of their industries on which decision-makers rely in order to draft policy. In 
this perspective, associations are not only a key element of the institutional framework 
that can contribute towards economic expansion and progress, but it underlines the bi-
directionality of the relationship and the dependence that policymakers have on these 
entities. Bennett (1997a) argues that trade associations are not to be considered in the sole 
perspective of business influencing political institutions, but also means through which 
government can relate with and influence the business environment, for example by using 
associations as proxies for disseminating information and self-regulatory mechanisms of 
portions of the economy.  
Trade association is the most common name for these entities, however, within extant 
academic literature they are referred to in different ways, including: “business 
associations (e.g. Bailey and Rupp 2006; Spillman 2012), “interest associations” (e.g. 
Galvin 2002), and “industry associations” (e.g. King and Lenox 2000).  
Aldrich and Staber (1988: 111) define trade associations as “organizations created to 
represent business interests within specific domains, mobilizing firms within their domain 
so that collective action can be taken on common problems”. Even though there are cases 
in which members of associations are individuals20 the membership is usually composed 
of companies21. In line with this latter perspective, Ahrne and Brunsson (2008) consider 
trade associations as ‘meta-organisations’ whereby the members of the organisation are 
other organisations rather than individuals. Similarly, even though Gulati, Puranam, and 
                                                 
20 In the UK, the Institute of Directors (IoD) is an example of an association in which members 
are individuals. In the US, an example is the Business Roundtable. 
21 Bennett and Ramsden (2007) argue that in the UK environment, professional associations are 




Pushman (2012) broaden the definition to include individuals, the scholars focus on this 
specific organisational entity and emphasize the independent role of the meta-
organisation itself as opposed to the perspectives grounded towards the firm and its 
collective undertakings22. Barringer and Harrison (2000: 383) describe trade associations 
as “organisations (typically non-profit) that are formed by firms in the same industry to 
collect and disseminate trade information, offer legal and technical advice, furnish 
industry-related training, and provide a platform for collective lobbying”. In contrast, 
Wilts and Quittkat (2004: 385) do not separate between employers’ organisations and 
trade associations and define them as “organisation(s) that relate private business interests 
to the public decision-making process”. However, it is necessary to distinguish between 
trade associations and employers or professional associations, whereby the first operate 
in the economic field and activities range from production, trade and economic policy. 
Contrastingly, the latter operate in the social field and undertake social activities such as 
those related to wages and employment matters, or the standards and ethics of a particular 
profession (Bradley 1992).  
There are trade associations that represent an industry nationally, such as The Society of 
Motor Manufacturers & Traders (SMMT) in the UK automotive industry, subsectors of 
an industry such as the Regional Airline Association in the US (Lawton, Rajwani, and 
Minto 2017), or may span different but interconnected sectors, as is the case of ADS 
Group that represents the aerospace, defence, security and space sectors in the UK. 
Additionally, there are horizontal associations, in which members are aggregated on the 
basis of their functions and practices; geographical associations, which comprise 
members that operate in the same geographical location; and federations, where members 
are other associations (Boléat 2003). Finally, a key typology relates to “peak-
organisations” which represent all kinds of business actors and are not linked to a 
particular industry (Barley 2010), such as National Chambers of Commerce, the Business 
Roundtable in the US and the Confederation of Business Industries (CBI) in the UK. 
Additional models can be that of international and supranational associations that are 
                                                 
22  The difference between including individuals or organisations as members of meta-
organisations is the main feature that differentiates two main schools of thought. The first, EU 
based follows Ahrne and Brunsson’s (2008) view and includes organisations, whilst the other 




formed to deal with particular institutional and regulatory environments. An immediate 
illustration can be taken from those associations at the European level that are formed 
with the specific intent to relate with European Union institutions. The AeroSpace and 
Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) comprises 24 national associations and 
is the key European association for the aerospace and defence sectors (ASD 2017a). A 
peculiarity of this organisation is that individual companies are also members (ASD 
2017b). This feature clearly highlights that the above-mentioned models are not ‘fixed’, 
rather they can be fluid and overlapping. Analogously, various studies (e.g. Bennett 1999; 
2000) contend that these typologies are over simplistic and do not capture how the 
membership composition can alter associations’ activities and decision-making 
processes. At the European level there are mainly sectorial or “special interest” 
associations, rather than associations that encompass companies from different industries 
and represent broad interests, such as horizontal business associations (Teufelsbauer 
2003: 33). Notwithstanding the growth of European associations, national associations 
have had to increase their representation above the national level (Eising 2004).  
This study adopts the definition of Ahrne and Brunsson (2005; 2008) and thus focuses on 
trade associations that can be characterised as meta-organisations. There are various 
features that define this type of organisation: first, as previously mentioned, members 
must be other organisations and not individuals. This entails a series of consequences 
such as for example firms having greater resources – as opposed to individuals - that may 
be employed and shared with the meta-organisation. Whilst this is necessary for the 
survival of the association, diverse resource-availability could lead to imbalances 
between members that could influence the workings and decision-making processes 
(Berkowitz and Bor 2017). Another consequence is that organisations within the meta-
organisation could compete with the meta-organisation itself (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008). 
Second, meta-organisations are partial formal organisations as they may or may not 
possess the five constituents of a complete organisation: membership, hierarchy, rules, 
monitoring and sanction (Ahrne and Brunsson 2010). Specifically, whilst trade 
associations may exhibit several of these characteristics, they may lack other such as for 
example the ability to sanction their members. Nevertheless, this conceptual 
acknowledgment is particularly relevant as it allows scholars (and this study) to consider 




such as networks or interorganisational relationships (Berkowitz and Dumez 2016). 
Third, meta-organisations must be associations, as members will be free to join or leave, 
and the authority of the meta-organisation will lie within the collective.   
However, within the classification of meta-organisations there is a wide variety of trade 
associations that can be structured very differently and exhibit considerable differences 
amongst them, even though in many instances these dissimilarities can not be readily 
distinguished (Boléat 2003). Generally, members fund trade associations through the 
payment of fees and often these are small entities with a limited number of employees 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994), whereas in other instances they are large organisations with 
extensive resources (Barnett 2013). There are enduring pressures regarding the size of 
these organisations as on one hand, a larger membership will yield grater financial and 
human resources and legitimise political demands (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), whilst 
on the other hand, large associations will encounter greater coordinating difficulties 
(Staber and Aldrich 1983). Subsequently, given these coordinating deficiencies, 
associations representing wide-ranging interests may be substituted by, or modify their 
structure into, associations that represent more specific interests (Lawton, Rajwani, and 
Minto 2017).  
Aldrich and Staber (1988) claim that trade associations usually require limited resources 
to function and this feature – which pertains to their minimalist nature - allows them to 
be robust organisations. This is echoed by Barnett (2013: 216), who underlines that trade 
associations require little overhead to initiate and, if necessary, can survive for extended 
periods of time with relatively little financial support. Contrastingly, Dür and Mateo 
(2012) find that the amount and type of resources that associations possess clearly affect 
the level of access that these may secure with political institutions. Resource rich 
associations have greater possibilities to access decision-making processes especially in 
terms of the European Commission.  Nevertheless, even if associations possess limited 
resources, the limited costs may allow them to persist over a long period of time and lead 
the trade associations to become a “ghost” association (Berkowitz and Bor 2017), 





Prior research suggests that there are numerous motivations for firms to join trade 
associations and the key reasons include: having their interests represented in socio-
political and economic arenas, influencing political decision making, networking, 
acquiring information and expertise and taking part in collective bargaining (e.g. Bennett 
and Ramsden 2007; Bennett and Robson 2001; Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani 2014; Wilts 
and Meyer 2005), as well as firms’ status in the market and loyalty to the industry (Battisti 
and Perry 2015). Hence, the key reasons are to reduce uncertainty, gain individual and 
collective benefits and influence the external environment. Barnett (2017:4) has 
characterised the wide-ranging factors in economic self-interest, sociological identity and 
meta-organisational management. In relation to individual benefits, these activities and 
resources may support companies develop firm-level capabilities (Kahl 2014). At the 
European level, Guèguen (2002) argues that companies become members of trade 
associations because on one hand the association is the official representative towards EU 
institutions, on the other hand because the organisation is an essential meeting place for 
national companies.  
Schmitter and Streeck (1981) propose the concepts of ‘logic of membership’ and ‘logic 
of influence’, which have an impact on associations’ attractiveness and structure. The 
logic of membership is concerned with the members’ characteristics and relates to the 
responsibility towards representing their members’ interests and the motives that drive 
firms to join (Bennett 1999). For example, a key factor that could have an impact on this 
logic is the composition of the association, i.e. the presence of a small number of big 
companies that dominate or a large number of smaller companies. The logic of 
membership is a bundle of services that can be further divided in the logic of services and 
the logic of collective action (Bennett and Ramsden 2007). The first relates to the 
association taking into account firms’ specific interests and providing firm specific 
services, and the second relates to the association’s role in representing members’ 
interests, or at least the majority of its members (Bennett 1998a; 2000).  
The logic of influence, relates to dealing with the concerns of the interlocutors, ensuring 
continuous relations with the institutional field and other stakeholders. Usually, the focus 
is mostly directed towards the government (Grant 2002). These, two concepts have 
varying weight depending on the institutional environment. If the environment is 




(Schmitter and Streeck 1981: 86), associations will give priority to the logic of 
membership, however, if the environment is complex this will create a “high political 
entry price” and associations will need to give priority to the logic of influence.  
2.3.3 Trade association activities  
In addition to the abovementioned typologies, scholars have further categorised 
associations according to their functions. Galambos (1988) differentiates between dinner 
club, service and policy-capable associations. The first type does not offer a 
comprehensive array of services but rather provides a ‘space’ in which members can 
assemble. Whereas the difference between the second and third typology refers to 
activities directed internally at members, and activities directed at influencing policy, 
which include practices such as “systematic policy monitoring, intermittently active 
lobbying, coalition formation and regular discussion with government on technical that 
are below the national-political radar screen” (Spillman 2012: 279).  
Similarly, building on Boléat (2003), Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips (2015) contend that 
trade associations can be categorised as powerhouses, fast followers, campaigners and 
orators based on their size and functions. In terms of their functions, the main distinction 
relates to their internal engagement (i.e. with their membership) and external engagement 
(i.e. with socio-political actors and the policy-making process). Dür and Mateo (2016) 
distinguish between “insiders”, which are represented by trade associations that provide 
information directly to policy-makers and “outsiders”, which are associations that 
mobilize the public to pressure policy-makers. To summarize, the main distinction, which 
is significant to this research refers to the fact that some trade associations are strongly 
focused at interacting and influencing the external environment, others instead 
concentrate internally at providing services to their members (Barnett 2017). This 
distinction can also be distinguished in terms of the typologies of goods trade associations 
can provide their members, namely selective goods, which are services to individual 
members and collective goods, which are directed at shaping the policy-making process 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1981). Finally, even though scholars suggest that activities 
directed towards the political arena are the main driver (e.g. Bailey and Rupp 2006; May, 
McHugh, and Taylor 1998; Minto 2016; Wilts and Meyer 2005), there have been different 




For example, Spillman (2012) argues that smaller trade bodies do not undertake lobbying 
activities.  
In relation to internal oriented activities, these include supporting member firms thrive in 
the market environment through business development activities (Perry 2009) such as 
sharing information, providing export and home market trade promotion, providing 
technical, legal and environmental advice and counselling (e.g. Culpepper 2002; May, 
McHugh, and Taylor 1998). In addition, educating members’ employees through 
seminars and professional development, conducting research such as surveys, trend 
analysis and making forecasts (Spillman 2012), as well as developing “product/process 
standards through trade committees, trade journals, marketing campaigns” (Aldrich and 
Fiol 1994: 658). A crucial function that is frequently undertaken by trade associations is 
that of industry self-regulation, where they can develop and implement regulatory 
mechanisms (e.g. Bailey and Rupp 2006; Barnett and King 2008; King and Lenox 2000). 
Berkowitz and Bor (2016) underline that producing information rather than actual 
products is a key characteristic of meta-organisations. Other market-oriented activities 
include exchange of price and statistics, industry cost analyses, collective bargaining, 
prevention of fraud and unfair methods of competition and commercial arbitration 
(Tedlow 1988). In their study on the factors affecting market entry modes of transnational 
corporations (TNCs), De Villa, Rajwani, and Lawton (2015) argue that interest groups 
and trade associations play a key role at the industry level in affecting firm operations as 
well as being sources of support. The authors highlight that trade associations are 
important for firms entering new markets as they can provide information, access to 
policy networks as well as increase their reputation and legitimacy towards host 
governments. Generating, managing and sharing information are key activities that 
associations undertake vis-à-vis their members and other stakeholders (Bennett 1997b; 
Beyers 2004; Taminiau and Wilts 2006). Another key function is their ability to develop 
inter-firm networks and relationships by facilitating connections between them (Battisti 
and Perry 2015; Maennig and Ölschläger 2011). 
In relation to the nonmarket environment, activities include policy monitoring, 
developing relations with decision makers, influencing the policy-making process 
through policy briefs, statements and position papers, developing platforms that connect 




2013; Fagan-Watson, Elliot, and Watson 2015; Oliver 1990). Moreover, there are certain 
activities that do not strictly fall into any of the two dimensions, but rather cover both 
market and nonmarket environments. For example, advertising campaigns, the provision 
of forums where firms can discuss and share information with other firms, trade 
association and institutional representatives, as well as provide “advice services […] that 
provide reassurance, increase confidence or reduce uncertainty” for firm representatives 
(Bennett and Ramsden 2007). Moreover, trade associations are able to reduce information 
asymmetry by merging information from several firms (Wilts and Quittkat 2004). This is 
of particular relevance to decision-makers that rely on information when developing 
policy and regulations (Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 2012). 
One of the fundamental purposes of trade associations consists in connecting a specific 
group of actors with “interlocutors or adversaries” (Van Waarden 1992). These include 
but are not limited to, governments, regulatory agencies, NGOs and other institutional 
players. Depending on the trade association, the nature of the group of actors can consist 
in industry specific firms or firms belonging to different industries. Their bridging and 
intermediary feature connecting parties (Reveley and Ville 2010) is decisively a key 
characteristic that underlines their nature. Grant (2002) stresses that this is a unique 
feature, and entails considering the necessities, priorities and most importantly the 
collective interests of their members, whilst attempting to develop a positive outcome for 
all. This is a particularly relevant point, as this intermediary function makes these 
organisations dependent on both parties. On one side, they are dependent on their 
members for participation as well as for information, economic and labour resources. On 
the other side, they are dependent on the institutional actors in terms of access and 
recognition (e.g. Van Waarden 1992).  
Tucker (2008) analyses how trade associations are able to act as industry reputation 
agents.  Reputation can be considered as a key feature within business-government 
relations; it is an intangible asset that benefits firms gather resources and improve 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Hall 1992). This is echoed by Coen (2007), who 
stresses that a firm’s reputation is influenced by its participation in trade associations. In 
return this ‘reputational capital’ will contribute towards ‘identity building’ and affect the 
development of firms’ direct access to decision makers (Coen 1998). Thus, in this view, 




and as “positive externalities of reputation building” rather than working towards the 
development of collective goods (Coen 2007: 339). Coen (2007) explores these notions 
in the context of the European Union and its institutions. During their development, there 
was an increasing number of firms that were looking to influence policy on specific 
matters. Preference or preferential access was given to those firms that were able to 
collaborate with competitors and develop broad based political agendas that would 
contribute towards generating collective goods that could create greater advantages to a 
bigger number of players. Even though Coen’s (2007) work refers to the supranational 
environment, strong similarities can be underlined with national political environments, 
as also national decision makers will prefer to relate with an industry body that is 
perceived to have a more objective perspective than individual firms and that can bring 
together several actors, presenting a unified voice (Traxler and Huemer 2007).  
Guèguen (2002) categorises trade association political strategies in negative, reactive and 
proactive. The first, consists in open opposition to proposals or recommending 
unsustainable positions. The second is characterised by trade associations not opposing 
the European Commission’s demands and relying a nonconflictual relationship. The third 
consists of actively collaborating with institutions. Moreover, trade associations are able 
to leverage resources external to the organisation by exploiting their member’s individual 
networks in the political arena as well as their specialist knowledge (Fagan-Watson, 
Elliot, and Watson 2015). Although several actions have been highlighted there is still 
the need to understand the in-depth dynamics, relations and platforms in which these take 
place (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017).   
2.3.4 Moderators of trade association activity  
Similarly to the features that affect individual firms’ political activity approach and 
development, there are several internal and external factors that may impact trade 
associations’ activities and effectiveness. The main factors include: the size or corporate 
governance mechanisms of members, the level of consolidation amongst members and a 
high level of commonality between their interests, high transaction costs, a shared 
external threat, a high level of government intervention, as well as the associative abilities 
of the organisation (e.g. Greenwood and Westgeest 2003; Reveley and Ville 2010; 




concentrated industries will affect the political activities of trade associations, as will the 
levels of government interaction, such as the amount of government contracts. Hultén, 
Barron, and Bryson (2012: 359) argue against the importance of industry concentration 
and suggest that “historically entrenched norms and expectations play a greater role”.  
Tedlow (1988) stresses that trade associations are more effective when they find 
themselves in a situation whereby the whole industry faces a common problem and the 
different actors i.e. firms, consumers, unions, distributors and shareholders are able to 
unite and the trade association is able to present a unified front. In terms of political 
activities, Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan (2016) build on Olson (1965) and contend that for 
trade associations to be effective, their members should coordinate and be aligned in 
terms of the agenda and objectives of the organisation. This approach will enable the 
collective group to settle potential issues and lead over groups that have not been able to 
present a united front.  
Concerning the institutional context Grant (2002: 55) stresses that: firstly, the structure 
of the government will influence associations’ activities. Differences in the decision-
making distribution between legislative and executive authorities will affect a different 
deployment of associations’ resources. Wilson (2003) argues that in the UK, given the 
power of the executive, firms, trade associations and other organisations that intend to 
represent business interests will have stronger links with government departments 23. 
Secondly, the level of the authority’s decentralisation, for example a federal state with a 
decentralised policymaking such as the US or many aspects related to the devolution 
processes of Scottish and Welsh local governments in the UK. Furthermore, the 
government’s attitude to the associations’ development has a strong influence on their 
effectiveness. Even in environments where associations are not part of the public 
decision-making process, a government’s acknowledgment and support of trade 
association activity can positively alter their functions and role (Bennett 2000). Schaefer 
and Kerrigan contend that trade associations’ nonmarket activities – the authors refer 
specifically to CSR related actions - are dependent on a number of factors including “the 
                                                 
23 The executive comprises the key actors and institutions that are involved in policy development 
as well as co-ordinating government activity (Smith 1999: 1). It includes the Prime Minister, 




nature of the industry, its history and structure and the level of external pressure it faces” 
(2008: 193).  
In contrast to the common views previously highlighted on corporatist, pluralist and 
statist theories, it is critical to stress that very often it is not possible to understand the 
role of trade associations or explain their political strategies and actions by simply 
referring to “standard theories and conventional assumptions” regarding national political 
structure (Spillman 2012: 296). In fact, these classifications are not able to capture the 
intricacies and dynamics of such complex organisations, as Laumann and Knoke (1987: 
381) state “the boundaries between public and private sectors are blurred, and irrelevant, 
even in noncorporatist societies”. Bell (1995: 27) stresses that in addition to broad macro-
political structures, scholars should pay attention to organisational attributes including 
trade association’s ability to aggregate members’ interests, focus on long-term matters, 
retain relative autonomy from its membership as well as be effectively resourced. It is 
hence vital to remain alert towards contextual features as well as specific endogenous and 
exogenous factors that might alter a group’s collective action or an association’s role in 
relation to its members, community and social, political and regulatory institutions.  
Spillman (2012) in her examination of the US environment argues that activity in specific 
policy domains is central in defining a trade association. Even though associations 
operating in pluralist environments do not have the structure and political muscle that key 
associations retain in corporatist environments, they can play a crucial role in shaping 
specific political domains. Associations collaborate and compete with other interest 
groups in these domains, and their activities will change in intensity, depending on the 
importance or costs and benefits of a specific domain. Hence, the intensity of political 
actions can vary considerably, from ‘light’ activities such as monitoring the political 
environment, examining changes in rules and regulations, and reporting findings on blogs 
and newsletters, to active policy participation and activities specifically engaged towards 
altering the political agenda. These considerations are extremely important in 
understanding that not all “business associations are politically active interest groups” 




2.4 Summary, gaps and research questions  
This chapter has provided a review of two intertwined strands of literature: the first on 
corporate political activity, and the second on trade associations. Specifically, the first 
section defined the concepts of nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity, 
highlighting how organisations operate in the socio-political and regulatory environment 
through the development and undertaking of political activities. Moreover, given the 
interdisciplinary nature of the field and the absence of a general theory, the key theoretical 
lenses used to analyse corporate political activities have been highlighted. The second 
section focused on a specific form of political activity, namely collective action. As 
evidenced, one of the main approaches to collaborative efforts in the political arena is 
undertaken through trade associations, which are crucial organisations operating in, and 
shaping the business-government interaction. Hence, the section defined trade 
associations and underlined the main activities undertaken by these organisations.   
2.4.1 Identification of the gaps in knowledge  
The review has allowed the researcher to identify research gaps that will be highlighted 
in the following paragraphs and addressed within this thesis. The first gap pertains to the 
area of collective action, intermediaries and trade associations. Several scholars within 
the fields of business-government relations, nonmarket strategy, international business, 
management, and political science (e.g. Barnett 2013; Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 2012; 
Jacomet 2005; Spillman 2012; Tucker 2008), have looked at firms’ approaches towards 
the political arena, and have investigated the reasons behind undertaking individual 
and/or collective approaches. Nevertheless, there is still the need to understand the 
different facets that drive firms to act collectively, recognise the role of key intermediaries 
(Bengtson, Pahlberg, and Pourmand 2009), and specifically comprehend the role of trade 
associations (e.g. Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan 2016; Marques 2017; Rajwani, Lawton, 
and Philips 2015; Wilts and Meyer 2005). Further evidence that there is still scope to 
investigate collective action, is given by Baron’s recent work in which he argues:  
A central nonmarket strategy question is when a firm should 
delegate nonmarket action to a general business association such 
as the Chamber of Commerce or the National Association of 
Manufacturers, when it should rely on an industry association, 
when it should form an ad hoc coalition, and when it should act 




Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani (2013: 99) state that “the corporate political activity 
perspective needs to be further explored, from within individual government affairs 
functions, collectively from within trade associations or using third-party lobbying 
organizations”. The authors mention that a key aspect is to understand how firm-
government relations complement or differ from business or trade associations’ relations.  
Moreover, recent work (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017; Spillman 2017; Berkowitz 
and Bor 2017) has advanced calls to specifically focus on trade associations that can be 
categorised as meta-organisations, which are associations of organisations (Ahrne and 
Brunsson 2005), as opposed to associations that comprise individual members as well. 
Berkowitz and Dumez (2016) highlight various avenues including the dynamics, 
efficiency and usefulness of meta-organisations, as well as their interactions with their 
members and the environment. Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto (2017) propose three levels 
of analysis to contribute to the understanding of trade associations. The first entails 
investigating the firm level and thus looking at members’ dynamics, the second focuses 
on the collective area comprised of members and the trade association, and the third, on 
the trade association level as an organisation in its own right. This thesis is clearly 
positioned in the latter dimension.    
In terms of meta-organisation management, Barnett (2017) underlines the need to 
understand how these organisations define their agenda and decide their strategic 
direction. In contrast to the previous research avenues, Aldrich (2017) underlines the need 
to acknowledge external features that may help to understand this typology of 
organisation in greater detail. The first entails understanding the relations between the 
different interest associations operating within a particular context. The second involves 
an appreciation of the distinctive features of political systems and how such different 
institutional settings may affect their relations between associations and political 
institutions. Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips (2015) highlight three main areas that need to 
be developed, which relate to institutional theory, namely how associations act as 
institutional entrepreneurs, within their organisational arena; to collective identity, in 
terms of how associations can develop shared identities; and nonmarket strategy, in 
relation to how trade associations participate in political action to shape the political 
environment. The latter will be the focus of this thesis. It is important to acknowledge 




active participation (Spillman 2012) and this research will attempt to explore the 
determinants of these differences.  
A further gap relates to the various levels than can be analysed in the investigation of 
business-government relations and corporate political activity. Most research, which is 
still fragmented and has yet to reach widely accepted theoretical and empirical 
conclusions, concentrates on the national level, although there are other levels i.e. local, 
regional and supranational, which develop policy and regulations. Thus, local and 
regional levels present a valuable opportunity for scholars to explore the field of political 
activities. Rajwani and Liedong (2015) highlight that most work investigating the United 
States context focus on the broader national level, disregarding the local level, where in 
many circumstances single states are also able to implement policy. Furthermore, most 
studies on trade associations have investigated the national level (e.g. Bell 1995; Reveley 
and Ville 2010; Wilts and Quittkat 2004), and the supranational level (e.g. Beyers 2004; 
Greenwood 2002). Hence, except a limited number of studies that have looked at the local 
level (e.g. Coleman and Grant 1985; Dixon 2006; Valler and Wood 2004), there is 
definitely a lack of research on trade associations on regional levels.  
A final gap refers to a methodological issue as there are several calls to adopt a qualitative 
approach in the analysis of this particular field (e.g. Dahan, Hadani, and Schuler 2013; 
Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011; Marquis and Raynard 2015; Rehbein and Schuler 1999), 
in particular through personal interviews (Boddewyn 2007) as abundant research has 
adopted a quantitative approach. Qualitative methods would provide an in-depth 
perspective at how organisations develop their interactions with policy makers and 
institutional entities and respond to political uncertainty (Marquis and Raynard 2015: 
321). In the context of analysing political resources, Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman (2006: 
326) argue that “political behaviours are often covert in nature” and that qualitative 
methods are more appropriate. Scholars such as Van Schendelen (2002) have also 
encouraged research using case studies and sector studies. This methodological approach 
is in line with a recent call for papers of the Global Strategy Journal24 where qualitative 
                                                 
24 This call was published in 2015 for a special issue of the Global Strategy Journal titled 
“Political connections in global competition” and the research questions included “Who are the 




studies exploring the “How” and “Why” questions of the interaction between businesses 
and political actors are explicitly requested. Table 2 provides a summary of the main gaps 
and how these will be addresses in this thesis. 
Table 2: Identified research gaps and contributions of the thesis 
Research gaps Addressed in the research 
Acknowledge what drives firms to act independently 
and/or collectively in a specific context (Baron 2016).  
The thesis builds on and extends existing 
views on why firms choose to join trade 
associations. 
Comprehend the specific role of trade associations 
(Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013; Rajwani, Lawton, 
and Philips 2015; Wilts and Meyer 2005).  
This study explores their role by exploring 
how trade associations’ managers and 
other business actors perceive their role as 
well as the features that may impact it.  
Understand how trade associations set their agenda 
(Barnett 2017) 
A key aspect that is analysed is how trade 
associations define their political strategy, 
by investigating the determinants that 
influence its development.  
More research is needed in trade association political 
activity (Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan 2016) 
Trade associations’ political activities are 
considered both in how these are defined 
and formulated as well as on how they are 
deployed to shape the political 
environment. 
Extant work has neglected trade associations as meta-
organisations (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017; 
Spillman 2017; Berkowitz and Bor 2017).   
Trade associations included in this study 
are specifically meta-organisations. 
There is the need to conduct the analysis at several levels 
(Rajwani and Liedong 2015). 
This study explores trade associations and 
their political activities on two different 
levels: national and regional.  
Need for qualitative research (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 
2011; Dahan, Hadani, and Schuler 2013; Marquis and 
Raynard 2015), in particular through personal interviews 
(Boddewyn 2007). 
Overarching gap that is reflected in the 
proposed research questions and the 
methodological approach chosen to 
answer them.  
Future scholarship should seek to integrate existing 
theories to improve our understanding of CPA (Doh, 
Lawton, and Rajwani 2012; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 
2011; Mellahi et al. 2016).  
The research is particularly sensitive to the 
specific context and attempts to find 
convergences between different concepts. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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The above-mentioned gaps have informed the elaboration of this thesis, from the 
development of the overarching objective and research questions, to the definition and 
development of an appropriate and consistent research design.  
2.4.2 Research questions 
In the following section three research questions are presented which stimulated the 
development of a research design involving qualitative methods. The broad objective of 
this research is to explore the political role of a specific form of meta-organisation in a 
highly politicised context such as the UK aerospace industry. Moreover, the research 
focuses on developing knowledge of how national and regional sectorial trade 
associations develop political activities and attempt to influence and shape their political 
environment. 
Broad research questions were set at the initial stage of the research, which were 
subsequently refined and adapted as new information and knowledge was gained either 
through the collection of primary data, insightful discussions with academics and 
professionals who have a strong understanding of the researched topic, as well as through 
the continuous revision of extant literature. This iterative process is distinctive of 
qualitative research (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008; Verschuren 2003) and is in line with 
Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey’s (2011: 32) proposition that “research questions are not 
static; they change, are adapted and refined while working through the different tasks in 
the design cycle”.  
Even though the research questions were not entirely defined during the initial stages of 
the research, they allowed the researcher to consider the qualitative method as the most 
appropriate. This approach is in line with Corbin and Strauss (2008: 27) who argue that 
“the interesting aspect of qualitative research is that though a researcher begins a study 
with a general question, questions arise during the course of the research that are more 
specific and direct further data collection and analysis”. Moreover, the proposed research 
design, which will be outlined in Chapter 4, is coherent with Bouchard’s (1976: 402) 
suggestion to formulate appropriate questions and subsequently choose the most 
appropriate method, instead of preselecting a method that would direct the research. In 
line with this view, other scholars (e.g. Corbin and Strauss 2014; Ghauri and Grønhaug 




In line with these notions and building on the discussion within this chapter the following 
research questions emerged: 
➢ RQ1: What are the determinants of trade associations’ political role? 
➢ RQ2: How is political strategy defined and exercised in trade associations? 
➢ RQ3: How do trade associations exert their influence? 
With these research questions in mind, the following chapter explores the characteristics 
of the UK aerospace industry, offering a background context for this study and explaining 






Chapter 3  Research setting - An overview of the UK 
aerospace economic and political environment  
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter offers a concise description of the UK’s aerospace industry as well 
as the political institutional environment. Moreover, the chapter will present the current 
framework of trade associations in the UK, and specifically focus on those operating in 
the aerospace context. The aim of this chapter is to provide a background context and to 
underline the features that justify the positioning of the study within this specific, and in 
many instances, unique empirical context. The following sections demonstrate that the 
UK’s aerospace industry is an appropriate setting to explore the business-government 
interaction, and in particular the role and functions of trade associations. 
Section 3.2 outlines the UK aerospace industry and broadly describes its characteristics 
and structure whilst underlining the factors that have positioned it amongst the top 
European and world industries. Moreover, the section underlines how and why industry 
players are politically active. Section 3.3 offers an overview of the political environment 
both at regional and national level, representing the different contexts in which the trade 
associations included in this study operate. Section 3.4 briefly describes the structure and 
development of trade associations in the UK, and then focuses specifically on illustrating 
the contemporary setting of trade associations in the aerospace sector. Finally, section 3.5 
concludes the chapter and summarises the key justifications as to why the UK’s aerospace 
industry is an appropriate research context. 
3.2 Defining the UK aerospace industry 
The aerospace industry can be defined as “the industry that comprises all those firms 
involved in the research, design, development, manufacture, repair, maintenance and 
disposal of aerospace products” (Hartley 2014: 2). The UK aerospace industry is currently 
the biggest in Europe and second globally. In 2016 it generated over £31 billion of 
turnover, of which 90% was exported. The industry employs over 120.000 people directly 
and further supports over 118,000 people indirectly (Gale 2017). Moreover the sector has 
particularly encouraging future prospects as the demand for air transport is set to increase 
and the UK industry currently enjoys a backlog of over 13,000 aircraft worth almost £200 




In addition to these figures, there are other characteristics that highlight the significant 
contribution that aerospace makes to the UK’s economic development and exercise an 
effect on its political importance. Hartley places aerospace within the restricted ‘club’ of 
economically strategic industries 25  defined as “high technology and R&D intensive 
industries with technical spill-overs to the rest of the economy; […] decreasing cost 
industries reflecting scale and learning economies; and […] imperfectly competitive 
based on national monopolies and oligopolies” (2014: 5). Additionally, the scholar 
underlines that the industry should be considered as a strategic military industry given its 
contribution to national defence and national security. According to a recent House of 
Commons library report, the industry employs high technology techniques and is 
‘research intensive’, which denotes that it draws a highly qualified workforce (Rhodes 
2014). Moreover, the rest of the economy also benefits from technology spin-offs 
stemming from products such as radar, composite materials and jet engines (Hartley 
2010: 164). A significant example regarding the importance of this particular industry to 
government, and the consequent strong relations between government and the industry, 
has been the creation of the Aerospace Growth Partnership (AGP) in 2010 with over £2 
billion worth of funding (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 2013). 
Subsequently, the government created the Aerospace Technology Institute (ATI) in 2014 
to assist the implementation of its technology strategy (AGP 2016).  
Aerospace is not a single market in its own right but includes various sub-markets. The 
key distinction that is relevant in terms of this study refers to the differentiation between 
civil and military markets as these feature different interactions with political actors. 
Firms operating in the defence industry26 have a particularly special relationship with 
political institutions, as defence sector customers are mostly governments (House of 
Commons 2011), whereas in the civil sector customers are predominantly private 
companies. This interaction mainly developed thanks to the importance of air power, 
                                                 
25  Economically strategic industries are leading industries (e.g. telecommunications and 
biotechnology), which are crucial to national economic development. Hartley (2014) advances 
several features that define economically strategic industries. For instance, they are constituted of 
a limited number of large companies that control the national market and enjoy very large profits, 
as well as present high levels of technological development, which can translate in spill-overs to 
other industries and sectors. 
26 The aerospace sector is only one of the constituents of the defence and military sector as other 




established during WWI, which profoundly changed the relationship of the state with 
aerospace (Hartley 2010). The last decades of the 20th century have been driven by the 
military sector, as there was a clear gap between defence sales and civil sales, with a 
superiority of the first, whereas recent years have seen a growth of the civil sector and the 
convergence of the two submarkets (Figure 2). Nevertheless, the majority of firms 
operating within the aerospace industry supply products and services to both markets, and 
more importantly this differentiation is almost irrelevant in this study as trade associations 
generally represent the broader aerospace industry27.   
Figure 2: UK aerospace industry sales by activity 1980 - 2010 
Source: ADS (2011)  
The aerospace industry is characterised by a pyramid structure and Keith Hayward’s 
description is still remarkably contemporary:  
“At the top there are a few fully capable prime contractors, or 
system integrators – usually, though not exclusively, airframe 
manufacturers; an equally small group of engine makers; a larger 
group of discrete systems and equipment firms; and a huge 
‘comet’s tail of medium and small suppliers and subcontractors” 
(1994: 6).  
                                                 
27  A notable exception was the NDI (Northern Defence Industries), a trade association 
representing small and medium size enterprises in the defence supply chain, until it was acquired 
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This description is valid for the global aerospace industry as well as for the UK industry, 
and this feature is exacerbated if the sole civil sector of airliners is considered as it is 
characterised by global duopolies in each aircraft category: large jet airliners by Airbus 
and Boeing; regional jet liners by Bombardier and Embraer; and turboprop by ATR and 
Bombardier (Hartley 2014). 
In the UK, the development of this particular industry structure is given by several 
reasons. A key feature relates to the post-Second World War recovery of the aircraft 
industry, which entailed rationalisation and the need to establish economies of scale28. 
This led to several mergers and acquisitions as well as industry exits that shifted the 
industry from featuring a large number of small firms focused on small-scale production, 
to having a limited number of multinational groups that dominated the entire industry 
(Hartley 2014). Hence, the industry is dominated by an extremely limited number of large 
companies that play a key role in both the market and nonmarket contexts. In terms of the 
latter, these companies are capable of relating directly with country level political 
institutional representatives and have a greater input in trade associations’ decision-
making processes.  
In contrast to other industries, such as for example the financial services sector that is 
mostly concentrated in one area (i.e. London), the companies operating in the aerospace 
industry are distributed around the country (UK Government 2013); there is thus a high 
regional distribution of aerospace companies across Great Britain (Figure 3). The 
establishment of large firms in various regions and home nations has attracted numerous 
firms, including suppliers and contractors, which in turn has resulted in the development 
of aerospace clusters. These concentrations can be found in the Northwest near Preston, 
the Southeast, the Southwest near Bristol and Yeovil, the Midlands, Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The South-West can be considered as one of the larger hubs (Matthews 
2017), and several of these clusters have developed ‘centres of excellence’ in specific 
fields of manufacturing (Hartley 2014). Consequently, these areas have seen the 
establishment of trade associations and it is not a surprise that key organisations are 
located within these regional clusters. The presence of companies disseminated across 
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the UK is thus a characteristic of the industry that has clearly had an impact on the 
development of trade associations.  
Figure 3: UK aerospace national distribution of companies 
 Source: (SBAC 2002)  
Similarly to many other aerospace industries worldwide, the aerospace industry in the 
UK presents strong relations between industry actors and public actors including national, 
local and supranational policymakers and regulators. Notwithstanding a generalised 
elevated degree of government interference, there can be substantive national variations. 
The differences can be linked to the structure of political systems and can range from 
outright ownership and control of the industry, such as during the former Soviet Union, 
to private-based configuration, such as in the United States (Hayward 1994). 
Nevertheless, even within the latter category national governments are extremely 
dependent on the industry, and possess the power to influence and shape it. Additionally, 
relations with policymakers within national borders, or across borders with supranational 
institutions may also change in time. 
In relation to the military sector, the UK government enjoys the privileged status of sole 
buyer of defence products within national boundaries (House of Commons 2011). 
Through the power leveraged with procurement contracts governments are able to control 
the size of the national aerospace industry. Military campaigns characterised by increased 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The 





public spending on rearmament have aided the expansion of the industry, whereas periods 
of disarmament have negatively influenced the development of the industry (Hartley 
2014). Employment figures are a useful source to underline the evolution and size of the 
industry. Records of employment in the UK aerospace industry (Table 3) clearly highlight 
how periods of war and peace have had an impact on the number of people employed, 
with spikes during the two World Wars and the Cold War, and a gradual reduction 
following the end of the arms race period (Hayward 1994).  
Table 3: Employment figures in the UK aerospace industry.  
 Source: Hartley (2014) 
Moreover, national governments can have an impact on the size and structure of the 
industry by selecting who is able to bid for government contracts (e.g. by limiting the 
bidding to home-country firms or allowing foreign firms to participate as well), choosing 
the form of competition (e.g. price or non-price characteristics), avoiding key contractors 
to go bankrupt, as well as control the ownership structure of the industry (e.g. by 
nationalising large companies) (Hartley 2014).  
In terms of the civil market, governments retain the ownership of landing and take-off, 
and airspace rights, and have a large share of influence on airports either through direct 
ownership or the development of policy and regulations. Furthermore, governments 
might own airline companies (e.g. flag carriers) that are required to purchase products 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 




from home-country companies. A major source of influence (and matter for on-going 
disputes between nations) relates to national governments providing direct or indirect 
support through funding of R&D projects, subsidies and contributions, through tax-
subsidy incentives, launch investments, and other forms of grants and loans. Given the 
long lifecycle of aircrafts and the particularly lengthy periods of product development 
(Figure 4), R&D funding is a critical factor in relation to the industry’s success.  
Figure 4: Indicative example of a major aerospace lifecycle 
Source: (AGP 2016)  
Additionally, the high-risk nature as well as the susceptibility of the industry to strong 
fluctuations in demand has placed national governments as a significantly more consistent 
source of support than private investors (McGuire 2011). The only way that companies 
have partially managed to sidestep the need for public funding and mitigate the 
expenditures and high-risks of producing high-tech and costly products has been to 
develop joint projects and complex international networks (Hayward 1994). Nonetheless, 
it must be underlined that these interfirm collaborations have often been reliant on state 
aid as well. Finally, governments can provide advantageous export finance and together 
with departments and embassies can be crucial in the promotion of defence and civil-
related exports (Hartley 2010).  
3.3 Overview of the regional and national political-economic contexts 
The following section provides a brief overview of the political and economic 
environment, which is necessary to understand, given substantial differences across 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version 




national contexts, the development of trade associations and their activities in a specific 
geographical setting. This is extremely relevant to the investigation of political activities, 
as “the culture, norms, values and institutions of a country will influence the type of 
NMAs [nonmarket activities] to use and their impact” (Fernández and Usero 2010: 2). 
The configuration of the political structure and activities of political institutional actors 
have a strong influence on where and how trade associations have flourished and how 
intermediaries and organisations representing business interests are able to interact with 
political actors. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this research is of interdisciplinary nature and 
thus “borrows” notions from other disciplines. This aspect is particularly evident in this 
section where notions stemming from political science are beneficial in highlighting the 
UK’s specific political structure and public policy processes, and help to explore how 
these have impacted the development of specific forms of organisations (i.e. trade 
associations) and their political strategies.  
As previously highlighted the UK is characterised by a pluralist system whereby “political 
power is widely distributed amongst many autonomous interest groups, each representing 
the social and economic forces in the wider society” (Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 2012: 
353). This arrangement on one side has enabled trade associations to participate in the 
policymaking process, in contraposition to statist systems whereby it is extremely 
difficult for non-elites to enter the political arena. On the other side, it has fostered the 
growth of multiple entities that are able to provide an input in the policymaking process, 
limiting the ability of trade associations to exclusively represent business interests.  
A further key characteristic of the UK’s political structure refers to the marked dominance 
of the central government in the distribution of economic and political power (Grant 
1989; Valler and Wood 2004), as opposed to other contexts (e.g. the US) where 
policymaking is strongly decentralised across the different states (Wilson 2003). 
Concurrently, parliament has a limited role - particularly in the early phases - in policy 
development. Nevertheless, given the configuration of the electoral system, MPs do play 
a key role as they have a strong connection with their constituencies, and this is 
particularly relevant for firms and trade associations that operate in constituencies that 
exhibit a strong aerospace presence. Together, these aspects entail that interest 




including regulatory agencies and civil servants (Boléat 2003), de-facto limiting the 
breadth of available options for interaction and influence.  
Moreover, there have been various developments that have modified the policy 
framework to which trade associations and other organisations attempting to operate in 
the political arena have been confronted with. As abovementioned, the development of 
the European Union and its institutions has impacted the political activities of meta-
organisations but it has also had consequences for national political institutions that have 
seen a transfer of power to these supranational entities (Macdonald 2001). Nevertheless, 
the main method used by trade associations, particularly smaller ones is to interact with 
national political institutions, which in turn will relate with European actors. This is 
mainly due to cost factors as it is cheaper, to engrained historical interactions that 
preceded the establishment of European Institutions, as well as to European bodies’ 
processes that rely on the actions of national institutional representatives such as ministers 
and government officials (Bennett 1997b).  
The devolution processes in Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland have established local 
institutions with considerable powers and autonomy. However, the devolution process 
has been an extremely unbalanced project and even though the local political institutions 
feature elected assemblies, the extent of devolved powers varies considerably between 
Stormont (Northern Ireland), Cardiff (Wales) and Holyrood (Scotland). Thus, each 
context presents differences in terms of the executive, regulatory and legislative powers 
that have been accorded to them (Valler and Wood 2004). At present Stormont is subject 
to direct rule, the Scottish Parliament has considerably more power than the Welsh 
Assembly, and Scotland has a different legal system to England and Wales.  
Similarly, England has seen the establishment of RDAs (Regional Development 
Agencies) and subsequently to their abolishment the development of LEPs (Local 
Enterprise Partnerships) as attempts to decentralise policymaking and foster economic 
growth and a greater extent of autonomy at regional level (Department for Transport, 
Local Government and the Regions 2002; Sandford 2013). Eight RDAs were set up by 
the Labour government in 1999 across England (Valler et al. 2004). It must be highlighted 
that devolution processes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are not equivalent to 




as the latter are to be considered as a timid experimentation of regionalisation (Hazell 
2000)29. It is reasonable to suppose that future consequences of the changing policy 
framework such as the proposed developments regarding shifts of authority towards local 
contexts, as mentioned in the recent Industrial Strategy White Paper (BEIS 2017), 
regional centres of economic growth such as the Northern Powerhouse and the Midlands 
Engine (HM Treasury 2016; Department for Communities and Local Government 2017), 
or the UK leaving the United Kingdom will implicate further transformations in business-
government interactions. 
The UK’s economy is characterised by a market-oriented approach, which entails a 
limited role of the state. The political economy of the last decades of the twentieth century 
was formed by two divergent views (Greenwood and Traxler 2007). The first one relates 
to the support of manufacturing industries stemming from the industrial revolution, which 
proposed interactions between the state and business actors. However, the collective 
organisation of manufacturing businesses was problematic as the UK highlighted an 
“engrained belief in autonomy of the individual firm” (Moran 2006: 455). The second 
relates to the growing role of free-market capitalism. During the Conservative 
governments headed by Margaret Thatcher various reforms were implemented, which 
other than bringing the UK closer to the second approach, limited the authority of 
organised interests (Crouch 1995; Greaves 2008). Overall, the political economy in the 
UK has contrasted the development of strong interactions between the government and 
business (Valler and Wood 2004).  
3.4 Charting the development and peculiarities of UK trade associations  
3.4.1 Historical and legislative background 
The UK’s history of collective action in the business environment, particularly trough 
trade associations, is characterised by contrasting dynamics. On one side there have been 
several, yet ineffective, attempts to organise and structure collective action and business 
interests to provide government and other political institutions with recognised 
organisations that would become the preferred channel of interaction between the public 
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and private sectors (Grant 1993). On the other side, factors including the contraposition 
between the financial sector and manufacturing firms, as well as rivalries in business 
representation, hindered the development of strong trade associations (Moran 2006). An 
additional notion that must be underlined relates to the fact that strong individual 
entrepreneurial activity resulted in the modern state being developed after the 
industrialisation processes and this further exacerbated the predilection towards limited 
state intervention (Greaves 2008).  
Keystones in the history of trade associations have been the work undertaken by Lord 
Devlin in the early 70s and by Lord Heseltine in the mid 90s. Both policy makers aspired 
to regulate associations in order to improve the power and capabilities of businesses as 
well as their interactions with government as there was the recognition that organisations 
representing business interests were excessively fragmented and unproductive. In 1972 
the Devlin Commission on Industrial and Commercial Representation advocated the 
establishment of a Confederation of British Business (Devlin Commission 1972). Whilst 
in 1993, during a speech to the CBI and through subsequent government publications 
Lord Heseltine, the president of the Board of Trade, sought to strengthen trade association 
representation and render them more effective organisations (Boléat 1997). The 
government’s policy strategy was to encourage the self-development of associations by 
promoting larger organisations, namely lead organisations that could represent broad 
industries allowing the government to have representative associations with which they 
could interact more easily (Bennett 1997b). Moreover, the government proposed that it 
would only interact with one organisation from each sector (Grant 2001), but ultimately 
efforts to change the configuration of business associations did not have effect and the 
arrangement remains highly fragmented (Bennett and Payne 2000; Grant 1983). Even 
though the recommendations did not lead to any specific developments, these efforts 
served as a catalyst for many associations and firms to rethink the role and functions of 
collective organisations, as well as mark the beginning of several mergers and coalitions 
between associations (Macdonald 2001). As a result, the 1970s and 1980s saw an evident 
increase in the number of trade associations being formed (May, McHugh, and Taylor 
1998). Nevertheless, rather than direct government activities, the “indirect impact of 
government structures” has been the key factor in shaping trade associations’ 




In recent years, on the backdrop of regulation developed at European level, there have 
been further attempts by British policymakers to legislate on collective interest 
organisations through the development of policy and standards on consultations with 
external stakeholders, such as the Code of Practice on Written Consultation, prepared in 
2001 by the Cabinet Office and consequently revised several times (Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008). The Code defines broad guidelines 
for consultations with external stakeholders whilst elaborating policy and legislation, 
however it “does not have legal force and does not prevail over statutory or mandatory 
requirements” (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008: 5). 
The efforts to regulate the interactions between private and public bodies have been 
undertaken to broaden consultation to firms with fewer resources and thus less able to 
interact with political institutional bodies, as well as recognise the role of associations 
and other bodies representing broad and collective interests. 
Nevertheless, coherently with the political and economic notions highlighted above, such 
as the pluralist political arrangement and a limited role of the state, as well as a market-
oriented approach, the regulatory and legislative framework in which trade associations 
have developed and currently operate is relatively unhampered by regulations and is 
rather characterised by a general laissez-faire approach. Hence, there is no specific 
legislation on trade associations (Greenwood and Traxler 2007) that requires them to be 
registered or to publish accounts (Boléat 2003). Additionally, associations can take 
various legal formats including: a company limited by guarantee, a company limited by 
shares and an unincorporated structure” (Greenwood and Traxler 2007: 318). 
This legislative freedom is reflected in both the internal relations with firms, as well as in 
the external relations with governments and other public bodies. In terms of the first, 
which differs consistently from other European nations (e.g. Germany) there are no 
structural incentives (e.g. collective bargaining processes) for firms to join them (Bennett 
1997b)30. This produced competitive forces amongst associations to compete with each 
other in order to broaden their membership (Bailey and Rupp 2006). In terms of the latter, 
interactions are relatively unstructured and voluntary, as trade associations do not enjoy 
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a “formalised state recognition” (Bennett 1997b: 13). Moreover, the effects of such a 
laissez-faire approach, and the feature that in the UK business associations do not have a 
statuatory status, has meant a weak national integration and that the size and 
fragmentation is similar to the US (Bennett 2000). In the words of Valler and Wood, trade 
associations in the UK “have lacked the financial, organisational, personnel, and political 
resources that derive from the public law status and obligatory membership arrangements 
found in other European context” (2004: 1840). 
There are several factors that have exerted pressure on trade bodies in the UK. At the 
national level, the devolution processes have brought positive and negative consequences 
to trade associations. On a negative note, this additional layer of decision-making has 
placed extra costs on trade associations as these have been forced to monitor 
developments at this specific sub-national level and, when necessary, engage with them. 
On the positive side, trade associations particularly the regional ones, have had a local 
institutional counterpart with whom they could directly relate to. This meant that for 
specific matters they would not have to interact with policy-makers in Westminster and 
Whitehall. At a broader supranational level the development of European institutions has 
had several impacts on the development and roles of UK trade associations. The first 
relates to the need for these organisations to focus on the activities stemming from 
Brussels, as these would have an increasing effect on businesses in EU member states. 
The development of the legislative environment and the growing impact of European 
level regulations, bureaucracy and laws on British businesses forced trade associations to 
add an additional operational level that would necessarily have to transcend national 
borders. This inevitably led to an increase in costs and the need for supplementary 
resources to tackle these tasks. Strictly linked to this feature has been the formation of 
trade associations or federations at the European level, such as ASD, that would help 
national associations manage this new legislative environment. It is nevertheless 
important to highlight that UK trade associations undertook activities in continental 
Europe even before the formation of the European Institutions (Bennett 1997b).  
3.4.2 The aerospace context  
The UK aerospace industry currently exhibits a strong trade association involvement, 




industry-wide associations. The main differences between industry wide and sectorial 
organisations concern the specific industry expertise that the latter organisations have, as 
well as profounder relationships with companies, particularly the smaller firms. 
Geographically, there are national trade associations, which are generally headquartered 
in London and may have regional offices, as well as regional trade associations, which 
represent members in specific areas. The latter have come to exist as a result of clusters 
of firms being formed in various areas in the UK.  
Aerospace companies can thus be members of industry wide organisations and/or 
sectorial associations, which can be represented as a continuum31. On one side, the first 
typology of organisation represents the entire industrial base and is lead by organisations 
such as the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) and the Confederation of British 
Industries (CBI). The CBI represents over 190,000 businesses and has 13 offices across 
the UK, as well as representation overseas, such as in Brussels and Washington (CBI 
2017). In the middle, there are other organisations that operate at national level such as 
the EEF - The Manufacturers’ Organisation (EEF) 32  and the Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB). The first represents manufacturing and engineering companies, whilst 
the latter represents small and medium-sized firms. The similarities between the two 
organisations are that they represent businesses across a variety of sectors and have 
operative offices across the country. At the other end of the spectrum, there are the 
associations that represent specific industries or subsectors of industries.  
The ADS Group is based in London and is the national body representing the Aerospace, 
Defence, Security and Space industries and can be considered as the most important 
sectorial body in these sectors. The ADS Group was established in 1915 as the Society of 
British Aircraft Constructors and then in 1964 changed name to the Society of British 
Aircraft Companies (SBAC) (Gale 2016). In 2009 the SBAC, which was originally solely 
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dedicated to aerospace, merged with the Defence Manufacturers Association and the 
Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers to form ADS. The association runs 
the Farnborough International Air show through its Farnborough office, which is one of 
the most important air shows in the world, alongside the Paris Air show (Le Bourget) and 
the Dubai Air show (ADS 2017). ADS has regional offices in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland that were established to interact with local governments following the devolution 
processes, as well as overseas offices in Toulouse and India.  
Furthermore, companies operating in the aerospace and defence sectors across the UK 
have the opportunity to join a number of sectorial regional trade associations (Table 4).  
Table 4: Overview of regional trade associations in the UK aerospace industry 
Trade 
association 





Founded in 1994, the North West 
Aerospace Alliance is the key industry 
organisation in the region, representing 
and uniting companies and organisations 







The Midlands Aerospace Alliance was 
formed in 2003 to support and represent 
the aerospace industry across the Midlands 
region.  
Coventry 300 





The Isle of Man Aerospace Cluster was 
founded in 2006 and offers cost-effective, 
joined-up solutions for its global blue-chip 
client base. As part of the North West 
Aerospace Alliance one of the most active 
aerospace clusters in Europe, the Cluster is 
part of one of the most influential 





Founded in 2001, the Aerospace Wales 
Forum is the trade association for all 
companies operating in the Aerospace & 
Defence sector in Wales and exists to 
provide the best service we can to assist 
our members by promoting your company 
in our capabilities database and giving you 
access to events, networking opportunities 








The West of England Aerospace Forum is 
a membership trade association that 
champions and supports the interests of 
the aerospace and defence industry in the 
South West of England. The forum leads 
the sector in delivering national supply 




chain initiatives, which connect the SME 






Farnborough Aerospace Consortium is a 
not-for-profit trade association acting as a 
facilitator of business between large global 
primes and the supply chain and as an 
enabler of business support to its members 
and partners.  It is one of the largest and 
most established aerospace and defence 
associations in the UK, providing support 
to, and furthering the long-term strategic 
growth of the sector in the South East. 
Farnborough 300 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data gained from trade association documentary sources.  
There is a further local level, which is embodied by associations such as the Coventry and 
Warwickshire Aerospace Forum (CWAF), however this latter typology is rather an 
avenue for small firms to collaborate and network locally (CWAF 2016). Moreover, these 
forums are not highly structured and the individuals leading them are generally involved 
in running their own companies.  
In line with the notions regarding the general structure of regional bodies in the UK, 
which have been historically underdeveloped (Valler and Wood 2004), there are 
considerable differences between the national and regional associations and the most 
evident dissimilarities concern structure, size and resources. ADS, similarly to most 
national associations operating in other sectors, enjoys larger resources than regional 
associations including a higher number of employees as well as a defined governance 
structure (Figure 5), which includes several committees and special interest groups that 
are composed of elected member firm representatives. Moreover, national associations 
are able to combine their member companies’ interests and should represent the national 
sectoral interest (Tedlow 1988). In contrast, regional associations are characterised by 
extremely limited resources and limited employees. Some regional trade associations are 










Figure 5: ADS Group governance structure 
Source: ADS (2017) 
In relation to political activities, the sectorial regional and national trade associations 
work collaboratively towards influencing the policymaking process through the 
“Aerospace and Defence Federation”, which allocates the national entity (i.e. ADS) the 
power to represent the collective membership in the political field and the smaller 
associations a marginal political function, as evidenced by its stated purpose: 
The Aerospace and Defence Federation has been formed as a 
result of the Regional Trade Associations (RTAs) working 
together for the benefit of its combined Membership. The 
Federation acts to provide a single 'voice' for Aerospace and 
Defence industry members, but also provides autonomy to work 
at a regional level, when opportunities arise (WEAF 2017). 
Nevertheless, regional associations have divergent levels of presence and influence in 
their socio-political arenas. One of the most prolific and dynamic settings has been the 
southwest, where the WEAF has proactively helped to create Innovation Aerospace 
(iAero), which is a collaboration between the aerospace industry, local institutions 
including the LEPs, local government as well as local universities (Heart of the South 
West LEP 2017).  
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. The unabridged version 




3.5 Summary and context justification  
This chapter has presented the context of the study by offering an overview of the value 
of the aerospace industry and a description of the political and economic institutional 
environment in which trade associations operate. In addition, it has presented a brief 
account and development of trade associations in the UK. This concluding section 
underlines the reasons and justifications for exploring the role and functions of trade 
associations, as well as the focus on their political activities in this particular sector.  
Investigating business-government relations is particularly insightful in sectors that 
exhibit a robust interaction with political actors. The reasons that make the UK aerospace 
industry an extremely favourable setting to explore the relations between business and 
political actors can be divided in three broad categorisations: institutional, industry and 
firm specific. These categories underline, on three different levels, the strong “degree of 
politicization” (Lawton and Rajwani 2011: 172) of this industry.  
First, at the institutional level, political actors and decision-makers value the aerospace 
industry due to its economic contributions to the national economy through the 
employment of highly skilled people, a high level of exports and technology spill overs 
to other sectors (e.g. Hartley 2014; Rhodes 2014). The military relevance of the industry 
has historically meant strong interconnections between government and companies that 
produced military products. Moreover, the liberal and deregulated environment in which 
trade associations operate combined with the necessity of political actors to gain expert 
information to develop policy, places sectorial trade associations in a position of strength 
to be examined as they will need to develop complex political strategies to attempt to 
influence the policymaking process.  
Second, at industry level, the aerospace context is characterised by a strong level of 
legislative and political institutional involvement, which has resulted in this sector being 
extremely regulated. As previously mentioned, high levels of regulatory intervention will 
drive firms to participate in political action and bear the costs of operating in the political 
arena and to develop political strategies (Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015). Individual 
firms in the aerospace industry are thus heavily involved in developing political strategies 
through their in-house government affairs offices, political and communication 




and other intermediary organisations. Moreover the industry exhibits a high trade 
association involvement, including industry-wide organisations as well as sector specific 
associations. This is further evidenced by the quantity of trade associations operating at 
the national level and also at the regional and local level. This is evident not only through 
subsidiaries of national trade associations but also through the widespread establishment 
of regional trade associations across the country.  
Third, at firm level, individual companies exhibit strong interactions with government 
and government departments. As abovementioned, this happens within the military sector 
as well as in the civil sector. Clearly, firms that manufacture military products will enjoy 
a stronger level of involvement given that the national government is a major customer. 
Moreover, firms heavily rely on government, government departments as well as other 
political institutions (e.g. embassies and consular representations) to promote the industry 
and its products abroad and unlock new market opportunities (Department for 
International Trade 2015). As stressed by Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh (2006) 
firms that have their business considerably affected by governments, are expected to be 
highly involved in developing political activities and establishing strong relations with 
political actors. Again, this feature will have repercussions on the role and functions of 
trade associations, as these necessary interactions can be then transferred within trade 
associations operating within this specific sector. Trade associations that have amongst 
their members companies that enjoy strong interactions with government and high levels 
of political capital may experience advantages that trade associations in other sectors will 
not have. Moreover, given the intertwined relations between government and firms, the 
latter will need, in specific circumstances, trade associations to convey delicate and 
sensitive messages as to not expose themselves politically.   
An additional justification resides in the timing in which this study took place. The data 
was collected in the time spanning the lead up to the Brexit referendum, subsequent the 
result to leave the European union, and first phases of the negotiations. All business 
sectors will probably be affected (KPMG 2017), however the aerospace sector is in a 
particularly delicate position given the importance of international collaborations and 




and the relationship with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)33 (RAeS 2017). 
Hence, this is a particularly significant feature as business actors including firms and trade 
associations increased their participation in the political arena to influence the 
development of new policies and regulations that will come into place once the UK 
definitely leaves the European Union (Liedong and Rajwani 2017).  
Finally, in addition to the abovementioned features, focusing on a specific sector has 
helped delineate a well-defined research context, narrow the focus of the research and 
examine in greater detail and depth the role and functions of trade associations.   
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Chapter 4  Research approach  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology that is adopted in this thesis, including the 
research design and methods employed. Specifically, it emphasises the benefit of 
undertaking a qualitative research approach centred around interviews, as this enables to 
capture individuals’ perceptions. Thus, a comprehensive research design is developed 
based on qualitative methods to reach the aim of this research, which is it to explore the 
role and political activities undertaken by trade associations in the context of the UK 
aerospace industry.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the philosophical considerations 
including the ontological and epistemological perspectives, providing an answer to the 
basic foundational questions that underpin this enquiry. Section 4.3 provides an overview 
of the research design and underlines the case study strategy and the adoption of 
institutional mapping. Section 4.4 provides a detailed report of what data is collected, as 
well as how and why it is collected, highlighting the main source of data, which are in-
depth semi-structured interviews. Section 4.5 offers an in-depth outline of the data 
analysis process, providing the data structure as an effective and visual representation of 
a rigorous and systematic approach to analysing the collected data. Together the sections 
emphasise how validity and reliability of this research - from the research design to the 
collection and analysis of the data - are ensured throughout the entire process.  
4.2 Philosophical considerations 
Preceding the description of the research design that is developed for this research, which 
includes the logics used to develop knowledge - meaning the tools and techniques 
implemented to generate and analyse data - it is necessary to acknowledge and underline 
the research philosophy that serves as a foundational pillar of the design (Blaikie 2009; 
Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2012). Researchers can be informed by a wide array of 
philosophical stances (Elliot 2014), however, given the limitations of this thesis these 
cannot be covered extensively. Nevertheless, the crucial notion that will be highlighted is 
to understand that each philosophical worldview will have an influence on the research 




The main philosophical paradigm that establishes the foundations of this research and 
informs methodological choices can be ascribed to the interpretative paradigm. In 
contrast to the positivist approach, which is rather associated to quantitative research, this 
view is in line with qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2011). The positivist 
approach implies that knowledge is defined in an objective way, and that the researcher 
“observes and measures the reality that exists out there” (Creswell 2014: 7). In 
juxtaposition, the interpretivist paradigm rather denotes a constructed knowledge and that 
the researcher has an active role in defining as well as constantly interpreting and 
modifying it.  
According to Stake (2005) the researcher has a crucial role in creating and shaping 
evidence. Thus, knowledge is developed through the formation of concepts and models 
that are continually interpreted and modified by the researcher (De Massis and Kotlar 
2014). Gephart (2004) argues that this paradigm is particularly relevant when the research 
aims to provide insights of a specific context and how this will shape a particular 
phenomenon.  
This research is thus rooted in the interpretivist perspective as the researcher shares the 
perspective that reality is socially constructed, and the researcher has a key role in 
forming and shaping the evidence (Stake 2005). This philosophical perspective is 
coherent with both the overall strategy, as well as with the specific data collection and 
analysis techniques. With respect to the first, case study research - the proposed research 
strategy of this thesis, which will be covered in detail in the following sections - can 
endorse different philosophical perspectives. Whilst Yin (2014) rather follows the 
positivist approach, this research is aligned to other scholars (e.g. Bryman and Bell 2003; 
Denzin 2001; Miles and Huberman 1994; Stake 2005) who follow the interpretative 
paradigm.  
With respect to the specific data collection and analysis methods, the adoption of a 
qualitative approach and specifically the use of semi-structured interviews provide an 
intensive method of investigation and create a rich understanding of the field of enquiry. 
Hence, knowledge is advanced through the development of themes and patterns “to make 
sense of human experience” (De Massis and Kotlar 2014: 17). Considering the 




perspectives that have been used to unearth underlying concepts, this philosophical 
approach enables the researcher to engage with participants and with the data stemming 
from the interviews and play an active role in constructing meaning. Hence, this allows 
for an in-depth investigation and a profound interaction with participants. Moreover, 
given that the objective of this study is to explore the role and political functions of trade 
associations in a specific industrial, socio-political and economic environment, the 
interpretivist stance is beneficial as it allows the researcher to retain a pronounced 
sensitivity to the specific context. 
4.3 Research design  
The following section describes the different stages and procedures that are involved in 
the development of the research design. According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 
(2012: 196) the research design is “the way research questions and objectives are 
operationalized into a research project”. Thus, to address the questions and objectives, 
which have been highlighted in the previous chapter, a case study research design was 
developed, entailing qualitative methods. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009: 6) define 
qualitative methods as “the techniques associated with the gathering, analysis, 
interpretation, and presentation of narrative information”, whereas quantitative methods 
are associated with numerical information.  
Johnson and Harris (2003) state that quantitative and qualitative methods can be 
considered as two ends of a continuum. The former is useful when research is structured 
and is undertaken in an area that presents a sensible amount of existing knowledge and 
precise constructs. In contrast, the latter is useful when the enquiry is explorative and 
attempts to generate theory, as there is not enough knowledge to develop specific 
constructs, variables and relationships. Qualitative methods allow the researcher to 
analyse complicated environments and produce a wealth of in-depth data (Corbin and 
Strauss 2014), as well as “thorough descriptions of actual actions in real-life contexts” 
(Gephart 2004: 455). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008: 32) argue “qualitative research 
settings do not operate on preset modelling on variables and their mutual correlational or 
casual relationships, but more on constant circularity and linking empirical analysis to a 




towards the context of the study rather than the adoption of pre-existing connections 
found in extant literature.  
Additionally, Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey (2011: 42) state that qualitative methods 
“focus on understanding and Verstehen of experiences and behaviour, and on hearing the 
voices of people themselves”. Understanding and Verstehen are two viewpoints that 
contribute to the comprehension of perceptions and behaviour. Whilst the first, focuses 
on the researcher’s perception, the second focuses on the studied population’s standpoint 
and understanding their perspective in their own context, specifically “studying people's 
'lived experiences’, which occur within a particular historical and social context” 
(Ormston et al. 2003: 11). 
This research and the proposed approach are consistent with these notions as the main 
method of data collection are semi-structured interviews, which focus on gaining 
participants in-depth views and perceptions on the specific role of trade associations, the 
institutional environment in which they operate as well as their interaction with policy 
and decision-makers. Acknowledging and comprehensively understanding informants’ 
perspectives, experiences and context is key when analysing the development of political 
strategy and the implementation of political activities. Hence, this study builds on the two 
circumstances advanced by Van Maanen, Dabbs, and Faulkner (1982) and underlined by 
De Weerd-Neerdhof (2001: 513) as “the use of close-up, detailed observation of the 
natural world by the investigator; and the attempt to avoid prior commitment to any 
theoretical model”.  
The qualitative approach is further justified by extant work on corporate political activity 
and business-government relations. Barron (2013), Barron, Pereda, and Stacey (2017), 
and Hillman and Wan (2005) are amongst numerous scholars who emphasise the 
difficulties on accessing information on corporate political activities, and Lux, Crook, 
and Woehr (2011: 241) advance calls for a qualitative approach, particularly through 
interviews. Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman (2006: 327) argue that qualitative methods are 
the most appropriate when “investigating the significance of political events and 
processes”. The scholars build on Shaffer (1995) who highlights that this field of inquiry 
lies in an intricate context, where events are irregular and sporadic, thus stressing the 




utilised. This qualitative approach is aligned with scholars who have explored lobbying 
activities through the adoption of in-depth interviews (e.g. Barron and Trouille 2016).  
Moreover, with regards to the sensitivity and complexity of the topics touched within this 
study, it is difficult to envision that the same quality, richness and breadth of data could 
be gained through the submission of a questionnaire. As was witnessed by the researcher 
during the initial stages of the research, the establishment of relationships as well as 
gaining a position of trust was necessary to prepare for the actual interviews, place the 
informants at ease and gather the appropriate quality of data. Finally, the limited number 
of trade associations in the UK aerospace industry, as well as the limited number of 
individuals involved in political activities, are further justifications for the adoption of a 
qualitative approach. 
Research approaches are frequently categorised in different ways, and whilst having 
recognised that qualitative methods are usually aligned with the inductive approach, this 
research design follows an abductive approach (Creswell 2014). This strategy is different 
to the classical categorisations of inductive and deductive approaches. It is rather a 
combination of both. Whilst the inductive approach “is intended to allow meanings to 
emerge from data as you collect them in order to identify patterns and relationships to 
build a theory” (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2012: 48), the deductive approach 
necessitates a clear theoretical stance from the outset that will be tested through the 
collected data. Furthermore, the inductive approach does not necessarily signify that 
theory developed within extant literature should not be considered. On the contrary, it 
enables the researcher to be theoretically informed, which will contribute to the definition 
of concepts that will be investigated during the research. Creswell (2014) states that 
qualitative researchers alternate the inductive and deductive reasoning. In line with this 
view, Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2012) argue that numerous management and 
business scholars adopt the abductive reasoning approach. Thus, the entire research 
design entails an alternation of inductive and deductive reasoning rather than the adoption 
of one or the other (Suddaby 2006). The abductive approach allows the researcher to 
extend extant theories, and at the same time present new ideas, as can be appreciated in 
extant work in the field on business-government relations, for example Barron and 




Hence, the initial phases of the data analysis entail an inductive reasoning approach, 
whereas the latter phases attempt to place the emerging patterns and themes within extant 
theory. The adoption of such an approach, escaping inductive and deductive extremes is 
helpful towards maintaining a strong connection with the studied context (Hay 2002), 
ensuring the findings are grounded in the data and that informant viewpoints are 
preponderant. 
4.3.1 Research strategy: the case study approach 
This research entails a case study approach, which given the sensitivity, lack of 
information and the exploratory nature, was considered to be the most appropriate (Stake 
2005). This particular approach enables the adoption of a multiplicity of research 
methodologies and allows drawing together a wealth of complex data (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007; Gillham 2000). Hence, it allows methodological triangulation, as well as 
the triangulation of sources. Yin (2014: 92) argues that any finding or conclusion in a 
case study is likely to be “much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several 
different sources of information following a corroborative mode”. This is a key aspect as 
this research focuses on converging data from different sources of the aerospace industry 
stemming from firms, associations, political and regulatory institutions, as well as from a 
wealth of other entities operating within this specific context. Ghauri and Grønhaug 
(2005: 114) suggest that this method is a “qualitative and field-based construction and 
analysis of case studies” which often encompasses data gathering from numerous sources. 
Moreover, a clear benefit is that the case study strategy allows the design and analysis to 
be tailored to the research questions and objectives (Meyer 2001). 
Case studies can be viewed as a mere method for collecting data, or used - as in this thesis 
- in a holistic approach as a comprehensive strategy (Stake 1995; Verschuren 2003; Yin 
2003). There are a variety of definitions presented within the literature. Simons (2009) 
argues that methods of data gathering are subdued to the commitment of investigating 
what arises from real events as well as the actual definition of the case study. The author 
further defines case studies as “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the 
complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system 
in a “real life” context” (Simons 2009: 21). Whitfield and Strauss (1998: 103) describe 




and to understand or to explain the phenomena placing them in their wider context”. This 
is in line with Yin (2014), who states that case studies are appropriate and advantageous 
when the investigation is centred on a contemporary set of events, over which the 
researcher has little or no control and when the research questions that are been asked 
relate to “how?” and “why?” questions. Flyvbjerg (2006: 221) in advancing case study 
research stresses “case study produces the type of context-dependent knowledge that 
research on learning shows to be necessary to allow people to develop from rule-based 
beginners to virtuoso experts34”. Consistently with these notions this research explores 
trade associations in their specific context.  
There are several approaches to developing case studies, which differ in the general 
design and structure. On one hand, scholars advance a structured approach. For example, 
Yin (2014) lists the necessary components of case study strategy: the research questions 
(which have to be original and informed by the literature review), the propositions (which 
enable the researcher to focus on what should be examined), the unit(s) of analysis, the 
logic linking data and propositions, and the criteria for interpreting findings. Other 
scholars argue for a more flexible and iterative approach, entailing “interplay between 
data collection, analysis and analytical framework” (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008: 129), 
rather than a standardized approach that could limit the understanding of the specific 
phenomenon (Dubois and Gadde 2002). This research is in line with the latter approach 
as the development of the theoretical framework is developed during the research whilst 
interpreting the findings and linking these with theoretical insights, rather than at the 
outset of the study, which might have limited the understanding of the studied phenomena 
(Dubois and Gadde 2002; Van Maanen, Dabbs, and Faulkner 1982). This approach has 
entailed openness to the broad range of theories that have been used to investigate CPA, 
nonmarket strategy and business-government relations (as mentioned in Chapter 2), 
which is in line with the exploratory nature of this research and involved selecting the 
most appropriate perspectives during the data analysis process. As will be underlined in 
the following sections this is consistent with the abductive approach and iterative 
processes of data collection and analysis.  
                                                 
34 Virtuoso relates to the qualitative advancement in the learning process. This notion is clearly 




Eisenhardt (1989: 533) stresses that case study strategy is exceptionally appropriate to 
organisation and management studies as it supports “understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings”, by exploiting a multiplicity of perspectives and variables, thus 
highlighting the several factors that characterise a studied phenomenon.  Case study 
strategy is suitable to cope with the circumstances in which there are multiple variables 
of interest that are rooted in the context of examination. This feature is extremely 
beneficial to this research because the area of business-government relations lies at the 
intersection of various independent systems (i.e. private and public), which constantly 
interact. The several perspectives are necessary to comprehensively acknowledge the 
peculiarities of the interactions between firms, associations and political institutions and 
simultaneously take into account the social and political environment and its norms, rules 
and regulations. 
There is a variety of different types of case studies that can be undertaken and the choice 
of one over another is given by the overall research objective (De Massis and Kotlar 
2014). Yin (2014) argues that there are three main categorisations: exploratory, when the 
purpose is to comprehend how a phenomena occurs and can offer a pilot research; 
explanatory, when the purpose is to comprehend why a phenomena takes place; 
descriptive, when the case study’s aim is to underline the importance of a phenomena. 
Stake (2005) proposes three different case study typologies: intrinsic, instrumental and 
collective. The first, relates to understanding the purpose of the research. The second 
relates to understanding a specific matter within the case. The third relates to several case 
studies that aim to comprehensively understand a phenomenon, which transcends each 
individual case. An additional categorisation offered by Babbie (2007) differentiates 
between studies that confirm or modify theoretical concepts, and ones that propose new 
conceptualisations.  This research is primarily exploratory in nature as it attempts to 
explore trade associations’ specific role, as well as understand how trade associations 
develop their political strategy, and exert their influence. However, descriptive features 
are combined and integrated in the research as well.   
There are additional differentiations in the case study methodology, as it can be designed 
and developed as single or multiple case studies, comparative or longitudinal, holistic or 
embedded, and intensive or extensive. This is another area where scholars have divergent 




studies require an extraordinary level of access. However, these are more suitable when 
the case is “critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal” (Yin 2014) and 
presents robust descriptive and persuasive features (Siggelkow 2007). Whereas, in 
contrast Dubois and Gadde (2002: 557) stress that multiple case studies allow researchers 
to cover more breadth but are very limited in terms of the depth of the findings. 
Furthermore, case studies enable the researcher to embrace a longitudinal perspective 
instead of focusing solely on a snapshot in time. This feature is important to capture 
information regarding the development of trade associations over time, as well as on 
policy developments, which can be lengthy. A comparative case study was initially 
considered, however it was recognised that it would be more advantageous to understand 
the intricacies and complexities of this unique industrial sector, and contemplate 
undertaking a comparative approach in future research. 
There are a number of limitations within the case study approach that should be 
highlighted, as this acknowledgement could assist the researcher to anticipate and avoid 
them. Scholars (Johnston, Leach, and Liu 1999: 201) have highlighted that this approach 
has been criticised for the lack of objectivity and methodological rigour and call for a 
systematic methodological approach. The collection of data in an open way, as is done 
when adopting qualitative methods, can lead to the potential risk of acquiring a 
disproportionate quantity of data that has to be managed and analysed (Johnson and 
Harris 2003; Harrison 2002). As a consequence of the openness and richness of the 
information, one of the pitfalls could arise from the different interpretations and from the 
biased nature of the sample and information. Furthermore, these data collection methods 
can be time and resource consuming. Keddie (2006) argues that this approach does not 
allow generalisation, as the cases will not be sufficiently representative, and qualitative 
case studies are frequently criticised for the inability to generalise to wider populations. 
This view is guided by a misinterpretation of the concept of generalizability in the case 
study approach (Blaikie 2009) as this should be substituted by the concept of ‘fittingness’. 
While undertaking qualitative research, generalizability should be rather considered as 
the ‘fit’ concerning the researched context and another to which researchers could apply 
the same notions and assumptions (Sarantakos 2005). Similarly, Yin (2014) suggests that 
case studies are not intended to generalise to different populations, generalizability rather 




generalizability towards theoretical propositions. In this study the aim is not to develop 
outcomes that can be generalised across different organisations, operational areas, 
industries and/or countries, it rather concerns the exploration and the in-depth 
understanding of business-government relations in a particular and defined context.  
Notwithstanding the disadvantages that have been highlighted, these do not outweigh the 
advantages to be gained from the use of this research approach in such a complex and 
multifaceted study.  
4.3.2 The definition of the case study  
The selection of case studies is a critical decision in the research design, and the choice 
is mainly given by how suitable a case is in revealing a particular phenomenon. There are 
several debates surrounding the design and implementation of case studies – especially 
selecting the case itself - and the main issue of contentious commonly stems from the 
different philosophical perspectives (Piekkari, Welch, Paavilainen 2009). For example, 
scholars who adopt a positivistic stance (e.g. Yin 2014) favour a rigid design, bounding 
the study to set research questions, objectives and a clear theoretical framework. In 
contrast, scholars (e.g. Dubois and Araujo 2004; Stake 2005) who favour alternative 
stances, such as the interpretivist perspective, argue that the decision of the actual case 
and unit of analysis will be developed during the data collection phase, as access is gained 
and empirical evidence collected (Ragin 1992). Coherently with the philosophical 
perspective, as well as the iterative and qualitative process adopted within this study, the 
latter approach was favoured as a broad sample was defined at the beginning but was 
refined as access was gained and data was collected during the research (as discussed in 
section 4.4.3).  
This thesis develops an extensive case study on trade associations representing 
manufacturing firms in the UK aerospace industry. The choice of the UK aerospace 
industry is largely given by its political and economic strategic importance and because 
the industry can be considered as a “political salient industry” (Mahini 1988). Thus, the 
relations between the private and public spheres are relatively easily observable, which 
can be considered as an advantage for the exploration of this particular topic. The choice 
of this sector is in line with previous studies that have examined business-government 




Lawton and Rajwani 2011). Several aerospace industries were taken into consideration, 
and initially the broader European level was contemplated; however due to various 
limitations (e.g. access to data constraints), and information gained through pilot 
interviews, the UK context was considered to be the most appropriate. Moreover, it must 
be considered that the influence and effectiveness of associations can vary depending on 
the industries and sectors in which they operate (Greenwood 2002). Specifically, as 
highlighted in Chapter 3, the UK aerospace industry exhibits precise characteristics that 
are highly beneficial to understand the role of associations and to the examination of the 
dynamics that govern private-public interrelation. For example the political and economic 
strategic importance that is given to this particular sector (Hartley 2014), the strong trade 
association involvement and high levels of industry regulations (Grier, Munger, and 
Roberts 1991; Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015), as well as individual firms’ strong 
government interactions (Hadani 2012; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002). 
The units of analysis are regional and national trade associations representing 
manufacturing companies operating in the broader aerospace industry (i.e. military and 
civil sectors), whilst the units of observation are trade associations and firms, as well as 
industry experts. This study focuses on meta-organisations, namely organisations whose 
members are other organisations. Thus, this research focuses solely on the trade 
associations that represent firms operating in the manufacturing sector and not other 
organisations such as professional associations. These associations were theoretically 
selected (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 27), as they are particularly suitable for 
revealing the underlying mechanisms involved in the development of trade associations’ 
political activities as well as the relationship between the trade associations, firms and 
government actors. The selected trade associations are revelatory and extreme exemplars 
given their overall robust and durable connections with the policymaking arena. 
Additionally, the decision to focus on a specific industrial sector rather than trade 
associations in general has facilitated the collection of rich data on the inner workings of 
trade associations and relationships with political stakeholders (Barnett 2013).  
A further consideration on the sampling of the trade associations refers to the distinction 
between the national and regional organisations as these can be considered as “polar 




environment, management and key political stakeholders, which can be advantageous in 
revealing contrasting patterns in the data.  
4.3.3 Institutional mapping  
Institutional mapping is a strategic instrument that is extremely advantageous and 
effective in identifying the main stakeholders and institutions, as well as comprehending 
the functions and relationships between them (Aligica 2006). This tool is commonly 
utilised in policymaking as well as social change initiatives, and the essential aim of 
“mapping” is to visualize and to reduce complexity. Aligica (2006) stresses that it is 
indispensable in acknowledging the institutions involved in a particular project, their role 
and relations. Moreover, it enables the identification of possible alliances and threats. 
Cummings and Doh (2000) argue that consequently to the notions that organisations 
operate in different environments contemporarily (i.e. market and nonmarket) there is the 
need to map these contexts according to the actors that populate them. They propose a 
framework that enables to ascertain the relevant stakeholders. The institutional map 
developed in Chapter 5 (Figure 10) is informed by extant scholarly literature, as well as 
by information gained during the in-depth interviews and documentary sources. This 
implies that the map, coherently with the entire research design has been subject to an 
iterative process and to modifications arising from the acquisition of new data and 
information. 
Barley (2010) develops an institutional map of the US environment to highlight how 
organisations shape the institutional field and influence policymakers. The author argues 
that corporations use other organisations to amplify the messages they are attempting to 
convey to political actors and regulators. In their conceptual paper, Rajwani, Lawton, and 
Philips (2015: 228) stress “we can extend Barley’s (2010) argument that corporations 
systematically build an institutional field to exert greater influence on government and 
see trade associations as proxies that fulfil this need”. This study seeks to advance this 
argument and contribute to the extant debate by providing empirical evidence that trade 
associations’ development of an institutional field is an integral part of their political 
functions.  
This study applies institutional mapping for three main reasons. Firstly, to sample the 




research, as well as their interests and interactions; secondly, to justify the selected case 
study; thirdly, to develop rich data that can integrate the interview data. According to 
Aligica (2006: 82) “the measure of validity of an institutional map is given by its ability 
to guide the strategic decision making”. With regards to this research, this can be 
translated in the ability of the developed map to understand the key actors in the business-
government interface and how trade associations interact with these when undertaking 
political activities.  
4.4 Data collection 
The following section highlights the process undertaken to collect data as well as the 
different sources that were utilised. It underlines how the data was collected and how it 
informed the research and contributed to the understanding of the researched phenomena 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen 2015). 
This research builds on the three principles of data collection in case studies: the 
utilisation of multiple sources of evidence such as interviews, archival data, media 
accounts, direct observations and secondary documentation; the creation of a case study 
database; and the maintenance of a chain of evidence (Yin 2014). The exploitation of 
different sources of evidence is necessary – during the collection and analysis processes 
- to converge and triangulate, which strengthens the findings, provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon, enhances validity, credibility and reliability (Creswell 
2014), and enables the integration of perceptual and objective data (De Massis and Kotlar 
2014). Patton (1990) stresses that the respective sources of data are advantageous in 
comprehending the entire phenomenon and that integrating the various elements is highly 
beneficial in strengthening the findings. The creation of a database is beneficial in storing, 
categorising and documenting the results of interviews, notes, transcripts and other 
documents so that they are easily retrievable for the analysis and interpretation. The 
database further serves as a repository for the narrative and increases the reliability of the 
case studies (Baxter and Jack 2008). Finally, the maintenance of a chain of evidence is 
crucial as it enables tracing the information and processes from the research questions to 
the conclusions (Yin 2014). Additionally, a comprehensive and thorough chain of 
evidence is key in ensuring reliability as it allows other researchers to replicate the study 




4.4.1 An iterative process  
This research has involved different stages of data collection and data analysis (the latter 
will be covered in the following section) through an iterative process that lasted several 
months as displayed in Figure 6. This particular approach can be considered as highly 
valuable as it has aided the development of the conceptual framework through the 
dialogue between extant literature and in-depth analysis of the collected primary and 
secondary data. Additionally, it has enabled the researcher to refine the research questions 
as new information was gained and thus providing a richer and more in-depth exploration 
of the phenomenon.  
Figure 6: An iterative research design 
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
The first phase of data collection started a few months into the PhD when the researcher 
attended and presented the study at the Aerodays conference in London35. The event 
helped to make observations, relate with potential informants and start collecting 
documents that were available to conference delegates, which were advantageous in 
broadening preliminary knowledge on the structure and key players of the aerospace 
industry in the UK. In this period various pilot interviews were conducted, which were 
                                                 




useful to identify key stakeholders and gain an initial understanding of the potential 
impact the research could have on the industry. This phase was followed by several 
phases of in-depth semi-structured interviews and documentary collection and analysis. 
This iterative process is advisable when undertaking qualitative studies (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008) and case study research (Partington 2002) as it helps the definition of a 
clearer focus and strengthens the conclusions. This particular approach is consistent with 
the research design used within this thesis. 
A key aspect of the iterative data collection process has been the establishment of 
relationships with key informants and gatekeepers within the industry. As mentioned 
several times by different participants, the aerospace industry in the UK can be considered 
as a “small family” and many events, conferences and trade shows see the participation 
of the same people. Attending several of these gatherings, has surely been beneficial 
towards the development of relationships with actors, some of whom have been 
interviewed in due course, and others who have helped gain access to other key 
informants. Hence, developing relationships based on trust has been a crucial element of 
this research and data collection process (Daniels and Cannice 2004). This point is 
particularly relevant when considering elite interviews.  
The overlap between data collection and analysis allows researchers to make on-going 
changes to some aspects of the research design and to identify new issues that are relevant 
for the research objectives. This iterative approach, including several stages of data 
collection assisted the reflective process on how to improve the data gathering process.   
4.4.2 Triangulation of methods and sources 
Triangulation is a central and evident aspect of this research, as using different sources, 
whilst moving between data collection, analysis and interpretation, usually characterises 
triangulation (Yin 1994). Moreover, triangulation within this research is undertaken on 
two distinct but intertwined levels: triangulation of methods and triangulation of sources 
(Denzin 1989).  
The first is undertaken by adopting different methods of data collection. As 
aforementioned, the main research method adopted for this research to collect data is 




such as company and association reports as well as institutional documents, at local, 
national and supranational levels. The adoption of different methods enables to 
triangulate and corroborate findings, as well as making them more accurate and 
substantial (Tracy 2010). In addition, triangulation is beneficial in validating the case 
study as well as in terms of avoiding limitations of individual methodologies. Verschuren 
(2003: 128) stresses that triangulating different methods prevents researchers from 
‘tunnel vision’. Stake (2005: 441) points out that triangulation ‘‘serves also to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen’’.  
A critical feature of data triangulation is that the findings should result from a 
convergence of the different sources of data. A typical pitfall is when researchers 
elaborate findings based on each individual and separate source of data and do not 
compare the evidence. It is thus necessary that facts or events be supported by various 
sources of evidence (Yin 2014). Hence, triangulating different sources is particularly 
relevant in terms of increasing the “representativeness and reliability of oral evidence” 
(Perks and Thomson 2003: 269). This approach has been consistently utilised throughout 
this research, as the data gained from documentary sources was methodically referred to 
inform the interview data. Hence, the information gathered from reports and archives 
served to triangulate the interview data.  
The second typology of triangulation relates to the different sources and is particularly 
significant when conducting research on business-government relations, given the 
various actors involved with extremely different perspectives. Yin (1994) advocates that 
good case studies contain multiple sources of information, as these will provide strength 
to the research. In his work on MNC-Host government relations, Luo (2001) recommends 
gaining information from both the firms’ perspective and from the institutional 
perspective. This is necessary to avoid developing research that is skewed towards the 
perspective of private organisations, and in contrast, being able to present a true picture 
and a reliable piece of research. In turn, the result of the research may not be one general 
explanation but rather the acknowledgement and understanding of diverse perspectives 
within the case.   
These different forms of triangulation conducted within this project are in line with the 




produce a more complete, holistic and contextual portrait of the object under study”. In 
the case study method this is particularly important, as you need to check and validate the 
information you receive from various sources.  
4.4.3 Semi-structured interviews  
Interviews are frequently the most common primary source of data when conducting case 
studies (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) as they offer numerous advantages, such as being 
collected for a specific study and providing rich and unique data (Ghauri and Grønhaug 
2005).  Primary sources of data are crucial in conducting research based on qualitative 
methods (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2012). According to Gillham (2000), this 
typology of data collection is considered to be the most appropriate when the topic is 
sensitive, which is the case for this particular study. De Massis and Kotlar (2014: 19) state 
that interviews are “targeted, insightful and highly efficient means by which to collect 
rich, empirical data”. Additionally, qualitative interviews are context specific and propose 
the occasion to explore phenomena in depth, revealing evident relationships and 
processes. 
Yeung (1995) contrasts rigid approaches to obtaining information and suggests the 
benefits of qualitative interviews. Quantitative methods such as questionnaires and 
surveys are advantageous when the objective of the data collection process is to collect 
data through a standardized and highly structured approach that will benefit the 
generation of data that can be analysed statistically.  
There are several approaches to undertaking interviews, and these vary from highly 
structured to open-ended (Fontana and Frey 1994). Semi-structured interviews sit in-
between this range and are a common qualitative method employed to collect data. They 
allow participants to answer through in-depth responses, and do not bind them to a 
structured guide giving them the ability to adopt a more conversational discussion. The 
most important feature that influenced the adoption of this particular approach, relates to 
the opportunity that this approach presented, such as revealing information that was not 
previously known. Adopting a more structured and predetermined approach would have 




Interviews present a series of limitations such as for example, respondent’s bias, asking 
inadequate questions or when the informant supplies the researcher with information he 
wants to hear as opposed to providing objective answers (Travers 2001). To confront and 
moderate these risks and reduce bias all the interviewees are highly experienced and well-
informed professionals who are able to bring into the research different perspectives 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). The different range of perspectives (Harrison 2002) 
gained through interviewing multiple typologies of informants (i.e. firm and trade 
association representatives, and industry experts), was key in confronting and 
crosschecking different sources of evidence and enabling triangulation. The interview 
guide was developed, whilst carefully contemplating these limitations. Ultimately, 
interviews are by definition limited, as only a definite number of contributors can be 
included in the project time, resource and financial constraints. In addition, not everyone 
that is considered as a relevant informant is available or willing to be interviewed.  
When undertaking qualitative research that involves interviews, it is imperative to include 
the appropriate informants, whose background and knowledge is pertinent to the study. 
The sampling strategy combined both purposive (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993; 
Siggelkow 2007) and snowball techniques to identify interviewees (Crouch and 
McKenzie 2006). The main criterion for inclusion of the participants was that they should 
have in-depth knowledge and/or experience in business-government relations in the 
aerospace industry, and on the role and inner workings of trade associations. Developing 
a strict sampling guide at the outset of this study would have limited the gathering of 
information and prevented to find additional informants. As abovementioned, the 
inclusion of different perspectives was a key factor when selecting participants. The 
distribution of the interviews amongst the different backgrounds is presented in Table 5.  




Firm Industry expert Total 
Number 8 14 7 29 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Nevertheless, some of the informants did not correspond to this broad sample and albeit 




research, they were instrumental in providing extensive knowledge on the nature, 
structure and complexities surrounding the aerospace industry. This information was 
essential when conducting interviews and approaching potential participants, as the 
researcher was able to demonstrate an extensive knowledge on the structure, composition 
and relevant terminology of this particular sector as well as demonstrate a broad network 
of relations within the industry. 
The interviewees were selected and contacted through various avenues. The initial source 
was through personal contacts and connections. Subsequently, various informants were 
found and included after interviews had taken place. Several questions in the interview 
guide, related to the different stakeholders and key intermediaries in the aerospace 
industry, were formulated purposively to increase the understanding on the various actors 
and relationships as well as to identify new potential candidates. This particular technique 
was useful in terms of including participants that would not have been found through the 
sole analysis of secondary sources. In addition, access to these specific participants was 
not an issue as in several occasions introductions were made by an existing participant. 
An issue with snowballing is that of biased selection, as the new participants would be 
part of the networks of the informants that had already been interviewed. To overcome 
this potential issue, a continuous analysis of the secondary sources was undertaken as 
well as participation in various events to uncover additional participants. Hence, other 
participants were contacted through formal emails, which briefly introduced the research 
and enquired if they would be available to be interviewed.  
Participants with various backgrounds were established to provide different perspectives 
on the studied phenomena and provide a balanced picture (Partington 2002). On the 
associations’ side, CEOs, public affairs managers, policy managers and chief economists. 
Almost the entire population of sectorial trade associations representing the UK aerospace 
industry is covered. For each trade association the CEO or a senior representative was 
interviewed. On the firms’ side the following were included: CEOs, companies’ public 
affairs managers, government affairs managers, external relations managers, strategy 
managers. Firms’ representatives were included for two main reasons:  the first relates to 
firm representatives being involved (or have been close observers) in the definition of 
trade associations’ political strategy, the second to provide an external perception to trade 




worked within trade associations and were familiar with their strategy development, 
which enabled them to provide a more independent view36. Industry professionals and 
sector specific experts37, such as leading societies’ managers were also interviewed to 
corroborate and triangulate the gained information, as well as to guarantee construct 
validity.  
One limitation of this sample is the absence of interviewees from the institutional side. 
The researcher acknowledges the lack of information and data stemming from interviews 
with policy makers, regulators and politicians. This information would have enriched the 
data and been extremely helpful towards corroborating the information gained from 
informants representing the business category. There are several reasons that can be 
ascribed to the absence of this typology of informants including time and resource 
constraints and the presence of different networks. The latter aspect refers to the 
researcher gaining a position of trust and, as previously mentioned, relating with 
gatekeepers who offered introductions and were thus instrumental towards fostering new 
connections. However, these new links were in all cases industry professionals, hence 
pertaining to a “business network”. It was acknowledged, and subsequently confirmed 
through discussions with leading CPA scholars, that fostering links with policy or 
government actors would require relationships with gatekeepers from the “political 
network”. Nevertheless, as will be highlighted in the section concerning avenues for 
future research in the concluding chapter of this thesis, the inclusion of this additional 
typology of informants, would be a fruitful area for future investigations.     
In line with existing studies on lobbying (e.g. Barron and Trouille 2016; Lawton and 
Rajwani 2011), and on meta-organisations (Berkowitz and Dumez 2015) the final number 
of interviews is relatively limited but sufficient to reach saturation and coherent with the 
advised methodological approaches for exploratory and in-depth inquiries (Crouch and 
McKenzie 2006). Table 6 provides an overview of the interviews that were conducted. 
 
                                                 
36 It was found that it is common practice in the UK aerospace industry that firm employees are 
seconded to work in trade associations to gain a broader experience in government relations and 
public affairs. 
37  It must be highlighted that several industry experts included in the study had previous 




Table 6: List of key informants 
Interview 
number 
Category Position Interview date Time 
1 Firm Strategy Manager 18/08/15 1h 
2 Firm Senior Manager 14/09/15 1h 
3 Industry Expert Public Affairs Manager 29/10/15 1h 
4 Firm Strategy Manager 10/11/15 1h 
5 Firm VP External Relations Manager 03/03/16 1.5h 
6 Industry Expert Business Development Manager 29/03/16 45m 
7 Firm Communications Manager 31/03/16 1h 
8 Firm Senior VP Corporate 26/05/16 1h 
9 Firm CEO 08/06/16 45m 
10 Industry Expert Policy Manager 05/07/16 45m 
11 Trade Association President 06/07/16 30m 
12 Trade Association Head of Public Affairs 23/08/16 1.5h 
13 Firm Former CEO 12/09/16 1.5h 
14 Industry Expert Founder of aerospace association 26/09/16 1.5h 
15 Trade Association CEO 05/10/16 1.5h 
16 Industry Expert Head of Policy and Public Affairs 07/10/16 45m 
17 Firm Former CEO 01/11/16 1.5h 
18 Trade Association Manufacturing Specialist 21/11/16 1.5h 
19 Trade Association 
Chief Economist and director of 
Policy 
24/11/16 1.5h 
20 Trade Association 






21 Trade Association Former Managing Director 28/03/17 1h 
22 Firm Senior VP  01/08/17 1h 
23 Firm Head of Public Affairs 01/08/17 1h 
24 Trade Association CEO 07/08/17 1h 
25 Industry Expert Strategy Manager 09/08/17 1h 
26 Industry Expert 




Group Head of Government 
Relations 
22/11/17 1h 
28 Firm Director of Communications 11/12/17 1h 
29 Firm 
Deputy Head of Government 
Affairs 
08/01/18 1h 
Source: Elaborated by author 
All the interviews were conducted by the researcher in order to increase the reliability of 
the study (Kvale 2007) and were frequently conducted at the informant’s workplace. The 
location was often chosen by the interviewee, especially in cases where the contributor 
was in a senior management position. When the researcher was given the option, the 
company or trade association premises was chosen to have the possibility to observe the 
environment and to grasp all possible information that could complement the interviews, 
i.e. through observations (this method will be covered in the following section). 
Moreover, a practical consideration is that company headquarters would often provide 
meeting rooms, which are an appropriate environment to conduct interviews, in terms of 
both privacy and external disruptions.  
Before the actual interview started, the project, the reasons and objectives of the study 
were introduced, as well as how the results would be disseminated. It was clarified that 
the informants would be anonymised if included in the study and that in order to guarantee 
anonymity, pseudonyms would be used if necessary. On average, the interviews lasted 
between 45 and 75 minutes. Various interviewees were contacted again and asked 
additional questions via telephone and Skype calls as well as through emails.  




consistency between the interviews, and was developed according to broad themes 
developed during the literature review. Gerson and Horowitz (2002) argue that 
undertaking interviews with the help of key themes as a guide is advantageous when 
conducting exploratory research as it enables the surfacing of issues that were not 
previously considered. However, given that informants derived from different 
backgrounds and had different perspectives (i.e. firm, trade association and industry 
expert) the interview guide was slightly adapted to each informant, as is common when 
conducting semi-structured interviews (Gioia et al. 2010). 
The interview guide was initially informed by the review of extant literature and was 
subsequently modified as the study evolved with the information gained through 
interviews and the on-going analysis. Corbin and Strauss (2014: 93) stress “the questions 
we ask over the course of a research project will change over time. Questions are based 
on the evolving analysis and are specific to the particular research”. Similarly, Farquhar 
(2012) argues that interviewing is an evolving procedure throughout which researchers 
gain additional understanding which will in turn influence the direction of the research. 
If the discussions lead towards an unexpected but interesting direction, this new lead 
would be followed, as new ideas, notions and concepts could emerge. When conducting 
semi-structured interviews, it is key to be open-minded, flexible and take advantage of 
arising opportunities. Hence, as the research progressed, interesting themes discovered 
during the interviews were included in the new interview guide or helped to refine 
existing ones. Moreover, the interviews gained additional depth because of the iterative 
approach of the data-gathering procedure, and because specific questions were 
formulated to gain informants views on the emerging patterns and findings. Table 7 
presents an overview of the interview guide themes.  
Table 7: Interview guide themes 
Broad theme Description 
General Motivations for firms to join trade associations, reasons for engaging with 
government and political institutions.  
Institutional 
stakeholders 
Perceptions on the key political and regulatory institutions and how trade 
associations interact with them. How these institutions affect operations and 




Intermediaries Definition of industry intermediaries, role, functions, relationships with 
firms and trade associations. 
Trade Associations Role, functions, objectives, relationships with companies, political 
institutions and other intermediaries.  
Political Activities Organisation, approaches, platforms and differences between firms’ and 
trade associations’ political activities. Insights on how these have developed 
over time.  
Institutional 
uncertainty 
Perceived uncertainties, institutional change, impact on organisation and 
adaptation versus management. 
Evaluation Impact on policy, impact on firms, mediation and facilitation of business-
government relations. 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Following discussions with the supervisory team, the interview guide was changed after 
an initial draft (Appendix 1 provides greater detail of the interview guide). The main 
changes concerned linguistic issues, as it was considered that many participants would 
probably not be familiar with academic jargon and with terminology used in the non-
market strategy and corporate political activity literatures. Thus, the language was 
modified in order to make it more accessible to interviewees. This is echoed by Ghauri 
and Grønhaug (2005) who encourage the adoption of simple and comprehensible 
language and cautious reflection on the terms commonly utilised in a specific research 
domain.  The academic lexicon related to the field of “corporate political activity” was 
modified to encompass terms such as “interest representation”, “business-government 
relations” and “lobbying”. In turn, the word “lobbying” was eventually not included 
because of the negative connotations, which could potentially provoke mistrust within 
organisations and limit the data collection.  
The majority of interviews were recorded with the help of recording equipment and 
subsequently transcribed. Recording interviews is widely recommended as it enables 
researchers to concentrate on the actual discussion rather than on taking notes. This in 
turn, aided the flexibility (Bryman and Bell 2003) of the interview as the researcher could 
completely concentrate on the actual interview and better react to the informants’ 
answers, which clearly aided the ‘smoothness’ of the discussion. Moreover, recording the 
interviews was beneficial for the analysis as it helped gain new insights as these could be 




However, some informants did not agree for the interview to be audio recorded, so the 
interview was undertaken whilst taking hand-written notes. The inability to record 
interviews could be considered as a limitation to data collection as several insights and 
notions could have been missed during the interview. Nevertheless, whilst the loss of 
precious data and information is unlikely contested, Peabody et al. (1990) argue that 
interviews conducted without the use of recording devices, ultimately may foster the 
openness of the conversation and allow the interviewee to share insights that would have 
not been mentioned otherwise.  
Hence, it is necessary to reflect about the reasons behind participant’s rejection to be 
recorded and how this can be considered as strength of this research rather than a 
weakness. It has already been mentioned that this research covers a very sensitive area, 
and many participants simply did not want their voice to be recorded when discussing 
such topics. There are two key implications that should be highlighted. The first is that 
without the fear of being recorded the interviewee was found to be in a more relaxed 
position and was freer to talk about aspects that would probably not have been mentioned 
otherwise. This aspect surely benefitted the research in terms of the richness and deepness 
of the obtained information. The second aspect relates to the development of a 
relationship of trust, with the informants. This aspect was highly beneficial as various 
informants were encountered on different occasions throughout the duration of the study. 
This was extremely helpful as the researcher managed to talk to the informants several 
times and elaborate or ask for clarification on certain aspects of the information gained 
during the interviews.  
After each interview the data was transcribed as soon as possible, including notes and 
observations. Following this procedure is highly beneficial, as the data is recorded more 
accurately while in recent memory (Wengraf 2004). The information gained through 
hand-written notes was subsequently rewritten on a word processor and printed. The 
reliance on the researcher’s notes and the absence of verbatim accounts for a minor 
number of interviews, had implications for the analysis as the researcher did not have the 
same amount of information as for the recorded interviews. However, this deficit did not 
privilege some interviews over others. Overall, this systematic approach was necessary 




and allow the effective development of the analysis.  
As previously mentioned, the aim of this research is to explore the political activities of 
trade associations and understand how and why these organisations play a role within the 
context of business-government relations in the aerospace industry. The semi-structured 
interviews were essential in providing the level of detail and depth of knowledge on the 
different roles, activities and relationships between firms, trade associations and political 
institutions, which couldn’t have been gained through the adoption of other methods. 
Specifically, the conversations with senior trade association managers revealed numerous 
insights in relation to the development of political activities and their implementation. 
Moreover, the rich information was particularly significant in terms of understanding the 
relation between the UK’s socio-political environment and political activities. 
The researcher ensured that university ethical rules, measures and guidelines were 
observed throughout the entire process. When undertaking interviews, several actions 
were undertaken to guarantee the fulfilment of ethical processes (Kvale and Brinkmann 
2009). Each informant was presented a variety of documents that summarised the nature 
of the research and clearly informed why, when and how he/she would be interviewed. 
These documents included the summary of the research, the Participant Information Sheet 
and the Informed Consent Form, which also guaranteed the anonymity of the respondents 
(Appendix 3 and Appendix 4).  
Given the sensitivity of the topic, particular care was given to ensure anonymity. Hence, 
all the information that could give away the identity of the informant was removed 
including names, and all informants were given a numerical reference. In terms of the 
quotes included in this thesis, the only information that is kept, is the background of the 
respondent (i.e. firm, trade association and industry expert) as this is necessary to 
contextualise the answers and highlight the different perspectives. Finally, the researcher 
ensured that data (in form of recordings or written material) was stored securely in 
accordance with the university’s data protection policy (Appendix 5).  
4.4.4 Elite interviews 
As highlighted in the previous section, interviews took place mainly with company and 




categorised as elite interviews. Harvey (2011: 433) defines elites as “those who occupy 
senior management and board level positions within organisations” and argues “that these 
people have significant decision-making influence within and outside of the firm and 
therefore present a unique challenge to interview”.  
The notion of elite interviews is particularly important in the political science domain as 
these actors are defined as “those with close proximity to power or policymaking” 
(Lilleker 2003) and are considered to have “more influence on political outcomes than 
general members of the public” (Richards 1996: 199). This is extremely relevant to 
corporate political activities, as in many circumstances the political activities are 
implemented at the highest levels of organisations.   
A further consideration on the benefits of elite interviews relates to the seniority level of 
the new informants that were accessed due to personal referrals and introductions made 
by the “elite” interviewees. When concluding the interviews, the researcher would always 
ask the interviewee if he could be referred to other potential interviewees. Even though 
this was not always successful, in various cases it led to access top-level managers that 
would usually be out of reach. In this respect, Maclean, Harvey, and Chia (2012: 11) 
highlight how occasions for lengthy interviews with business leaders are rare. 
Introductions by elite participants presented an additional advantage in terms of the 
sincerity and reliability of the information gained from new participants as the researcher 
gained a position of trust. This also limited the negative aspects of a strong hierarchical 
separation between the researcher and the interviewee (Beech, MacIntosh, and MacLean 
2010). 
In terms of the sincerity and transparency of interviewees, another factor that was 
beneficial to the depth, richness and weight of the collected data pertained to the fact that 
at the time of the interview, some of the elite informants were not employed, but had 
recently retired or were in between jobs. This feature was highly beneficial as it placed 
them in a position to speak more freely and provide information that they would have 
normally not been keen to share. Before an interview the former CEO of a global 
aerospace company underlined: 
I don’t represent […] but my own personal views and I think this 




to be politically correct, or adhere to company communications 
(Interview 17, firm). 
Oral history literature (Perks and Thomson 2003) provides some crucial notions that have 
to be carefully considered when interviewing. Whilst acknowledging that there aren’t 
fixed rules, and that these features should be considered for any interview, it is important 
to consider aspects such as “the value of preparation, the importance of establishing a 
rapport and intimacy, of listening and of asking open-ended questions, not interrupting, 
allowing for pauses and silences, avoiding jargon, probing, minimizing the presence of 
the tape recorder and so on” (Perks and Thomson 2003: 101).  
In line with the explorative nature of the research design and to contrast potential pitfalls 
of interviewing elites, the interview guide was developed adopting open-ended questions. 
As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 674) argue, “elites especially – but other highly 
educated people as well – do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended 
questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining why they think what they 
think”.  
However, elite interviews also present some limitations and drawbacks. Many of the 
interviewed top managers had very busy schedules and were subject to sudden and 
unexpected changes to their agendas. For instance, during one of the interviews, the 
informant received a call regarding the visit of a foreign Ambassador, and therefore, had 
to suspend the interview. Even though the interview was not scheduled to last much 
longer, this had a negative impact on this specific data collection episode and on the 
capacity to finish the interview in the desired manner.  
4.4.5 Documentary sources and archival data 
Documentary sources are an extremely significant piece of data for case studies and “are 
used to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (Yin 1994: 81) and verify 
the validity of information gained through interviews (Lilleker 2003). De Massis and 
Kotlar (2014: 21) propose several strengths of documentation and argue that it “is a stable, 
unobtrusive and exact source of data”. This is echoed by Yin (1994) who underlines that 
documents are advantageous as they are unobtrusive, can be examined repeatedly and 




The documentation that was taken into consideration is diverse. It was collected from 
different sources and provided diverse information (see Table 8). As aforementioned, 
coherently with the research design and the iterative nature of this study, documents were 
collected throughout the different stages of the research. Several interviewees were 
instrumental in directing the researcher towards documents that provided additional 
evidence. These characteristics are intended to increase the evidence from supplementary 
sources and to corroborate the findings. Hence, the collection and analysis of the 
documentary data was highly beneficial to the triangulating process and limited the 
weaknesses of the semi-structured interviews (Punch 1998). 
Thus, different documents have been collected from institutional, company as well as 
trade and business associations’ sources. Institutional documents such as: House of 
Commons and House of Lords papers, reports and publications, green and white papers, 
meetings minutes, House of Commons Library reports, Select Committee hearing reports, 
EU publications such as the Official Journal of the European Union, European Parliament 
law and reports, European Commission papers and reports, and EU press releases. 
Furthermore, documents included company and trade association press releases, annual 
reports, external relations reports, marketing campaigns and materials, government 
affairs reports, as well as business, consultancy, international organisations and NGO 
reports. These documents have been retrieved directly through company and institutional 
websites, on site, university, national and local government, and EU databases as well as 
through archives. The UK Parliamentary archives, the National Archives, as well as the 
archives of the National Aerospace Library are examples of the latter. Finally, data from 
media outlets was monitored, analysed and included if pertinent.  
Table 8: Overview of documentary sources 
Source Document Description of use in the 
analysis 
Number  




Provided information on firms’ 
external relations and government 
affairs and strategies, as well as 
information on key stakeholders 
(public and private).  
5 
Trade Association Policy objectives, 
public statements, 
industry surveys, 
industry reports, blogs 
Provided industry data. Company 
responses to surveys. Policy aims 
and objectives. Government and 





and newsletters, trade 
association archives, 
websites. 
reports. Documents also provided 
an overview of the key 
stakeholders and their 
relationships.  
UK political institutions 
(including local and 
national government and 
government departments, 
House of Commons, 
House of Lords, 





reports and online 
videos, meeting 
minutes, minutes of 





Provided in-depth and rich data 
on the interactions between 
government and government 
departments with firms and trade 
associations. Moreover, these 
documents emphasised the 
importance of the aerospace 













outlook, overview of 
the aerospace sector, 
top companies reports, 
lobbying reports. 
 
Provided a key source of 
information for understanding the 
structure and workings of the 
aerospace sector as well as 
definitions and information on 
how lobbying and interest 
representation activities are 
conducted in various countries.  
28 
European Institutions Transparency register, 
industry reports. 
Provided rich data on lobbying 
and on the aerospace industry in 
the EU.  
8 
Media outlets  Newspaper articles, 
websites. 
These were instrumental in 
gaining information on public 
political strategies (i.e. how trade 
associations use media outlets to 
convey their messages to a wider 
audience).  
12 
Total   116 
Source: Elaborated by author 
The data gathered through documents was mainly utilised in three ways. The first was to 
develop a deep understanding of the context, actors and relationships pertaining to the 
aerospace industry in the UK. This data was utilised to describe the sector and to develop 
the contextual chapter. The second, which is closely related to the previous relates to 
understanding the historical context of the phenomena as to consider its historical 
development.  The third way in which the data was utilised was to triangulate and verify 




the beginning of the research to understand the actors as well as the industry and political 
environments, and in the later stages of the study to substantiate the information gained 
from the interviews.  
The documentary data served to build an exhaustive database of national and regional 
trade associations in the UK aerospace sector, which was developed by systematically 
scrutinising all trade associations’ and firms’ websites and reports. The database 
encompassed the various trade associations, information on their governance structure, 
their geographical location, a brief description of their aim, operations and services. The 
latter aspects are particularly insightful towards understanding their stated objectives and 
functions, as well as the weight given to political functions in relation to their overall 
activities. Moreover, the database included the largest companies operating in the UK, 
which was conducive towards highlighting that firms join several trade associations 
concurrently.  
As with the other methods utilised within the research, it is vital to reflect on the validity 
of the information gained from these documents. It was necessary to scrutinise the 
collected data in terms of its content and authenticity (Scott 2014), as well as in terms of 
any underlying reason for the publication of such a document to assess its 
representativeness and contribution to the research (Bryman 2004). Robson (1993) argues 
that documents developed by private organisations are inclined to present positive 
features of a sector, whereas institutional documents may represent a specific political 
agenda.  Furthermore, it was imperative to “understand the provenance of sources, to read 
them against the grain, and consider them in the context in which they were produced” 
(Perchard et al. 2017: 19).  
Finally, as highlighted by scholars such as MacLean, Harvey, and Clegg it is important, 
when collecting and analysing documentary sources, to acknowledge “organisational 
failures” (2016: 35), as organisations may deliberately decide to include or exclude 
information in official documentation. This is an additional feature that underlines the 






Observations are a data collection method commonly utilised in ethnographic studies, 
which can be implemented in both quantitative and qualitative approaches (Eriksson and 
Kovalainen 2015). Nevertheless, it has been a crucial technique to gather data, 
information and key insights on the actors, roles, procedures, and relationships in the UK 
aerospace industry that would have been impossible to collect in a different way. Myers 
(2013: 92) states that observations provide “rich insights into the human, social and 
organisational aspects of business organizations”.   
There are different typologies and activities that can be employed whilst making 
observations. Yin (2014) differentiates observations between formal and casual data 
collection activities. Similarly, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2015: 86) highlight that 
observations can be divided in participant observation and non-participant observation. 
The first relates to a deep involvement and active participation in the studied context (i.e. 
working for a firm, which is at the same time the context of the study), whereas the second 
refers to activities that limit the researcher to an outside observer. The latter typology was 
adopted within this study.  
Nevertheless, acknowledging that a thorough and systematic collection of data through 
direct observations requires researchers to spend a protracted period of time within the 
research setting, it would be unwise not to mention the valuable information gained with 
this particular method. These non-participant observations helped to inform the 
interviews and direct the collection of documentary sources. Additionally, this method 
increased the validity of the study as it enabled the researcher to present a true picture of 
the phenomena (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2012). Consistent with the research 
philosophy adopted for this study, these insights clearly informed the understanding and 
interpretation of the topic. 
As with any data collection method, researchers should consider the limitations linked to 
particular methods adopted within a study. In relation to observations there are several 
limitations such as the low degree of reliability, and low degree of representativeness 
(Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2012). In terms of the latter the objective of the 
observations was not to generalise, rather to acquire insights into the activities and 




associated to observations, relates to the time and financial resources required. This 
concern was curbed by the fact that the researcher would already be attending several 
events to establish relationships and find potential participants.  
During the course of the PhD, the researcher attended several industry conferences, 
events, fairs where it was possible to observe how and where firms and trade associations 
relate with government and political institutions. Examples of these events are the 
Aerodays 2015 conference in London, the 2016 Farnborough Air show, the Advanced 
Engineering 2016 fair, as well as several seminars, meetings, conferences and events 
organised by the Royal Aeronautical Society, the Italian Chamber of Commerce in the 
UK, the Italian Embassy in the UK, and by think tanks and other organisations. 
These events have been a key source of information for understanding the key 
relationships, roles and activities in a way that is not readily understandable solely by 
secondary documents and by information gained through interviews. Moreover, 
observations allowed an immersion in the research, in order to appreciate the activities in 
a real-life context as they were unfolding, rather than in an artificial setting such as during 
formal interviews. Verschuren (2003: 131) argues that each method of data collection 
“reveals its own aspects and parts of social reality”. Hence, whilst other methods of data 
collection such as interviews may be beneficial in understanding the motives of a 
particular behaviour, observations are conducive towards revealing the actual behaviour.    
Taking extensive and detailed field notes was critical towards an accurate documentation 
of the observations (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). These were subsequently 
transcribed in a word processor for several reasons. Firstly, to gather all the data in one 
place, i.e. in the case study database. Secondly, to be “prepared” in a correct format that 
would aid the analysis. Finally, to make this information as accessible and manageable 
as possible, for it to be readily retrievable when required. 
Dubois and Gadde (2002) argue that researchers are able to collect two very distinct 
typologies of data: passive and active data. The first relates to the data that the researcher 
is looking for and intends to find. The latter refers to data that is associated with discovery, 
hence, data that would not have been found through active search. For example, the 
researcher was fortunate to attend a board of directors meeting at the Italian Chamber of 




govern the relationships and power-relationships of firms within the context of an 
association. The insights gleaned from this event clearly informed the researcher’s 
knowledge on trade association activity and consequently assisted the development of 
new questions that contributed to the improvement of the interview guide. Dubois and 
Gadde (2002: 557) stress that, “a very active interviewer will come across passive data 
only. On the other hand, active data will require a more passive (less predetermined) 
researcher”. Here again the flexibility of the research design and of the case studies was 
beneficial to assimilate unanticipated information (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2015). 
4.5 Data analysis process and data structure 
The key function of data analysis is to comprehend and obtain insights from the collected 
information (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005). In relation to qualitative analysis, the data is 
interpreted to gain a broader understanding and progress empirical knowledge (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008). In order to achieve these objectives and understand the multiple 
intricacies that constitute the research problem, it is necessary to “transform and interpret 
the qualitative data” with academic rigour (Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 3).  Pratt (2009) 
argues that there is not a standard model to analyse qualitative data. Hence, it is important 
to develop a specific approach that takes into consideration the peculiarities of the 
researched context and subsequently support and justify the utilised techniques.  
In qualitative studies the data analysis and the data collection frequently overlap (Baxter 
and Jack 2008; Sarantakos 2005). As abovementioned (Section 4.4.1) and coherently with 
the overall research approach, each individual phase is not developed subsequently but 
the process is rather simultaneous. A clear example is that during the data collection 
phase, themes and codes start to be developed. As the researcher gains empirical data, it 
is key to start formulating inferences and use the data. Hence, a key feature of this analysis 
is its iterative nature in linking the data to existing theory (Eriksson and Kovalainen 
2015). Dubois and Gadde (2002) argue that data analysis should not be considered as a 
stand-alone stage of research. It should rather be considered as “going ‘back and forth’ 
from one type of research activity to another, and between empirical observations and 
theory” (Dubois and Gadde 2002: 555). In this way, researchers are able to expand their 
understanding of both theory and the empirical phenomena. Thus, the several iterations 




data assisted to progressively move from an empirical level to a higher level of abstraction 
(Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton 2012). Yin (2014) warns that delaying the analysis of the 
data may lead to gaining a great wealth of data and eventually not utilising it, which in 
turn, can lead to delays in the data analysis phase. 
In this study, interviews are the main source of primary data, and Kvale (1996) defines 
three levels of analysis: firstly, interviews must be transcribed. Secondly, they must be 
analysed. Finally, they must be verified. In comparison, Huberman and Miles (2002) 
categorise data analysis in: data reduction, display, conclusion drawing and verification. 
The analysis is undertaken in conjunction with the content analysis of documents and 
secondary data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). In order to engage in data reduction, the 
collected information should be edited, sorted and summarised. Simultaneously, the data 
should be coded which implies a procedure of categorisation with the intent of identifying 
common themes, ideas, insights, concepts and patterns. Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey 
(2011: 217) state that coding has two main purposes: firstly, to “identify a range of issues 
raised in the data, and understand the meanings attached to these issues by participants”. 
Secondly, codes are useful labels or keywords that can assist in storing and labelling the 
data so that it can be easily retrieved. Corbin and Strauss (2014: 159) indicate that coding 
implicates that notions, views and perceptions are extracted, and that there is an 
interaction with the data. The next stages, display and conclusion drawing, relate to 
methods that assist to display the data in order to be able to present it, as well as advance 
observations and concepts from it.  
The first approach to analysing the interview data was undertaken immediately after the 
first interviews took place. During the transcription of the recorded interviews, comments 
were noted down on emerging thoughts, themes, ideas, conceptual patterns, as well as on 
possible links to existing literature. This information informed the development of new 
questions that were included in the interview guide for subsequent interviews. Moreover, 
undertaking a preliminary analysis whilst compiling the transcripts, rather than after the 
process was completed, was particularly beneficial in terms of the fresh recollection of 
interviewees’ emotions and actions during the interview, which benefitted the richness of 
the data. These features could easily be lost when reading the transcript several weeks or 
months after the interview took place. This can be considered as an advantage of 




external party. Eriksson and Kovalainen (2015: 144) argue that “the joint process of 
transcription, coding and analysis offers an extraordinary opportunity to become 
sensitized to the full richness of your data” and that “the very slowness of the process 
somehow contributes to the theoretical depth which is possible to achieve”. 
An additional feature that should be considered when analysing interview data is that 
researchers should keep in mind that informants may not reveal all the necessary 
information. It is hence necessary to maintain a high level of sensitivity towards what 
informants avoid sharing (Gillham 2000), as this may be key towards gaining a real 
understanding of the studied phenomena.  
NVivo 11 was used to facilitate the collection, analysis, manageability and 
trustworthiness of the data (Corley and Gioia 2004). The software was beneficial in terms 
of meticulously storing, sorting, coding and retrieving the data when required, as well as 
enhancing the transparency of the analysis (Morse and Richards 2002). One of the main 
criticisms regarding the use of NVivo or similar computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software (CAQDAS) is that there is the risk of decontextualizing data (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill 2016). Given that one of the key features of this research is the 
paramount importance of the research context and the environment in which trade 
associations operate, it was necessary to maintain a close awareness to the origin (i.e. who 
said what, and in which context) of each individual fragment of data.  
Similarly, to the grounded-theory approach (Bryman and Bell 2007), the main phase of 
the data analysis consisted of several coding steps (Dacin, Munir, and Tracey 2010; Gioia, 
Corley, and Hamilton 2012; Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2016), which ensured a 
consistent, rigorous and systematic approach to the analysis. Grounded theory is 
considered as the most widely used framework for analysing qualitative data (Bryman 
and Bell 2007: 584). Since Glaser and Strauss’ (1976) seminal work, grounded theory has 
gained a variety of different connotations, and can refer to a methodological approach, a 
method of inquiry and the result of a research process. The first, relates to a research 
strategy. The second relates to a technique of collecting and analysing data, the third 
refers to theory that emerges inductively from the data (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 
2016). In its original form, the grounded theory approach had the prerequisite that 




(e.g. Charmaz 2000; Eriksson and Kovalainen 2015) have underlined that this is very 
seldom the case and most commonly, the approach refers to theory that has emerged from 
the data (Bryman and Bell 2007).  
Even though this research does not specifically embrace a grounded theory approach, the 
adoption of a grounded-theory derived logic to the analysis is beneficial, as it does not 
confine this research to existing theoretical models primarily developed for different 
contexts. Rather, it allows for a greater sensitivity to the specific research context and 
enables to extend and refine theories that reveal the peculiarities of the processes and 
mechanisms of political activities. It also enables to accentuate informants’ perspectives 
on the studied activities and processes, which is another key feature and strength of this 
research. Besides, dissimilarly to the “pure” grounded theory approach, the analysis was 
informed by existing literature (Eisenhardt 1989). Moreover, the data-driven approach is 
coherent with the case study strategy of working the data from the ‘ground up’ (Yin 
2014), as well as with existing research in the fields of business-government relations and 
corporate political activity (e.g. Lawton, Rajwani, and Doh 2013). However, in 
juxtaposition to Yin’s (2014) approach in relation to the development of case studies, 
Eisenhardt (1989) whose work was inspired by the grounded theory approach (Eriksson 
and Kovalainen 2015) contends that the formulation of propositions can hinder the 
exploration of the phenomena.  
In the first stage of the coding process, the interview transcripts were printed and read 
several times. Initial comments and concepts were written on the margins of the 
transcripts. Subsequently, the transcripts were entered in NVivo and coded 
systematically. This initial coding stage may be referred to as ‘open coding’ (Bryman 
2016; Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2016). The surfacing labels were not predetermined 
or standardized (Charmaz 2000); rather they emerged from the data itself and often 
composed of ‘in-vivo words’. These labels contained words, sentences and accounts on 
the role and activities of trade associations, as well as their relationships with other 
organisations, intermediaries and political institutions. This process produced over 150 
codes.   
A key feature of the preliminary coding stage, which nevertheless was also adopted in the 




which entails comparing each new data fragment to other passages that have already been 
coded. It ensures consistency and facilitates the process of analysis. Moreover, the codes 
were analysed and compared with the interview transcripts to ensure their consistency 
and accuracy with the raw data, and that they reflected the views, perceptions and notions 
as underlined by the participants. In this stage, several codes that described the same 
phenomenon were aggregated with other codes. When possible and useful to the analysis, 
the preliminary codes were also renamed in order to link them with existing concepts and 
notions in the corporate political activity literature. Several idiosyncratic codes that were 
not particularly relevant or recurring throughout the interviews were dropped. This is 
consistent with the abductive approach undertaken within this research as codes are 
initially developed inductively, however they are then compared with existing ones. This 
technique ensures the correct interpretation of the data as well as a greater level of 
analytical coding (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2016).  
The second stage consisted in elaborating and grouping similar codes (Bryman and Bell 
2007) into higher-order categories and connecting these categories. Gioia, Corley, and 
Hamilton (2012) compare this process to Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) axial coding. The 
key aspect of this stage is to find similarities and differences amongst the different 
categories. This stage reduced the number of categories consistently and produced first 
order categories, which had to be meaningful in relation to the data and in relation to the 
other categories. During this phase, the categories were complemented and refined 
through the triangulation of information gained from other data collection methods (e.g. 
observations, trade association and firm reports, institutional publications, and archival 
data).  
In the management domain, there are different approaches towards utilising different sets 
of data whilst developing the data structure, which demonstrates the flexibility of such an 
approach38. On one side scholars (e.g. Ravasi and Philips 2011) make an extensive use of 
documentary data and include it in the coding process, whereas other scholars (e.g. Dacin, 
Munir, and Tracey 2010) develop the data structure using primarily the interview data 
and then complement it with documentary information. This study is closer to the latter 
                                                 
38 Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton (2012: 26) argue that this approach should not be considered as a 
“cookbook” but rather in a flexible manner and “open to innovation”. Treating it as a structured 




approach and thus the documentary data informed the interview data. This feature is 
consistent with the case study research strategy as one of the main pitfalls is that during 
the data analysis phase each source of data is treated independently (Yin 2014). Rather, 
the various sources of data should be converged in order to gain a holistic understanding 
of the phenomena. 
The third stage of the analysis consisted in finding connections among the first-order 
categories and grouping them in second-order categories. This procedure was not linear, 
rather it involved going back and forth from the emerging patterns and the first-order 
categories until adequate conceptual themes emerged (Eisenhardt 1989).  
The fourth stage consisted in linking the second-order categories into aggregate 
theoretical dimensions. This last stage is completely positioned in the theoretical realm 
and is necessary to question the emerging themes for concepts that help to explain the 
studied phenomena. The theory is thus allowed to emerge from these relationships and 
connections between themes. This stage can also be referred to as selective or focused 
coding, where core categories are selected and analytically associated to the other 
categories (Bryman and Bell 2007; Strauss and Corbin 1990). Saunders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill (2016: 185) echo this approach and highlight how researchers will identify 
themes and patterns and will place them in extant literature “in order to refine, extend or 
generate theory”.  
The outcome of the four stages that were undertaken and revised several times was the 
development of the data structure (Figure 7), offering a visual depiction of how the 
analysis evolved from raw segments of data to aggregate theoretical dimensions (e.g. Pratt 
2008; Tracy 2010). Whilst the previous paragraphs have underlined in detail the process 
and various stages of the analysis, Chapter 5 will elaborate this data structure and provide 









Figure 7: Final data structure  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Several measures were implemented to strengthen the analysis of the data and ensure the 
robustness, reliability and validity of the emergent themes and patterns. First, was the 
adoption of detailed notes or memos. Memos can be considered as a systematic approach 
to note and record insights, ideas and theoretical questions (Eriksson and Kovalainen 
2015: 164). This is another element that was ‘borrowed’ from grounded theory 
approaches (Bryman and Bell 2007), which has been useful to maintain a clear and 
transparent track of emerging ideas and patterns. Second, several key informants were 




the analytical findings. Finally, the researcher engaged in peer debriefing (e.g. Ravasi and 
Philips 2011), which consisted in discussing nascent analytical patterns and findings with 
researchers not involved in the study to canvass critical questions and gain an outsider’s 
viewpoint. Hence, the researcher engaged in several discussions with peer scholars, other 
researchers as well as scholars with specific expertise in the area of political activities and 
trade association research.  
4.6 Summary  
This chapter has provided a comprehensive description of the methodological approach, 
including an outline of the research design and research strategy. The choice of adopting 
a case study approach using qualitative methods is given by theoretical and practical 
considerations, and a key aspect that should be highlighted is the iterative process that is 
distinctive of the qualitative approach. Subsequently, the chapter engaged in a detailed 
discussion on the different data sources that were collected and how they were analysed. 
The following chapter will build on the analysis of the data to explore the role of trade 




Chapter 5  Findings  
5.1 Introduction  
The following chapter builds on the literature review, methodology and contextual 
information presented in the preceding chapters to provide a thorough account of the 
findings that emerged from the collected data.  
The findings indicate that trade associations are embedded within their institutional 
environment (Granovetter 1985), which mainly emerges thorough the influence of 
environmental conditions, the strong relationships with other organisational actors - both 
internal, i.e. member firms, and external other organisations - as well as the apparent 
convergence to policy and decision makers’ expectations (Getz 2001). Moreover, 
findings suggest that trade associations undertake a breadth of proactive political 
activities to exert greater influence and shape their environment. The key findings are 
summarised and presented in Table 9.  
Table 9: Summary of key findings 
Key findings 
This study adds to the debate on why firms decide to undertake political activities collectively. It goes 
beyond the individual vs collective approach, and underlines complementarity between the two 
approaches.  
Even though cross-sector organizations dominate the intermediary environment, in terms of size of 
their membership, resources, and ability to represent broader domains, the importance of sectorial trade 
associations emerge thanks to their expertise and knowledge of the industry, as well as a result of a 
closer proximity to SMEs and mid-sized enterprises.   
This study illustrates the significant influence of the political and policy framework in the UK on trade 
associations’ role (e.g. dominant role of executive, sub-national political governance bodies, dynamic 
nature of political institutions). 
Trade associations’ political activity development is influenced by external (e.g. matching government 
agenda) and internal factors (e.g. role of large firms and trade associations’ top management). 
Trade associations’ political activities are characterized by informational and relational strategies and 
by the combination of proactive and reactive approaches. 
Trade associations undertake collaborative rather than confrontational interaction with policymakers, 
as this approach is necessary to gain institutional legitimacy. 
The deployment of internal and external resources (i.e. member firms) is used to proactively influence 
the institutional environment (i.e. organisational, relational, and reputational). 
This study extends the notion that firms build an institutional field to influence government (Barley 
2010) to trade associations. 




Figure 8 proposes a visual representation of the findings that will be discussed in the 
following sections and is used to structure this chapter. Section 5.2 will cover the two 
oval boxes on the left (i.e. Political role and Political strategy formulation), and address 
the first two research questions: 
➢ RQ1: What are the determinants of trade associations’ political role? 
➢ RQ2: How is political strategy defined and exercised in trade associations? 
Whereas section 5.3 will cover the oval box on the right (i.e. Shaping the institutional 
environment), delve into the political activities that trade associations develop and 
undertake, and address the third research question: 
➢ RQ3: How do trade associations exert their influence? 
The findings challenge the assumption that theoretical perspectives commonly utilised 
within the CPA and NMS literatures can be applied in isolation to elucidate trade 
associations' role and activities. The findings rather draw attention to the complementarity 
between institutional perspectives and resource-based views, as these are both required 
to understand trade associations’ political role as well as how these organisations define 
and execute their political strategy. 
Figure 8: Visual representation of the findings 
 




In line with recommendations in presenting qualitative research (Pratt 2009), and to 
emphasize the richness of the collected data, as well as to justify the interpretations and 
maintain a close connection between context, data and emerging concepts, the following 
chapter will be suffused with interview quotes. This approach is beneficial towards 
demonstrating qualitative rigour of the analysis and presentation of the findings (Gioia, 
Corley, and Hamilton 2012). Moreover, Appendix 2 provides selected excerpts to support 
the researcher’s interpretations.  
Furthermore, this chapter will present a detailed narrative of the interpretations coupled 
with theoretical reflections that will enhance the articulation of the findings (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007; Ravasi and Philips 2011). Together, these findings are conducive 
towards the overarching aim of this research, which is to explore the role and functions 
of sectoral trade associations in the context of business-government relations in the UK 
aerospace industry.  
5.2 Recognising trade associations’ embeddedness in the institutional 
environment  
In seeking to address the questions concerning sectoral trade associations’ role in the 
business-government interaction and how they define their political strategy, it is 
necessary to investigate the environment in which these organisations operate. It is hence 
necessary to examine how trade associations’ managers view trade associations and how 
firms’ managers who regularly interact with these bodies view them in relation to the 
broad range of intermediary organisations operating at the interface of industry and the 
political institutional environment. Coherently with the definitions of trade associations 
adopted within this study 39 , the environment in which these organisations operate 
comprises internal (i.e. the relationships between trade associations and their members) 
and external (i.e. the relationships with other intermediaries, as well as with economic 
and socio-political actors) factors that have to be analysed in order to fully understand 
                                                 
39 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the main definition on trade associations used within this study 
relates to Aldrich and Staber (1988: 111) who define trade associations as “organizations created 
to represent business interests within specific domains, mobilizing firms within their domain so 
that collective action can be taken on common problems”. Moreover, another characteristic that 
is helpful towards understanding the focus is proposed by Ahrne and Brunsson (2005) who 
consider trade associations as ‘meta-organisations’ whereby the members of the organisation are 




their specific role and function. Hence, the following sections explain why firms engage 
with trade associations at both national and regional level, contributing to their 
development and survival, how managers who are involved in the development of 
political strategy perceive the institutional environment and the relationships with key 
stakeholders that populate it. Finally, it examines how political strategy is defined within 
trade associations and key factors that influence its development, as these have gained 
limited attention within extant literature, and it has been recently indicated as an avenue 
that could benefit from further investigations (Barnett 2017).  
5.2.1 Firm engagement  
One of the key themes that emerged during the analysis of the data relates to the reasons 
and motivations behind firms’ participation in collective action and engagement with 
trade associations. This is a concern that several scholars have investigated (e.g. Bennett 
1999; 2000; Tucker 2008; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer 2002), and the findings of this 
research contribute to the limited understanding of what drives firms to join these 
organisations, consigning them a key role in the business-government interaction. 
Moreover, an acknowledgement of why firms join will help to understand trade 
associations’ functions (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017). Coherently with the structure 
of the interviews, which were designed to allow participants from different professional 
backgrounds to answer questions in an-open manner and provide in-depth and rich 
accounts, the results underline different perspectives, highlighting subtle complexities 
that could only be grasped with the adoption of such a qualitative approach. There are a 
wide variety of drivers that impact the decision to join trade associations, however, the 
underlying notion is that for certain business actors, trade associations can be considered 
as crucially important and effective organisations, whereas for other organisations they 
are merely a means to maintain relationships, whilst real business is done elsewhere.  
Barnett’s (2017) broad classifications (i.e. economic self-interest, sociological identity, 
and meta-organisational management) are widely recognisable within the interviewees’ 
responses, especially aspects concerning economic self-interest and sociological identity. 
Nevertheless, the predominant perspective that emerged, irrespective of the interlocutor, 




size of member firms. Namely, the notion that smaller firms tend to join and operate 
through trade associations because of a lack of resources:  
For the smaller companies, you don’t have the resources…so it’s 
actually very useful to have the trade association to push them, to 
represent the SMEs because without them you don’t have the 
resources to affect government policy (Interview 16, trade 
association). 
Hence, this deficiency of resources results in extremely limited if not completely absent 
opportunities to influence the policy-making process (Taminiau and Wilts 2006), and 
trade associations represent an effective alternative to operate in the political arena as 
evidenced by the former CEO of a large prime:  
The benefit for SMEs being involved in trade associations is 
because it gives them a bigger voice and again it’s around the 
alignment of goals and I think also that there is an opportunity for 
SMEs that are proactive, to actually get involved and shape the 
agenda (Interview 17, firm). 
The deficiencies are mainly due to organisational, financial and human resource 
constraints, and the inability to establish internal government and public affairs 
departments or pay for external political consultants. The notions that large firms are able 
to operate individually and will have larger discretion towards joining regional and 
national trade associations were emphasised and validated by informants across the 
different backgrounds. The CEO of a regional trade association mentioned that: 
It is also important to recognise that at the regional level they 
[large companies] have the size and influence within regional 
government to ask for what they want themselves. They don’t 
need the [trade association] to do that on their behalf (Interview 
15, trade association). 
This research extends seminal, yet still up-to-date work on political activities (Hillman 
and Hitt 1999) in that large firms, particularly the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) and Tier1 suppliers40, have the capacity to interact with the national government 
directly as well, as the senior VP of a large prime operating in the sector underlined that: 
Intermediaries are important but not fundamental as we have a 
direct interaction with the government (Interview 8, firm). 
                                                 





Hence, large firms will be generally able to choose when to act independently and when 
collaboratively, and will consider trade associations as a limited source of benefits and as 
complementary to their own government affairs departments (Reveley and Ville 2010). 
Several firm informants presented an extreme view highlighting negative consequences 
of an external organisations’ involvement and how an indirect approach with political 
stakeholders could dilute the effect of the message they are trying to convey:  
I think that by doing everything through a trade association it’s 
like putting a light through a spectrum […] it’s not quite the direct 
thing. So it’s not the same thing, it could be complementary to 
have a trade body putting these messages but we would want to 
have some confidence…sometimes if something is very crucial 
to us that we convey that ourselves. So I would see a trade body 
always as complementary to what we are doing (Interview 23, 
firm). 
Another aspect associated to resource availability concerns the physical distance from 
policymakers, as larger firms will potentially have the capacity to establish offices in the 
proximity of key institutional arenas in order to interact with policymakers regularly. 
Figure 9 maps the headquarters or government affairs offices of large companies in 
central London and underlines the proximity to Whitehall (i.e. government) and 
Westminster (i.e. parliament). This aspect is particularly relevant to trade associations as 
well, and as will be highlighted in the following sections, the capacity to constantly - and 
when required promptly - relate with key institutional actors is a decisive capability in 
developing and undertaking efficient political activities (Hillman and Hitt 1999).  
Moreover, trade associations will be extremely important for firms (particularly smaller 
firms) towards compensating the scarcity of resources aimed at the business environment, 
for example in terms of helping firms market their products. Trade associations will 
usually set up stands at local, national as well as international events and fairs, which may 
support smaller firms establish a presence in additional markets and develop relationships 
with foreign trade bodies by opening business channels and international business 
platforms (Interview 18, trade association). As described by an informant whose business 
is member of several associations:  
They could have money saving deals to allow a collective group 
of businesses in the supply chain go and investigate a new market 




opportunities to go to an exhibition or a trade exhibition where 
you can go under the umbrella of that organisation and…you 
don’t have to put the big thing on yourself, it is covered by that 
trade association (Interview 14, industry expert). 
Figure 9: London headquarters and/or government affairs offices of leading aerospace 
companies41  
 
Source: Elaborated by author 
Nonetheless, regardless the opportunity to operate independently or not, large and small 
firms will tend to join several associations at the same time. According to a survey 
undertaken by a regional trade association, 70% of their members, which span from micro 
SMEs (less than 10 employees or £2m turnover) to larger firms (more than 250 employees 
or £50m turnover), answered that they are part of several associations 42  (Strategic 
                                                 
41 Some of these companies are manufacturing/engineering companies with aerospace divisions. 
They are included in the map as informants consider them as competitors to aerospace companies 
in the political arena. Moreover, if the relationship with trade associations is considered, which is 
the focus of this study, these companies certainly play a role in the definition of trade associations' 
political strategy. 
42 Membership of other associations included other sector specific associations both at national 




Marketing 2013). This is in line with extant studies (e.g. Bennett 1998; Bennett and 
Ramsden 2007; Perry 2012) that underline how firms join various kinds of associations 
to meet their different needs. Moreover, as underlined by Perry (2012: 23) trade 
associations operating in industries characterised by the presence of a limited number of 
large companies, will seek to preserve large firms’ membership, as the lack of such 
companies may weaken the organisation.  
In terms of economic self-interest, which is linked to the notion of communal strategy 
(Barnett 2006a), firms recognise that their position is endangered by industry effects and 
thus shift their focus towards the industry, which is considered as a determinant of firm 
performance. This is conceptually opposed to the classical view of competitive strategy 
where a firm’s position is endangered by competitive forces, and thus firms direct their 
attention towards rival firms within the same industry (Barnett 2017). The shift between 
these two strategies will determine where firms direct their resources. In several cases, 
there is thus, a clear strategic vision to join trade associations and firms may foresee direct 
benefits from paying membership fees and engaging with their competitors on 
collaborative activities. As the CEO of a regional trade association put forward:  
Lots of organisations see the benefit of being part, certainly of the 
national trade associations, simply by trying to influence the 
national strategy, by having a sector coming forward to represent 
the whole industry, rather than individual companies doing that 
and potentially giving different messages (Interview 15, trade 
association). 
Various interviewees stressed the sole economic and operational benefits excluding 
sociological identity or other factors from their motivations to join associations. Hence, 
in line with extant studies (e.g. Tucker 2008) these findings confirm that economic 
incentives are an important determinant, as highlighted by a trade association 
representative: 
That is why people pay their subscriptions to [trade association] 
it’s because they think there will be some commercial benefit 
from being a member (Interview 19, trade association). 
Several informants, particularly the managing directors and CEOs of the various trade 





[…] one of the prime drivers is to gain greater exposure and to 
win more business, it’s as simple as that (Interview 24, trade 
association). 
Hence, in this case, the collective organisations are not considered as catalysers of 
aggregation within a specific industry, and firms do not join them because they identify 
with their community (Spillman 2012). Rather, firms consider trade associations as mere 
tools and platforms, which can be used towards individual gains. 
Another reason that motivates firms to engage with trade associations, which can be 
considered as a subset of economic self-interest, relates to the opportunity that firms have 
to gather intelligence and information from the trade associations they are members of. 
Informants confirmed notions underlined in extant work (e.g. Barron, Hultén, and 
Vanyushyn 2015; Lawton, Doh, and Rajwani 2014) that firms gain knowledge and 
expertise when joining trade associations:  
Sometimes its intelligence gathering […] so by participating in 
that form you get to learn what other companies, potential 
competitors are asking for, what are they pushing for, and in some 
ways, it is intelligence gathering that you can’t get in any other 
form if you are not part of that association (Interview 19, trade 
association). 
Hence, these organisations are incredible sources of market and nonmarket intelligence 
as well as specialised knowledge, and firms are thus able to gain information that they 
would not otherwise be able to obtain (Dalziel 2006) and address information asymmetry 
(Greenwood 2002). Knowledge can be gained from the association itself or from other 
members within the organisation (Battisti and Perry 2015). In relation to market 
information, trade associations are particularly well placed to offer internal and external 
knowledge. In terms of the first, intelligence may relate to industry competitors, or for 
smaller firms, to business opportunities stemming from larger firms (Interview 24, trade 
association). In terms of the latter, the analysed trade associations demonstrate evident 
capabilities in conducting market and business research and providing firms with national 
and international market intelligence, as was confirmed by several informants from the 
firms’ side: 
I see a trade association as being a resource, somewhere I can go 




trying to move into an export regime, they might have country 
information for me, from my sector perspective […] so they are 
for me sort of a marketing vehicle and a resource of information 
(Interview 17, firm).  
In terms of nonmarket information, trade associations, particularly the more active in the 
political arena demonstrated a breadth of information regarding the government’s agenda, 
new policy developments, as well as knowledge on key political actors at parliamentary 
level and within the civil service (Interview 18, trade association). Intelligence on 
political matters is crucial to large and small firms alike, and even though large firms may 
be able to interact independently there are cases when they will be able to gain key 
information only through trade association channels. The Head of Public Affairs of a 
large prime stated: 
So sometimes the trade bodies make us aware of issues that we 
are concerned about. So, for example at the moment, [the trade 
association] is having regular meetings with the Secretary of State 
on Brexit, and the Secretary of State says I want to meet the 
sector. I don’t just want to meet [a company] (Interview 23, firm). 
The findings regarding trade associations as key sources of political intelligence, build 
on Hultén, Barron, and Bryson’s (2012) work in which the authors argue that country-
specific institutional characteristics affect firms’ political activities. The scholars 
underline how, in contrast to their expectations, SMEs in the UK were more likely to use 
government fonts rather than trade associations as source of information. However, they 
point out that a possible explanation for this attitude may pertain to the fact that the data 
was gathered during the European election campaigns of 2009, a period in which political 
parties were highly involved in communication campaigns (Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 
2012: 358). In comparison, the data gained for this research was collected during the 
Brexit referendum and throughout the negotiations following the result to leave the EU, 
which represent a period of high political and economic uncertainty and might explain 
the marked reliance on trade associations. Interestingly, a senior trade association 
representative put forward the notion that Brexit could be considered as an opportunity 
for associations, and intermediaries in general, as changing rules and regulations would 
motivate firms towards joining such organisations in order to obtain information on how 




The sociological identity feature is underlined in various forms, and several informants 
highlighted the benefits and values of being part of a group and of a community embedded 
within industrial borders. However, the choice to join trade associations is complex and 
frequently does not fit with strict categorisations, rather it is a combination of various 
factors. Hence, sociological identity and economic self-interest may also be interlinked 
and overlap. According to a trade association CEO: 
I think it is about being member of a club, and then being a 
member of a club accessing support, information and help, being 
able to network, business development, meeting customers, 
meeting suppliers, it is part of being part of something bigger than 
just running your own business (Interview 15, trade association). 
An additional feature concerning the sociological identity relates to how firms are 
perceived by other firms, in terms of how they contribute to the development of the 
industry: 
For some companies it is better to be part of the community, and 
to be seen to be part of the community. And that they are playing 
their part, rather than being on their own and isolated, not part of 
the group (Interview 16, industry expert). 
It is important to highlight that broad sociological characteristics concerning being part 
of a group and of a community also have consequences on the messages that a particular 
industry or sector is able to convey, and on how policymakers will perceive these:  
Sometimes its about being part of the collective and having all the 
companies in the industry speaking with one voice, it makes the 
view stronger and makes it carry more weight within government 
(Interview 16, industry expert). 
This is in line with the notions proposed by Tucker (2008) on the collective reputation 
management activities undertaken by trade associations. Trade associations that are able 
to promote a cluster of companies, which is bound by shared values and common interests 
will be able to have greater impact or at least greater access to policy arenas. Thus, one 
key requirement is that the companies that cooperate are also willing to align their 
interests, as this will be a strong determinant of trade associations’ activities 
effectiveness:  
You try and get a position because the more common ground you 




it but if they are all saying the same thing the person at the other 
end will say “this sounds important, I better listen to this”. […] 
So, it is not in anybody’s interest not to coordinate quite well with 
these things (Interview 19, trade association). 
From the other side, governments will seek a collective voice, as this will enhance the 
capability to interact with the private sector. They will be able to substantiate their 
relationship to other members of parliament, private citizens and other stakeholders, and 
demonstrate that their engagement entails an entire community rather than a mere 
interaction with specific firms (Interview 22, firm). This is in line with the Code of 
Practice on written consultation published by the Cabinet Office in 2000, which 
welcomed broadly representative bodies, recognising the special position of trade 
associations (Cabinet Office 2000). This does not imply that governments will not have 
direct relations with specific companies, for example in terms of procurement and 
government contracts. Rather, this relates to the circumstance in which there is the need 
to relate with the entire industry, for example in terms of modifying or implementing new 
legislation or policy. Hence, the effectiveness and perceived effectiveness of a trade 
association to develop a communal identity and represent the broader community with 
political actors, is a strong moderating factor that will impact firms’ choice to operate 
through it or act individually. This notion was emphasised by a senior trade association 
representative: 
If the trade association is seen by the big companies as effective 
in doing these things [political activities], they would much prefer 
that the lobbying is done by the trade association because they 
know that government doesn’t like being lobbied by individual 
companies. It much prefers to be seen to be dealing with a whole 
association, a whole sector, not just an individual company. So 
it’s a matter of effectiveness (Interview 19, trade association). 
Another pattern that emerged during the analysis that entails firms’ choice to join trade 
associations, relates to a trade associations’ ability to develop the broader supply chain. 
Trade associations in the UK aerospace industry are attempting to improve the supply 
chain by developing a more homogeneous structure (Interview 12, trade association), 
which is intended to accelerate the competitiveness of the industry: 
Other than being positive for small firms, this will develop the 




effective supply chain will make them want to invest more in the 
UK (Interview 12, trade association). 
Hence, these activities are extremely relevant for larger firms, especially primes, which 
will have a more efficient supply chain and will be able to liaise more effectively with it. 
In this respect, trade associations will have a double role, on one hand they will be able 
to develop the supply chain, and on the other hand they will facilitate the interaction 
between the large primes and SMEs:  
[…] so, the big companies being part of the regional alliances is 
very important. On our board we have senior representatives of 
[OEM and Tier 1 suppliers]. It is very important that they are 
engaged and connected with the supply chain (Interview 15, trade 
association). 
This is seen as particularly important from the perspective of smaller firms as well, as 
they will be able to interact with large firm representatives; interaction that would not be 
available without the coordinating functions of trade associations as put forward by a 
trade association manager:  
We try to encourage our larger organisations to help and direct 
our small members by providing speakers at these events and 
providing us with internal information in our discussions with 
them. […] so that is how we use our large members and a lot of 
our large members joins us to do that, so if you say that 
[company] wants to talk to its supply chain, it’s easier for them to 
talk to us than it is for them to talk to their entire supply chain 
(Interview 18, trade association). 
Moreover, whilst for the majority of informants, trade associations are a means for large 
firms to relate and interact with their supply chain, some interviewees offered a different 
view that captures the notion that large primes promote the development and use the meta-
organisations to actively manage their supply chain. In the following quote, the former 
Head of Political and Economic Affairs of a large trade association explains how the 
establishment and development of a regional organisation was furthered and promoted by 
one of the aerospace primes that had a large presence in that specific geographical area: 
[…] particularly the [trade association], very strong, encouraged 
in part from [company] for obvious reasons, they saw it as a 






Critically one of the main reasons for firms to join trade associations relates to the 
management of issues that transcend the boundaries of the individual firm and relate to 
broad industrial issues that affect the entire industry:  
When it comes to the interests of the industry, then obviously the 
individual companies have their own responsibilities at their own 
companies but there are a lot of issues which sit across the 
industry as a whole and often it is better to collaborate with your 
competitors and your partners than it is to compete around those 
issues (Interview 17, firm). 
There are various matters that cannot be handled individually by firms regardless of their 
size, or whether they are capable to undertake independent activities through their own 
government affairs departments or external lobbyists. These include common industry 
wide matters, related to regulatory change, a legislative change or a policy change 
(Interview 16, industry expert). 
Furthermore, there are specific issues that firms are purposely not willing to handle 
directly as these could have wider implications to their operations, reputation, credibility 
and image. A key implication that is particular, nevertheless not exclusive, to the 
aerospace industry, relates to the strong commercial and procurement links several firms 
enjoy with the national government. These strong relationships on one-hand benefit 
companies commercially, on the other hand they may limit the political activities these 
can undertake. In these instances, firms will thus need to operate under the auspices of 
trade associations. As the Head of Public Affairs of a large prime argued: 
Sometimes there are also difficult messages that we want to give, 
and because in many respects the government is our customer and 
they are buying things from us, they don’t want to be told negative 
things by the people they are buying things off. We ask our trade 
bodies to sometimes give more difficult messages (Interview 23, 
firm). 
Hence, there are several occasions when these organisations are not in the position to 
back particular instances, especially when issues are sensitive or politically oriented:  
You also find that the reason why they use trade bodies and they 




sensitive […] they won’t necessarily want to be lobbying directly 
(Interview 16, industry expert). 
A topical example can be taken from the campaign preceding the referendum for the 
United Kingdom to leave the European Union. In this instance, many companies were 
not willing to advance their views on the preferred outcome because of the negative 
consequences that could ensue. Airbus and Rolls Royce are examples of the few 
companies operating in the UK that expressed their favourable opinion towards the UK 
remaining a member of the European Union (Davies 2016), and after the referendum, 
were very outspoken about their preferred direction of the negotiations (Ruddick 2016). 
In sharp contrast, trade associations played a key role in presenting the industry’s interests 
advocating against the exit of the UK from the EU (Kakkad 2015). Several firm 
representatives, as well as other professionals operating in the industry, highlighted how 
associations were instrumental in advocating on issues when they could not:  
[…] associations can bring forward issues we can’t, and the 
referendum is a clear example (Interview 5, firm). 
Hence, a clear differentiation between firms’ and trade associations’ political activities is 
the ability of the latter to contribute to the political narrative in a more direct approach on 
particularly sensitive issues. A firm representative commented: 
We simply cannot say anything contentious […] so for instance 
we did not get involved in the European referendum, whereas 
someone like [trade association] they are able to be an effective 
voice of industry, because that is their role to be the voice 
(Interview 7, firm).  
Several informants, specifically from the firms’ side, referred to this feature as ‘free 
speech’, and consider trade associations as the organisation that is expected to engage 
with policymakers when the issue at stake is particularly sensitive. Senior trade 
association representatives confirmed these notions:  
There are messages that you want to get across to government that 
you do not want your company’s name associated with, and it’s 
easier to have someone else deliver the message than just the 
company. The company might also be giving that message. But 






The last category that emerged from the analysis of the data concerning the reasons firms 
join sectorial trade associations, relates to the key features that differentiate the several 
typologies of trade associations, as well as trade associations from other intermediaries. 
As highlighted in Chapter 2 there are different typologies of trade associations operating 
across the aerospace industry. Namely, the main distinction relates to professional 
associations such as the Royal Academy of Engineering, industry wide associations such 
as the CBI, and sector specific trade associations, which are the focus of this study. Even 
though firms in the UK aerospace industry may be members of several types, informants 
emphasised how the different organisations operating as intermediaries have very 
different aims and objectives, as well as impact towards representing specific industry 
interests. This is clearly evident from the following quote from the interview with the 
CEO of a large prime: 
The CBI is generic, and you need more horsepower such as in 
sector specific trade association (Interview 8, firm). 
Firms are thus members of several trade associations and consider them as multi-layer 
building blocks as all of them will contribute towards the development of a particular 
narrative. Hence, firms will convey different kinds of messages through the various 
typologies of trade or business associations depending on the specific issue they are 
confronted with as mentioned by an industry expert:  
Some of these organisations are much better than others, some of 
them have got more money than others. I think they come with 
different strengths and different weaknesses (Interview 16, 
industry expert). 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the different types of associations varies considerably 
in terms of the contextual and environmental conditions. In his study on the different 
organisations that formed a corporation’s institutional field, Barley (2010) highlighted 
how in the US during the 70s the most influential organisations were those associations 
that spanned industries. In juxtaposition, several informants emphasised how in the 
current UK aerospace industry context, sectorial and professional trade associations are 
more effective in conveying their interests. The associative framework in the aerospace 
industry is very well organised both at national level and across the various regions. This 
characteristic has enabled the associations to establish strong links and relationships with 




of the industry’s specific issues, i.e. technical, legal or commercial and will be considered 
by policymakers as reliable industry representatives. As put forward by the CEO of a 
regional trade association:  
They [peak association] probably have much bigger membership 
than we do in total number of players, but they are much less 
focused. We have a relatively small membership, something 
around 160, that includes companies, universities and other 
relevant institutions but we are very heavily focused on our sector 
or sectors because we cover aerospace, to a degree defence and 
space (Interview 24, trade association). 
Firm representatives, who are members of both typologies of organisations, confirmed 
the view that peak associations or organisations representing broader interests are taken 
into consideration for broader issues and rather relied on sectoral organisations when 
industry specific issues were at stake. Typical responses were:  
The CBI tends to take a broader economic view and will tend to 
focus on the broader economy and not get so involved in specific 
issues. They have done some work on defence, but they are not 
really seen as a credible voice in that arena (Interview 23, firm). 
Together, the different patterns that have emerged from the data analysis build on extant 
literature on CPA and contribute to the understanding of why trade associations are key 
political actors in relation to the business-government relations field. Moreover, this 
section has underlined that the membership base of trade associations in the UK aerospace 
industry is diverse as firms choose to join trade associations for a variety different 
reasons, extending previous accounts that have focused on different contexts (e.g. Battisti 
and Perry 2015; Van Waarden 1992). The differences between small and large firms, 
particularly in terms of their interests, aims and objectives have wider implications, and 
are the motive for tensions that cut through most sectorial associations, both at the 
national and regional level. These tensions culminate in the capability of trade 
associations to align the diverging interests and put forward a common voice that truly 
represents all its members.  
5.2.2 Contextual conditions 
The second theme that has emerged from the data analysis covers the characteristics of 




different organisations and institutional stakeholders with which trade associations relate. 
In terms of the latter, particular attention is given to national and local government, as 
well as to the role of individual MPs. Furthermore, this section will highlight broader 
environmental characteristics and how changes in the political system and the perception 
of institutions and institutional change can influence trade associations’ role and 
activities.  
The environment in which trade associations develop and undertake political activities is 
densely populated by a broad spectrum of institutional actors as well as numerous other 
organisations and intermediaries with which they interact. This environment is complex, 
dynamic and subject to continuous economic, social and political shifts. Examples of 
these shifts include changes in government, the EU referendum and the international 
financial crisis that struck in 2007. The purpose of this section is not to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the political system, but rather to underline the key 
institutional and organisational stakeholders that form the institutional field based on 
informants’ perception of such environment43.  
The institutional field is defined as “set of organizational populations and the relations 
that embed members of these populations into a social system or network with a purpose” 
(Barley 2010: 780). Identifying the key organisations and institutions is necessary to 
understand the environment in which trade associations function (Keim and Hillman 
2008) and are embedded (Granovetter 1985). Figure 10 is an attempt to simplify and 
contribute to understanding the context in which trade associations operate, position them 
within the wider context of intermediaries and institutional actors, and underline their 
relationships44. Hence, as underlined by a trade association CEO, meta-organisations 
included within this study interact with political institutions and non-political institutions: 
Our stakeholders would be LEPs, there would be organisations 
like UKTI, there would be organisations like the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Department of 
                                                 
43 This includes perceptions other than of association managers, of firm managers as well because 
they are able, through their membership and/or key positions in trade association committees, to 
influence trade association strategy and activities.  
44  The type and strength of the relationship will vary according to regional and national 
associations and stakeholders; nevertheless, this map attempts to represent the different levels. 
The map was developed following interviews with informants and was then revised following 




Communities and Local Government, and then there are wider 
organisations such as the universities in the region […] there is 
the [automotive trade association], we work closely with them 
(Interview 12, trade association)45. 
In relation to organisations that do not entail policy or decision-making but try to 
influence it, trade associations included within this study relate, cooperate and compete 
with firms, other associations 46  and a broad range of additional organisations and 
intermediaries. As Keim and Hillman (2008) argue, in relation to understanding a specific 
environmental context, it is essential to “be aware of all the other organisations that are 
acting to affect public policy and that could prove to be potential rivals, adversaries, or 
collaborators within the political environment” (2008: 50). Amongst others, the most 
recurring actors include firms, think tanks, academic institutions, research centres, trade 
unions, charities, learned societies, Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), chambers 
of commerce and the media. Moreover, there are also political analysts and aerospace 
analysts who are opinion formers as well and play an important role in this non-market 
environment (Interview 17, firm).  
                                                 
45 The UKTI was replaced by the DTI (Department for International Investment) in 2016 (UKTI 
2016) 
46  As previously mentioned there is a variety of different associations including: peak 
associations, chambers of commerce, associations operating in other sectors, and associations 




Figure 10: Trade associations’ environment  
 




These organisations are able, in specific circumstances, to undertake activities that may 
overlap with activities undertaken by sectorial associations. The findings are coherent 
with existing studies that have addressed the overlap of services and interest 
representation amongst different typologies of UK associations (Greenwood and Traxler 
2007), as well as the inability of organisations representing interests to dominate over 
other organisations, given the UK’s pluralist tradition (e.g. Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 
2012). This study further contributes to the understanding that interest representation 
activities may overlap between associations and other typologies of organisations, which 
will be influential and have opportunities to contribute to the public policy shaping 
discourse. Informants underlined activities of various organisations that could undertake 
interest representation and advocacy functions. Nevertheless, differences can be 
emphasised in terms of the underlying reasons and methods related to how and why other 
organisations operate in the political arena. For example, trade associations will drive a 
certain agenda whereas academic organisations will supposedly examine a given problem 
objectively. Comparably, as mentioned by a firm CEO, a clear case is provided by think 
tanks and how they contribute to developing a particular narrative: 
I think that think tanks are often influential. […] They won’t try 
to lobby, they will try to be analytic in the way they come at a 
problem […] because if you ask a think tank to look at an issue, 
and they look at an issue, what they conclude will be based on 
deductive logic and research and educated opinion. Whereas, if 
you come through a trade association clearly they are trying to 
represent their membership, so that is a different kind of agenda 
(Interview 17, firm). 
Even though the notion that think tanks are key actors is a recurrent theme amongst 
informants, the interview data underlines contrasting perspectives regarding their role and 
function. Some informants viewed them as independent organisations that provide 
evidence-based research and analysis on a wide range of issues, whereas other informants 
and documentary data demonstrated that think tanks may be used as platforms through 
which firms convey their messages and build narratives towards promoting specific 
interests. In relation to the first perspective, the interviewed industry experts all agreed 
that think tanks are reliable organisations and that policymakers should rely on their 




Governments should rely more on independent information 
stemming from independent sources such as think tanks, but this 
is very difficult because firms lobby against this for their own 
interest…for example, Trident is superficial, but firms continue 
to lobby for it as it increases profits (Interview 26, industry 
expert).  
In relation to the second perspective the Government Affairs Manager of a large firm, 
argued that think tanks were organisations instrumental to protecting or enhancing their 
position, which could be used passively, as a source of intelligence and “industry gossip”, 
and actively to develop and push a certain narrative:  
I think that think tanks are a less cumbersome route than trade 
associations to try and protect your own immediate company 
interests. They can work up some quick-fire campaigns, trade 
associations don’t do fire campaigns (Interview 27, firm). 
Organisations such as research and manufacturing centres (e.g. the catapults 47 ), 
universities, foundations, and trade unions that have a constant interaction with the 
business environment may relate with decision makers on specific issues. Additionally, 
there are professional and sectorial charities such as learned societies, who may at first 
glance not be considered specifically as lobby organisations but are nevertheless 
extremely important at influencing the policy environment and developing positive 
industry narratives48. They are able to submit position papers, testify in front of specific 
commissions such as the parliamentary select committees, and respond to green papers 
consultations49. Another key function of these societies is to establish platforms and 
forums that enable politicians, regulators, policymakers and key actors in the aerospace 
industry to relate with each other:  
[The charity] is an independent organisation, non-commercial, 
not for profit […] and has to report to the charity commission. 
[The charity] can’t lobby but can be influential and can bring 
people together, sometimes with politicians and civil servants, but 
                                                 
47  Catapults are not-for-profit, independent technology and innovation centres. They were 
founded by Innovate UK and their role is to connect businesses with the UK’s research and 
academic communities. There are 10 catapults in the UK (Innovate UK 2015). 
48 Examples of these societies in the UK aerospace sector include the Royal Aeronautical Society, 
The Air League and the Honourable Company of Air Pilots. 
49 Select committees are established to conduct investigations and to produce reports on a variety 
of issues, from the conduct of Government to specific subject areas. There are Select committees 





it will also bring those individuals who work for companies and 
facilitate their interaction with civil servants (Interview 16, 
industry expert).  
In some respects, these organisations may be acknowledged as organisations that can, in 
specific circumstances act as intermediaries, as their activities can be placed on the same 
level as corporate political activities or trade associations’ political activities and interest 
representation functions. These organisations represent the interests of their communities 
through several platforms such as when government asks for consultation on specific 
matters. For instance, the government in January 2017 presented a consultation request 
through the green paper on industrial strategy (BEIS 2017), which created the opportunity 
for organisations to bring forward their views.  
A critical issue for sectorial trade associations linked to competing organisations in the 
institutional field, relates to having members that operate in different sectors 
simultaneously, as these will not rely entirely on a specific association. As an industry 
expert, who had experience in both company and trade association contexts put forward: 
So companies that are active in aerospace but not necessarily 
totally wedded to aerospace’s business their sole source of 
income…it is important for those companies to have different sets 
of voices, not just trade associations but alongside those trade 
associations there are the professional associations and there are 
the organisations that are established to help the development of 
future products and systems (Interview 14, industry expert). 
These notions are important to emphasize that sectorial trade associations are not the sole 
influential intermediary active in the business-government relationship within the UK 
aerospace industry and may have to collaborate with organisations that have the same 
views or compete with ones that present opposing views. This is valid in terms of interest 
representation, as well as in terms of their role towards developing bridging platforms for 
the public and private spheres to interact.  
In relation to political institutional stakeholders, trade associations need to relate with a 
broad range of institutional stakeholders including government, the different 
governmental departments and agencies, non-departmental public bodies, local councils, 




and collective level (i.e. when they are part of select committees or APPGs50). There are 
considerable differences across the country, as well as in terms of how these actors play 
a role in the policy-making process and how they influence the development of trade 
associations’ political strategy. Local trade associations operating in Wales, Northern 
Ireland and Scotland relate primarily with the devolved administrations, whereas the 
regional trade associations in England engage with LEPs and other forms of local 
government (interviews 15; 24, trade association).  
These different institutional structures present considerable distinctions in terms of how 
they are composed (i.e. elected or appointed) as well as in terms of the autonomy of 
funding. The CEO of a trade association operating within a devolved administration 
underlined the differences between the political institutional context in which the 
organisation operates and the English context:  
It has a greater degree of power and more importantly, because 
the two go hand in hand, a greater degree of financing. So that is 
an important thing, and [the devolved administration] can do 
things without too much reference to the UK, it has its own 
devolved responsibilities for economic development. So, it can 
put money into companies, into infrastructure without necessarily 
having to refer to the UK, so I can get access to the first minister, 
I can get access to the economics minister, or any minister 
(Interview 24, trade association). 
Moreover, the devolved administrations have an additional institutional stakeholder in 
the national government, which is the territorial Secretary of State (Cabinet Office 2013). 
The relationship between the Secretary of State and the regional trade associations is 
particularly relevant, as it is one of the limited occasions in which smaller trade 
associations can relate directly with the national government51. The interaction with the 
executive is usually confined to the national associations as these will have offices in 
central London and will be able to engage with it on a regular basis.  
                                                 
50  All-Party Parliamentary Groups are defined as “informal cross-party groups that have no 
official status within Parliament. They are run by and for Members of the Commons and Lords, 
though many choose to involve individuals and organisations from outside Parliament in their 
administration and activities” (UK Parliament 2017). 
51 The Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are Cabinet ministers and 




The different institutional structures affect the development of trade associations and their 
role within the broader institutional field. In relation to the last quote, the trade association 
has a direct and strong relationship with the local government, placing it in a position of 
strength towards representing its members’ interests. It must be highlighted that this 
interaction is not common to all the devolved administrations for two main overarching 
reasons. Firstly, because of the political environment, i.e. the political atmosphere could 
be more or less sympathetic to specific business and industrial interests. Secondly, 
because of the structure and dominance of the aerospace industry in each region, for 
example, Wales presents a stronger aerospace presence than Scotland (Rhodes 2017), 
thus the sector will be particularly relevant for Welsh politicians and policymakers 
(Llewellyn-Jones 2015). 
Nonetheless, the main actor in the British context is the national government given its 
executive powers (e.g. Boléat 2003; Dorey 2014), as was agreed by the entirety of 
respondents included within this research. Hence, the government has a considerable 
influence on the aerospace industry, which is evident from its strong relationship with it. 
The strong and intertwined links between the two spheres (i.e. public and private) are a 
recurrent theme within the data, as emphasised by the CEO of a trade association: 
Pretty much wherever you go in the world and see an aerospace 
industry; that is actually because government and industry are 
working together. It doesn’t tend to work if government isn’t 
supporting it (Interview 12, trade association). 
As highlighted in Chapter 3 the aerospace industry is broadly divided in two main 
segments, i.e. civil and defence, and this research finds that there are contrasting 
perspectives on the interaction between government and the two sectors. On one hand, 
several informants agreed that in terms of business-government relations the two sectors 
essentially overlap, as once firms (that operate in both sectors) establish relations with 
political institutions the benefits may flow from one sector to the other. This is even more 
valid when taking into account trade associations, given that the vast majority of them do 
not differentiate between these two sectors in terms of interest representation. As the 
government affairs manager of one of the key industrial actors describes, during a 
Parliamentary Select Committee hearing, the relationship between industry and the 




[…] aerospace is politics with wings on it. The two parts are 
totally interlinked, whether we like it or not sometimes. Before 
joining Airbus, I worked in the automotive sector and there was 
nowhere near the amount of involvement. The most important 
thing for us in the industry is to work with that the right way. 
Sometimes it can get in the way, but it is usually beneficial. 
Therefore, the two are definitely interlinked (House of Commons 
2011, HC 735-II: 48). 
On the other hand, informants recognised differences in the relationships with the two 
sectors and government, as in the civil sector companies sell to private and public 
customers, whereas in relation to the defence sector customers are always governments 
(House of Commons 2011). As a trade association representative explained:  
[…] the government is the customer, and the regulator and the 
user of the equipment, and so the relationship between 
government and industry is just very different. Because with civil 
aerospace government is just trying to make the business 
environment as globally competitive as possible. And it’s a much 
easier thing to achieve than on the defence side where because the 
MoD is user, purchaser, regulator, etcetera…it’s a very different 
relationship (Interview 19, trade association). 
One of the areas in which these disparities are readily observable relates to the 
development of formal government partnerships with the two sectors, namely the 
Aerospace Growth Partnership (AGP) and the Defence Growth Partnership (DGP). The 
first is well developed and has progressed strongly since its establishment in 2010 (AGP 
2016). The government’s role is to engage constructively with the manufacturing industry 
to develop, and the products are then sold to customers in the UK and throughout the 
world. Whereas in the second, the government is the customer and has a more conflicted 
relationship, and that has limited the DGPs development. Several informants confirmed 
these diverse interactions:  
[…] on the civil side, we tend to be asking for support selling 
aircraft abroad, research investment, investment in skills and 
training. And we ask for all those things on the defence side as 
well, but there is an additional relationship of…we are selling our 
products, […]. So, in some respects the government is more 
reluctant to have such strong relations. […] The reason they are 
reluctant is because they want to maintain strength in contract 




The above quotes underline the different role that the government can have in relation to 
the industry, namely customer, regulator and advocate (Interview 8, firm). This 
perspective was recurrent amongst respondents from the firm side, as a large prime CEO 
commented:  
In our case the customer and government were the same thing in 
essence. So we sold into governments so basically influencing the 
government is the same thing as influencing customers but I felt 
it was all about having influence (Interview 17, firm). 
Nevertheless, one of the main aspects that was emphasised, indistinctly of the background 
of the informant, is that both parties (i.e. government and industry) benefit from this close 
relationship. From one side, government will rely on the aerospace industry to provide 
national socio-economic outcomes including the development of high-skilled jobs, 
technology and research that can spin-off to other sectors, long-term economic prosperity 
and national security (RAeS 2017). From the other side the industry will look to establish 
a strong relationship with government towards selling its products, supporting exports, 
gaining research investment, investment in skills and training, as well as creating a 
positive environment in which to operate (Interviews 17; 23, firm). Amongst these, one 
of the most evident and important features relates to firms exporting their products and 
selling them to foreign governments, as the government will have a decisive role in the 
outcome of such undertakings. Bob Keen, Head of Government Relations of BAE 
Systems, underlined these notions during an oral evidence session in the House of 
Commons:  
[…] it is not just good enough to have terrific products, absolutely 
necessary though that is…you also require absolutely joined-up 
support of the British Government because the overseas customer 
is buying into the relationship with the UK Government. The key 
to our success has been strong political support (House of 
Commons 2011, HC 735-II: 48).  
Historically, in relation to the development of collective action and the establishment and 
development of trade associations, the UK has been characterised by a strong 
involvement and influence of the government, which developed over time. Politicians 
and civil servants required a strong business intermediary and a single voice representing 
the industry with which they could relate. Moran (2006: 457) argues “to end half a century 




the early 1960s actively looked for a single business partner in its new ventures in 
economic planning”. 
Having considered the government’s paramount role, it is important to highlight other 
features of the UK’s political system, which emerged from the data and which have an 
impact on trade associations’ role and functions. As an informant put it:  
We don’t have a single entity…that is not the way government 
policy is formed, it is not the way it works. Many people have a 
voice, […] the treasury has a voice, the defence has a voice and 
the rest of the political machine has a voice (Interview 14, 
industry expert).  
A characteristic of the UK’s political structure, which differentiates it from other 
European political systems, is assumed by individual members of parliament and their 
significant function in terms of connecting industry with political and governing 
institutions: 
[…] in the UK the way politics works is that there is of course a 
government with ministers who make the national decisions, but 
they are essentially influenced by members of parliament who 
may be in the government but may not be, those members of 
parliament all come from constituencies, i.e. they are voted in. 
And they are very interested in what goes on in their constituency 
(Interview 20, trade association). 
Hence, having acknowledged the strength of the executive, and the downgrade of 
parliament’s role in the policy-making process (Dorey 2014: 74), MPs that are not part 
of the government and do not hold ministerial positions (these include opposition MPs as 
well) are an extremely relevant stakeholder, which impact trade associations’ political 
activities. This is because political activities do not only entail the activities directed 
towards influencing a specific policy but entail the broader set of actions undertaken to 
relate with officials, regulators and politicians, who may or may not be involved in a 
specific policy making process. The UK aerospace industry is spread across the nation, 
and the MPs that represent constituencies in which there is a strong aerospace industrial 
presence will usually be particularly interested in the development of the industry given 
the benefits in terms of employment and economic contribution to the area as confirmed 




[…] MPs that represent constituencies with a high number of 
aerospace companies play a great role. As SMEs are scattered 
across the country, firms and associations can use these features 
as resources to lobby MPs (Interview 16, industry expert). 
This is a key feature of the institutional environment that clearly has a strong impact on 
trade associations’ operations, as managers will need to consider the activities directed 
towards individual MPs when developing political strategies. In addition to political 
objectives and commitments vis-à-vis their constituencies, MPs may become interested 
in affairs concerning aerospace, and thus influential, because of personal interests or their 
professional background (Interview 12, trade association). Hence, informants underlined 
that establishing and maintaining political connections with members of parliament, who 
are either directly involved in aerospace matters or show a particular interest in aerospace, 
is a cornerstone of political action.  
Sun, Mellahi, and Thun concede that political connections can undeniably be considered 
as a strategic value and that their value may shift in time and “become a handicap at a 
later stage” (2010: 1161). Even though the abovementioned study considers emerging 
markets, this research finds that negative externalities from political embeddedness can 
ensue in developed markets as well. Fostering relationships with MPs is a fundamental 
feature of trade associations’ political activities, but there are instances where shifting 
relations with political stakeholders can have a damaging impact as highlighted by 
various respondents: 
They can turn on you as well. So, for example, another one of our 
local MPs (…) is not such a supporter of ours, which baffles me 
but this person is a supporter of our major competitor, even talks 
about them in the House of Commons and doesn’t talk about us. 
We have tried, a lot of outreach to this person, but it doesn’t seem 
to work so we just leave it (Interview 22, firm). 
Hence, even highly embedded organisations that constantly attempt to grow the volume 
of their political connections face variations in their political networks, as the political 
and policy environments are dynamic (Boléat 2003: 89-90). This is another characteristic, 
regarding the institutional environment and the relationship between trade associations 
and political actors, which may affect their role and political activities. Lawton, McGuire, 
and Rajwani (2013: 96) argue “the evolution of the political system can present 




new context”. This research extends these views to the political activities of trade 
associations and finds that in the context of the UK aerospace industry institutional 
change at national, regional and local level has presented meta-organisations with 
increasing challenges. Although scholars (e.g. Wright et al. 2005) have called for 
additional research in emerging markets, due to the institutional volatility of such 
contexts, institutional change can occur even within highly institutionalised environments 
(Wooten and Hoffman 2016).  
Informants from both regional and national trade associations, highlighted how changes 
in the political environment have made it more difficult for organisations to relate with 
policymakers and that associations have had to continuously react and adapt to these 
changes, or in the best-case scenario, anticipate them. The nature of the fluctuations in 
the institutional field can vary consistently: from changes in interpersonal relationships 
between managers and politicians, to reshuffles in cabinet or ministerial positions 
following a general election (Keim and Hillman 2008); and from broad structural 
transformations stemming from changes in economic policy to exogenous political 
shocks (Siegel 2007). An example of institutional change that has affected the 
development of political strategy is presented by an informant with extensive experience 
in a large aerospace trade body who described the shift in strategy following the 2017 
general election52:  
They are now doing more on the parliamentary side because of 
the nature of the minority government, which makes 
backbenchers more effective and influential […] backbench MPs 
became a much more important stakeholder. Whereas in the past 
we took the view that […] engaging with government ministers 
or officials was the most important aspect and that will be 
sufficient (Interview 29, firm).  
A powerful variation in the institutional environment, which informants perceived to have 
profound effects on trade associations, has entailed policies regarding local and national 
governance. In the interest of economic growth, the UK has historically adopted a 
centralised approach to policymaking (Hildreth and Bailey 2013), but global dynamics 
have shifted the focus towards local geographical, historical and socio-cultural 
                                                 
52 The 2017 general election resulted in the development of a hung parliament, whereby the 
Conservative party, which was in power at the time of the election, lost its majority of seats (Syal 




influences, which has placed greater emphasis on local economic policy development 
(Dicken 2011). Hence, the UK’s history is scattered with several attempts to move from 
a centralised system to one that places an emphasis on local and regional entities. One of 
the key events that has influenced the development and function of trade associations was 
the launch of the nine Regional Development Agencies53 (RDAs), and their subsequent 
abolishment by the Coalition government in 2010 in favour of a series of Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs)54.   
The findings seem to suggest that the institution of the RDAs permitted the regional trade 
associations to place themselves in a strong intermediary position. This was possible 
because the collective organisations faced a solid institutional entity with which they 
could relate, attempt to influence and gain funding from. As underlined by the former 
Head of Economic and Political Affairs of a trade association during the late 90s:  
The relationship between central government and regional 
support… these were the days of the Regional Development 
Agencies, and this is why the regional associations were 
becoming important (Interview 20, trade association). 
The RDAs had the capabilities to develop economic strategies and then the capacity, in 
terms of economic and human resources, to work with the various industrial stakeholders 
to implement it 55. These notions are confirmed by a variety of informants from different 
backgrounds:   
The RDA used to focus quite heavily on the sectors that employed 
the most people and produced the most GDP in their areas, so 
when the [RDA] was around here it focused a lot in the aerospace 
supply chain in the area because that was very important to the 
                                                 
53 The Regional Development Agencies were “set up with the intention that they would become 
arms of the proposed elected Regional Assemblies…[and for] producing the new Regional 
Strategy and in taking over responsibility for regional planning” (Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2010). These entities were developed to contrast the 
substantial economic disparities in the different areas in the UK and produce specific policy and 
regional strategy that best suited each geographical context.  
54 The LEPs are voluntary partnerships between local authorities and businesses to determine 
local economic priorities and lead on economic growth within their areas (Lepnetwork 2017).  
55 The RDAs produced the Regional Economic Strategies (RES), together with key stakeholders, 





economy and it would provide supporting finance for the various 
levels of that supply chain (Interview 14, industry expert).  
The biggest selling point for official structures at regional or local 
level, whether it is the old RDAs or the devolved administrations 
currently, is that they do have their own budgets. And they can 
therefore invest in industries or industry academic links or give 
R&D credits or tax incentives for building, etc., which is 
something the central government, struggles with (Interview 29, 
firm). 
Moreover, informants argued how the regional trade associations were not seen as a threat 
to the national ones in terms of developing a national presence and gaining access to 
central government circles, but nevertheless were in the process of forming notable 
lobbying and networking functions (Interview 18, trade association). Additionally, their 
relationship with RDAs, as well as the funding and subsidies they received from the 
institutional bodies placed the associations in a position of strength, which allowed them 
to increase membership and weight in their interest representation functions (Interview 
21, trade association). On one side, the RDAs worked in close partnership with the 
regional bodies to support business development particularly for small and medium 
enterprises. On the other, the regional bodies would interact with the RDAs as the latter 
would have an important role within national committees (Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2010), it would thus be an avenue for regional trade 
associations to exert pressure up to the national policy making level.   
The ensuing establishment of the LEPs drove the regional trade associations to face 
several issues that affected their political strategy and effectiveness of their political 
activities. The crucial change concerned the fact that the RDAs in each region were 
replaced by multiple LEPs, which did not have the same budgetary powers as the RDAs 
and most powers were shifted back to London (Bailey and Berkeley 2014). Moreover, 
these changes forced local trade associations to interact with a growing number of 
stakeholders, and to adapt their communication approaches to convey their concerns to a 
wider audience. In many cases issues related to aerospace engineering and advanced 
manufacturing require a high level of technical understanding by actors operating in the 
policy-making side, which was destabilised by the institutional shift and organisations 
have had to develop a more formal and presentational approach. The trade associations’ 




interact with policymakers and be influential. These notions are clearly exposed in the 
comments of a regional trade association’s CEO:  
Because an organisation like mine, which is only a small trade 
association, does not have the capacity now to go and do what it 
used to do with a regional development agency with five different 
Local Enterprise Partnerships, we can’t go and have the same 
conversation five times, we can’t go and influence the same 
initiative five times. Now we got [LEPs] they all got their own 
strategic economic plan. They all got what they consider their 
priorities. We find it very difficult to influence those strategies in 
order to help our members in the aerospace sector (Interview 12, 
trade association). 
Moreover, the abolishment of the RDAs changed the relationship between the regional 
bodies and the firms as put forward by a senior trade association manager:  
And then of course the RDAs got abolished […], so to some 
extent some of the big pulling power and subsidies, the RDAs 
disappeared with that, and bang-bang went the free membership 
(Interview 20, trade association). 
Another variation in the political landscape, which affected trade associations, concerns 
the devolved administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Changes in the 
political weight and authority after the establishment of the devolved administrations 
have been crucial in terms of the development of the local forums into strong regional 
intermediaries. As these institutional entities gained additional powers to develop policy 
and implement rules and regulations, trade associations adapted their political activities. 
A parallel can be drawn to how firms and organisations adapted their political activities 
to face the development of new supranational institutional actors (Woll 2007).  
These findings are divergent from the notions that local governments are not important 
to trade associations and that devolution processes poses threats to them as underlined by 
Boléat (2003: 98). Specifically, Boléat (2003) focuses on the impact that these changes 
have on national trade associations (e.g. in terms of additional costs and staff to keep 
abreast of changes at the local level), and overlooks the impact on regional trade 
associations. Instead this study suggests that these changes in local institutional 
arrangements did have, even if with diverse outcomes across the UK, an impact on 
regional trade bodies. Comparisons amongst the different regional trade associations 




strong relations with key institutional actors that allowed them to strengthen their position 
as business intermediaries.   
Nevertheless, it is significant to stress that a key factor in the development of regional 
associations, as well as in the relationships and potential influence with local institutions 
is given by industry characteristics, such as a strong presence of aerospace within a 
particular region and its contribution to the local economy. A noteworthy example can be 
taken by the difference in employment in Wales and Scotland, where the percentage of 
total UK aerospace employment are 10.1% and 2.8% respectively (Rhodes 2017), which 
clearly highlights the different contributions in these contexts.  
Finally, there are endemic political, societal and technological changes that have affected 
the business-government relationship on a broader level that does not entail a specific 
geographical context. As emphasised in Chapter 2, the growing institutional influence on 
the business environment (Hart 2007) increased organisations’ political activities and 
their attempts towards establishing relationships with policymakers and operating in the 
political arena. In turn, this produced an environment in which there are an increasing 
number of organisations that attempt to influence public policy: 
The size of the public sector has shrunk, years ago you used to 
have easy access to civil servants, they would be glad to take a 
meeting from you. [Now] it’s much more difficult, it is becoming 
such a crowded environment as well, […] it is much more 
difficult to get heard (Interview 16, industry expert). 
This is particularly striking if the level of analysis is focused on a specific economic 
sector. The political institutional actors that are able to interact with the multiplicity of 
stakeholders that seek to gain access to the political arena are limited, as underlined by 
an industry expert with experience in corporate and associational environments:  
There are few politicians that can be lobbied, there are few 
interested and that have the capacity to intervene…there are few 
access points (Interview 16, industry expert). 
Moreover, trade associations, as any other organisation that is trying to influence the 
political environment, have been challenged by rapid technological changes (e.g. the 
advent and preponderance of social media and new communication channels), and have 




They have had to broaden and modify their political strategy to include specific 
communication strategies through new tools and platforms. As trade association 
managers in the 90s had to encompass television and radio appearances in their spectrum 
of informational political activities (Interview 20, trade association), in recent years 
representatives have had to develop strategies that provide them with a constant presence 
on social media platforms. These findings build on and extend previous studies (e.g. 
Boléat 1997) that have analysed how market changes (e.g. privatisation and 
internationalisation processes) have influenced trade associations’ structure, by 
highlighting how other exogenous changes have required trade associations to adapt and 
revise their strategies and activities. 
Notwithstanding the nature or magnitude of institutional change, some trade associations 
can prepare in advance towards changes in the institutional environment. The findings 
suggest that the larger trade associations are better equipped to either anticipate, or react 
to changes within the institutional environment, whereas smaller trade associations have 
suffered from these institutional variations. This distinction is emphasised throughout the 
respondents’ answers, for example a regional trade association representative highlighted 
how changes of actors in key departments would alter their political connections and 
ultimately undermine their ability to effectively relate with the decision-making arena: 
One of the things that we have struggled with is this changing of 
people in leading departments...that can be very difficult to build 
a strategy around, how that is going to happen…you can spend a 
lot of time trying to create something or make things happen but 
because of this instability, you have no idea whether or not it will 
get signed off, because we are playing political football between 
interventionist and market oriented people and it does seem to be 
in a flux of who are winning at any time. It’s amazing we get 
anything done (Interview 18, trade association). 
In juxtaposition, a senior representative of a national trade association argued how his 
organisation was well prepared and accustomed to dealing with changes and reshuffles in 
government departments:  
With politicians in some ways, it is easier because if there is a 
change of government, a change of ministers, a reshuffle…there 
is a set pool of people they are going to choose from (Interview 




The ability of larger associations to deal with changes in the institutional environment 
and the perception that institutional change can be dealt with is given by several factors 
including more resources at their disposal, a greater number and stronger ties with 
institutional stakeholders, as well as a greater comprehension and knowledge regarding 
the mechanisms of the governmental machine. Larger associations will generally 
undertake a more structured approach to developing connections in the political spheres 
as opposed to sole interpersonal relationships. In relation to the last quote (Interview 19, 
trade association), the trade association knew exactly who the candidates for the positions 
were and had already put in place political tactics by establishing contacts and informing 
them on the current situation and issues concerning the aerospace industry. These notions 
can be linked to firms’ abilities to respond to institutional change as highlighted by 
Feinberg, Hill, and Darendeli (2015: 35), whereby organisations with increased 
monitoring capacity and ability to manage political ties will be more responsive. 
Additionally, assumed the ability to develop effective political strategies the national 
trade associations operating in the UK are able to cope relatively easily with such changes 
because of the generally orderly and steady nature of the institutional context, as opposed 
to contexts that are prone to sudden political shocks. 
Nevertheless, both typologies of trade associations have faced instances in which their 
political role was undermined by the institutional context. The abolishment of the RDAs 
deprived the regional associations of their main institutional counterpart. This 
institutional change produced a gap in the business-government relationship as the local 
industrial players were left without a political institutional actor, with whom they could 
relate and that had the capability of developing and introducing policy. The regional trade 
associations operating in the devolved administrations faced the problem of a redefinition 
in the relationships with the new political and regulatory entities. Hence, the structure of 
the political system, and variations within it, played a key function (positive and negative, 
depending on the area) in defining the role of trade associations in the UK aerospace 
industry.  
The specific institutional contexts and the resultant relationships between industrial and 
political stakeholders may be an additional explanation to understand the shifting political 
role of trade associations. Thus, why trade associations in specific contextual conditions 




activities to the national association, and why other trade associations see in the 
development of political activities and interacting with politicians their main functions. 
These notions can be conceptualised as “institutional gaps”, whereby the interest 
representation organisation finds itself deprived of an institutional counterpart. This in 
turn weakens its political influence and ability to effectively play a role in the policy-
making process. Institutional gaps differ from the predominant notions of “institutional 
voids” (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 2005) as these mainly focus on emerging economies, 
and propose the idea that institutions are weak or completely absent. In this case, 
organisations operate in an environment characterised by strong institutions at the 
national level, but they do not have the specific institutional players at the local level that 
enable them to operate as strong political actors. 
5.2.3 Strategy formulation 
The last second order dimension connected to trade associations’ embeddedness in the 
environment in which they operate focuses on the factors that affect the formulation of 
political strategy. These factors may stem from the external environment such as the 
required ability of trade associations to “tap into” governments’ agenda and align their 
strategy to government objectives, as well as internally within the trade associations. In 
terms of the latter these mainly include trade associations resources, as well as a key 
emergent concept, which relates to the role of the CEO or managing director in charge of 
the organisation.  
The findings highlight various exogenous factors that may affect the development of trade 
associations’ political agenda. External influences can entail political, fiscal and given 
the nature of the industry, also geo-political and military events. In relation to the first, 
trade association representatives underlined how similarly to the broader political role, 
institutional changes or policy decisions stemming from the executive could force the 
organisation to modify the specific direction of its political strategy:  
Events include general elections, fiscal events such as budget and 
spending review, SDSR 56 , new approach to the industrial 
                                                 
56 The SDSR (Strategic Defence and Security Review) is the government’s document that defines 
the defence strategy including the UK’s threats and the necessary capabilities required to face 
them (UK Government 2015). This document is particularly relevant for aerospace companies as 




strategy, the Scottish referendum, and the development of new 
departments after a change of government. This is what drives 
policy strategy (Interview 12, trade association). 
Hence, external factors could cause trade associations to change their political strategy, 
both in terms of its content, as well as in terms of which political stakeholders should be 
targeted. For example, as previously mentioned, following the general election in 2017, 
where the leading Conservative government lost the parliamentary majority (The 
Guardian 2017), trade associations and other organisations attempting to influence policy 
have had to keep into consideration the growing role of backbench MPs, which had 
become more effective and influential given the nature of the minority government 
(Interview 29, firm).   
In relation to sector specific events, decisions to invest or upscale military spending by 
the national government, leading to military intervention would directly impact the way 
trade associations relate with the government and with specific government departments, 
such as the Ministry of Defence. A former trade association CEO described how during 
the Iraq war the interaction between the organisation and institutional stakeholders 
changed: 
I suppose, probably the most significant event was the fact that 
the Iraq war started in 2001 and I think, you have to understand 
that politics gets very different in war time, (…) and so it was 
important for us that government knew that we were going to be 
able to back them in a physical sense, supply what they needed, 
which individual companies did but which we also supported. 
And I guess that was an unexpected event, we didn’t know there 
was going to be a war, we couldn’t know that until it happened, 
but then we had to react to that. It wasn’t something that was 
totally game changing, it was just the way government behaves 
in war time is just different from the way it behaves in peace time, 
particularly the MoD, whereas they might take two years to make 
a decision they can do it in ten minutes in a war if you are with 
me and the whole pace of things becomes much different 
(Interview 21, trade association). 
Moreover, trade associations’ strategy could also be affected by exogenous events outside 
national borders and “usual” operational environments. Chapter 2 highlighted instances 
of changing supranational frameworks beyond the political spheres to which 




Woll 2007). The empirical findings of this research contribute to these notions, by 
providing additional evidence as to how trade associations have had to react to 
international matters. An interesting example that was mentioned during the interviews 
concerned the European Trading Emissions System (EU ETS) implemented in 2012 
(European Commission COM (2012) 697). The legislation was intended to apply to 
emissions from flights from, to and within the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The measure required airlines to amend their 
emission reporting and contribute towards reducing aviation emissions. Following 
pressure from foreign governments and airlines (i.e. not based in the EU) on the UK 
industry, national UK trade associations lobbied the European Union to amend the 
legislation. Consequently, the scope was restricted to flights operating within the EEA 
excluding from it airlines based outside the EU. One of executives involved in the 
lobbying activities highlighted how the exogenous factor influenced their actions:   
They used us as the whipping boy to say to the European Union 
“you need to amend this piece of legislation we don’t like”. Now 
actually ETS the aviation part of it had absolutely nothing to do 
with aerospace manufacturers at all. If anything, it was more 
airlines that had to amend their emissions reporting and maybe 
buy more aircraft, in many ways we actually liked ETS because 
it encouraged people to buy newer cleaner aircraft. So, we 
weren’t unhappy about it and suddenly the Chinese stopped “But 
this has nothing to do with us”. “We don’t care, you are in Europe 
and you have to tell your governments to stop”. We had to go into 
a complete crisis mode (Interview 22, firm). 
 
A constant and recurring theme across the interview data, in relation to the definition of 
political strategy, relates to matching the national policymaker’s agenda, as mentioned by 
several trade association informants and corroborated by firm representatives involved in 
trade association’s political strategizing:  
To be effective, political strategies have to leverage the 
government's agenda. This is the ABC of government relations 
(Interview 13, firm). 
The analysis and triangulation of the data suggests that trade associations develop their 
political strategies whilst taking into consideration interests and agenda of policymakers 




Several informants highlighted how trade associations develop political activities whilst 
trying to match government priorities in order to create a shared agenda. The following 
interview excerpts with a trade association Government Affairs Manager (Interview 12) 
and former CEO (Interview 21) highlight different instances of how the organisations 
would build on government priorities:   
A critical feature is making government priorities a common 
agenda, for example George Osborne’s Northern Powerhouse. 
When government decides that these projects are important then 
the association should acknowledge it and build its policy 
accordingly. [The association] will tap in government priorities 
and agenda and try to align its strategies and aims to that 
(Interview 12, trade association).  
 
One of the things we certainly did was try to fit what we wanted 
into what the government said was its strategy. We would look 
very carefully at what their political, overall political strategy was 
to see how we could take what we wanted and say this fits, 
because it is much harder, almost impossible to persuade 
government to do something which isn’t in its strategy at all. […] 
You need to accommodate to an extent (Interview 21, trade 
association). 
 
The interpretation of the data suggests various reasons behind this approach. The first, 
relates to trade associations’ inability to undertake confrontational activities and the 
consequent need to adopt collaborative approaches, which may diverge from firms’ 
attitude to political activity. Whilst keeping in mind that an alignment of interests between 
industry and government spheres is one of the key aspects to consider when developing 
political strategy within any organisation, firms can leverage assets and resources to 
pressure policy-makers that trade associations do not have. Firms may threaten 
institutional actors to relocate their business elsewhere, delay investment decisions or lay 
off employees in order to draw attention on specific issues57. This approach would entail 
devising a political strategy that engages in a more adversarial relationship with political 
stakeholders. Trade associations do not have the same resources and hence have to adapt 
their political strategy accordingly. An interesting notion was raised by various 
                                                 
57 Several companies threatened the government to move production sites to other European 
nations during the Brexit referendum campaign and on-going negotiations (Collingridge and 




informants who argued that even though trade associations provide information and 
knowledge that can help policymakers draft policy, differently from firms, they do not 
provide any goods or services and therefore are necessitated to demonstrate a stronger 
level of collaboration. As mentioned by the Head of Government Affairs of a large 
company who had an extensive trade association experience:  
What trade bodies don’t want to do is lose access to government. 
It’s unlikely a company like us will ever lose access to 
government, even if our relationship sours at different levels, 
because we are delivering certain capabilities to government we 
will always have that relationship, whereas a trade association is 
not delivering a good or service to government specifically. So 
their relationship with government means that they have to 
provide value to government as well as to their membership, 
therefore they need to look at how they can support government 
agendas (Interview 29, firm). 
These notions are in line with Woll’s argument that “the apparent lobbying success is 
therefore not an indication of ‘power’, in the sense of victory in a business-government 
conflict, but of the convergence of business and government objectives” (2007: 59). 
Moreover, as underlined by a senior trade association executive with extensive 
experience in both company and trade association environments, the relationship with 
institutional players has to entail a profound cooperative approach:  
[…] it’s kind of softer…I have to be nice to everybody. One of 
my members says she can never do my job because I have to be 
nice to everybody. I have to be friends with everybody. If you are 
a big company, then sometimes you can throw your weight 
around and be a bit firmer (Interview 19, trade association). 
The second and strongly interconnected reason behind this compliance can be ascribed to 
the strong dependence that the industry has on the government, including but not limited 
to funding, procurement and export support. This happens at both regional and national 
level depending on the different trade associations, their membership and main political 
stakeholders. One regional trade association CEO highlighted how their lack of resources 
increased their dependency on the local political institution:  
We don’t have the resources, we don’t have the capability to 
create a world class aerospace sector […] on our own. We need a 





At national level, an informant with extensive experience in several trade associations 
underlined how in the past 15 years the industry consistently lobbied the government for 
research investment. During this time period trade associations altered their political 
strategy several times to adjust to the changes in the institutional environment, as well as 
to match the different issues policy-makers were facing, whilst constantly asking for the 
same kind of support. The following quote clearly highlights how the political strategy 
would shift according to institutional changes:   
The issue is the same, we want money for research, but over that 
time we have had a change in government, we have had different 
issues come and go. So, when I first started out the issue was “we 
need money, we give you jobs”. So, we lobbied on that, then the 
economic crash happened, “We are a very sustainable industry, 
the whole economy is falling apart, you give us money we will 
save the economy”. So, it’s still the same thing but you have to 
connect with the government’s agenda […] you have to evolve 
the message to the political climate but in my experience the ask 
is pretty much consistent (Interview 23, firm). 
The final and to some extent interlinked reason behind this strong compliance to 
decisions’ makers agenda can be linked to the profuse and growing number of 
organisations that attempt to relate and influence institutional actors, as well as the notion 
that politicians’ only real dependence lies on their constituents’ votes. This implies that 
politicians are not (or at least should not be) bound to any specific business interest and 
will try to achieve their political objectives through any means possible. Consequently, if 
a particular sector is considered as not assisting them achieve their political goals (e.g. 
reducing unemployment and fostering economic growth) they will support, if possible, 
another sector that will. Thus, sectoral trade associations need to demonstrate that they 
are proficient at contributing to broader political objectives:  
We have to make sure that they feel like what our sector strategy 
is doing is helping solve their problems and their political 
objective. […] at the end of the day these are just politicians, they 
have political objectives, if we are not delivering, helping them 
deliver their political objectives, they do not need to care about 
us. And so, in some ways, building that relationship is about 
understanding the politics of it and being seen to be addressing 
the politics of a situation, but being credible in the way in which 




Nevertheless, industry and specifically trade associations are not always able to match 
government priorities and align their strategy to the government’s agenda. The issue 
regarding the construction of a third runway at Heathrow airport in London is a clear 
example of when the two agendas do not match, and common priorities are not 
established:  
There is no part of the aerospace industry that I know of that 
believes that that runway is wrong. It is case made, it is 
completely clear and obvious that it is needed, and that is known 
in government of course, and that lobby is been very strong for a 
very long time. […] but the government hasn’t made the decision 
to do that, so there is one example where the industry is 
completely sure that that is the right thing to do but government 
isn’t (Interview 14, industry expert).    
Additionally, how policy-makers view and consider specific organisations will influence 
the development of their strategy, and this will change according to specific socio-
economic and political periods. While describing his experience within a company, a 
trade association representative highlighted how, just after the financial crash whilst the 
economy was struggling, the organisation he was working for was creating thousands of 
jobs. This situation produced a positive image of the company, which affected the 
approach of its political activities:  
So, the [company] was almost literally the only good news story, 
good news economic story in the UK. Which meant everyone 
loved us, which made it easier to talk about who we are and what 
we want. And so you don’t necessarily need to do too much, you 
don’t need to go out of your way to talk about the political 
narrative, the political narrative is desperate, the politicians are 
desperate to wrap themselves to [company], and to be seen with 
[company] (Interview 19, trade association).  
Having considered the external and environmental features, which have an impact on the 
definition of trade associations’ political strategy, it is now necessary to contemplate the 
internal characteristics that have emerged from the data, which may also play a role. 
These features are mainly related to organisational attributes, inter-firm dynamics within 
the association, and the role of the person leading the organisation. 
Building on previous work (e.g. Barnett 2013; Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017) there 




and structure of the association, large firms will play a key role in the definition of 
associations’ political strategy. Specifically, large firms that have existing and strong 
relations with government and institutional actors (e.g. defence contractors) will enjoy a 
large political power, which may then be transferred into the trade associations and 
influence the decision-making process. Subsequently, the trade associations would 
attempt to build consensus amongst the broader membership. These notions find 
empirical support from the majority of respondents including industry experts who 
emphasised that dominant companies are able to push their own interests and objectives 
on the collective, both from the firm side:  
The political strategies are defined by the main contractors, which 
have the biggest political weight. Formally the strategies are 
defined by all the associations’ members, but in reality, it is the 
big companies who decide what to do (Interview 13, firm). 
As well as, from CEOs of the trade associations:  
It is generally the prevailing interest of the prime that goes 
through, we don’t try to align we try to find the overlapping 
interests, which tends to be from the primes perspective 
(Interview 18, trade association).  
Potentially it will be tilted towards the bigger companies who do 
have the resources and the louder voice (Interview 19, trade 
association). 
The capability of large firms to influence the definition of trade association’s agenda 
gains even more importance when the national context is considered. A key example has 
been the development of the AGP through which the industry managed to garner over £ 
2 billion worth of funding until 2026 (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
2013). As a trade association CEO underlined: 
I would say that at national level we tend to have an ask of 
government that is largely put together by the big companies 
because they have the resources and capabilities to produce the 
evidence base for the ask of government. I would say that the 
bigger companies tend to be the most proactive and the most 
influential in terms of guiding policy and government funding 
(Interview 15, trade association). 
Overall, respondents did not find the large firms’ dominance as an entirely negative 




possess the means that would be helpful for the trade association to reach its political 
strategy objectives as emphasised by a firm respondent58:  
I know that they will really hate me saying this, but I think [trade 
association] is more orientated towards the larger companies and 
I think that is how it should be (Interview 23, firm). 
However, trade associations do establish several platforms and activities aimed at 
allowing their members, independently of their size and economic and political 
importance, to have a voice in the definition of their overall strategy. As previously 
mentioned, larger trade associations will have structured forums that will allow different 
interests to be heard. Several organisations have committees, boards, interest groups, 
which are formed with the specific intent of engaging with members towards the 
definition of an agenda that is developed and agreed by the majority:  
What we have done is we have put more effort in, over the last 
two years I would say, to understand the issues that our members 
are facing and then try to develop our own policy aims and 
objectives based on what they have said (Interview 15, trade 
association). 
Moreover, both large and small organisations will also organise workshops, seminars and 
develop questionnaires to relate with the membership and understand their challenges, 
issues and be able to define a strategy accordingly: 
Part of our job is to get out and engage with them, listen to the 
businesses, get to know the businesses, what are the challenges, 
what are the issues, and to build up a picture of this kind of the 
shape of industry. […] It’s by understanding those challenges and 
the shape of industry that we can prioritise (Interview 19, trade 
association). 
Even though large firms do play a dominant role in steering the direction and strategy of 
trade associations at both national and regional level, a trade association’s ability to 
gather, analyse and summarise the issues from the broader membership rather than from 
a restricted group of large firms will enable the organisation to legitimately claim to be 
                                                 
58 A potential limitation of this research relates to the fact that the majority of interviewees from 
the firm side represent large organisations. These were specifically selected, as they are involved 
in the trade associations’ political strategy development. However, the researcher acknowledges 




representing their entire membership, and possibly a large portion of the industry. This is 
crucial when interacting with policy-makers and gain institutional legitimacy. 
Larger organisations will have the necessary resources to hire a CEO and have a well-
defined organisational structure (as evidenced in Chapter 3, Figure 5), that for example 
includes a board of directors and several internal departments, which in turn will lead to 
a more formalised decision-making process. In contrast, smaller associations will not 
have such a structured organisation and will rely on the activities undertaken by the 
director or manager.  
Hence, several informants stressed the notion that the CEO of the trade association was a 
key determinant in the definition of the organisation’s political strategy and in 
establishing a “policy capable organisation” (Coleman 1988: 51), whereby the association 
is able to autonomously develop its strategy, which is not a mere sum of members’ 
interests. This is in line with the developments in the broader UK association framework 
concerning the centrality of the director leading the organisation, as opposed to the 
previous authority of committees in directing associations’ strategy (Boléat 1997; 
Macdonald 2001).  
Comparably to the work of Henisz (2016), who calls for CEOs to act as corporate 
diplomats59, this dimension considers that the role of the leading figure managing a trade 
association can significantly alter the political functions of the organisation and its 
political impact. Moreover, the findings build on specific calls (Barnett 2017: 6) to 
investigate how “those who manage a TA play a significant role in forming its agenda 
and in ensuring its implementation”. Trade association executives or informants with 
significant experience in trade associations mentioned how, regardless of the size of the 
trade association, several specific characteristics concerning the managing director or 
CEO including his/her academic and professional background, the ability to develop and 
deliver complex strategies based on research and data, and be flexible to innovations 
concerning communication with internal and external stakeholders, were highly 
                                                 
59 Extant work (Henisz 2016) has aligned the CEOs external facing functions to diplomacy and 
called for managers to act as corporate diplomats. Corporate diplomacy is the ability to win the 





influential towards the definition of the organisation’s role and political strategy, as 
evidenced by an informant with extensive trade association experience: 
It does come down to the skills and expertise of the person who 
is chief executive or director general […] the person who runs the 
organisation was formally a consultant, so she introduced a lot of 
ways of working that were based on a consultancy model. So that 
was her experience, so it was very much influenced by her. [The 
CEO] who is there now was brought in because it was felt that 
they were not focusing enough on lobbying and representation, 
that they had got too distracted on business development and all 
sorts of other things, work offices around the world (Interview 23, 
firm). 
This was also confirmed by industry experts: 
Each of the trade bodies will have, depending on who they recruit 
and who is in charge and the nature of the industry, will have their 
own way of going about things (Interview 16, industry expert). 
The main aspects that could be influenced are the overarching aims and direction of the 
trade association. As emphasised in Chapter 2 trade associations differ consistently, and 
whilst some organisations will focus on activities directed at shaping the socio-political 
environment other organisations will focus on market-oriented services (e.g. Barnett 
2017; Bennett 1999; Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015). Even though the various 
activities will be examined in greater detail in the next section, it is important to 
emphasize that the principal orientation of trade associations is extremely mutable and 
fluid, and the CEO may be considered as a key determinant. These patterns can be found 
in the data, for example the following quotes, which relate to the same trade association 
over a number of years, underline how the objectives and thus broad direction of the 
organisation completely changed because of the CEO. In the first quote the informant 
emphasises how the main concern of the trade association was to be involved in market-
oriented activities, whilst the second underlines the need to focus on lobbying and interest 
representation activities: 
[the trade association’s] successor managed it better, because he 
was focusing on delivering services to members, classic trade 
association approach, much more functional, much more service 





[the trade association] has six top-level objectives but the first two 
are the most important, which are: raising the profile and image 
of the industry and influencing policy. These have been 
introduced by the new CEO. The other four regard matters such 
as business development (Interview 12, trade association). 
Moreover, there are both positive and negative aspects associated with the impact that the 
CEO can have on the association. Several informants highlighted how the background, 
expertise and professional experience of the CEO was strongly related to the importance 
that he/she would concede to political activities in relation to their overall functions. One 
interviewee commented:  
[…] hiring professional rather than neo-retirees, so people who 
know the industry, come from the industry or government but 
who still have got places to go in their career rather than finishing 
their career off. So, as a stepping-stone for a job within the 
industry or within government and so a high energy proactive 
rather than just mucking time until their career is finished 
(Interview 28, firm). 
Numerous CEOs of trade associations in the aerospace and defence industries until the 
early decades of the 20th century were formal military staff and civil servants, or staff 
appointed directly by the government (Turner 1988). These features limited the 
development of structured and sophisticated political strategy because interactions would 
be solely established on a relational level as managers would have existing contacts with 
officials and policy-makers. Frequently, interactions would be extremely limited in scope 
as emphasised by a trade association CEO:  
Everyone prior to me since the end of the war was actually a 
retired air force officer because the industry up to that time was 
viewed as largely supporting the defence industry, needs, 
government requirements, but that had changed, so that by the 
time I came along, the members, the companies that support the 
trade association, who funded it, decided they wanted someone 
from industry not from the MoD or a former officer because they 
wanted this broader look, someone familiar with business, 
familiar with the civil sector which had grown so much and so on. 
Hence, that is why I came into it. When I arrived I found that it 
did do government lobbying, in the sense that it is generally 
understood, but it was rather confined to military issues and really 
hadn’t focused too much on the civil sector and that clearly had 




Hence, the interactions with government relied on personal relationships rather than 
through the development of systematically organised political strategies defined by the 
collective membership. This inertial approach was detrimental in several ways. Firstly, 
the trade associations would not develop systematic and continuous political strategy that 
included proactive actions but would solely rely on reacting to external events. Secondly, 
the organisations were unable to forge relationships and develop a broader network in the 
socio-political arenas. Thirdly, the associations were used as policy instruments by the 
government (Turner 1988), as acknowledged by a firm Head of Government Relations 
who argued that associations are vital instruments for the government to interact with 
industry (Interview 27, firm).  
Lawton, Rajwani, and Doh (2013) argue, in their study on airlines and the deregulatory 
context, that airline ownership structure influences the approach to corporate political 
activity, using the dynamic capabilities lens. The authors, stress that state owned 
enterprises are less able to develop political capabilities because of resource constraints, 
and because of their ownership structure, as they “did not have to go far to lobby” (2013: 
238-239).  Whilst agreeing with the scholars, the findings suggest that the institutional 
embeddedness perspective is advantageous in highlighting the difficulty and/or inability 
of organisations that have close links with institutional actors to develop efficient political 
activities. It is undeniable that political ties are distinct to outright ownership, 
nevertheless, the results underline that organisations’ dependence on institutional entities, 
manifested through CEOs political ties, developed through their professional background 
working in military and governmental spheres or direct appointment, may be detrimental 
to the development of political strategy. Moreover, the findings partially answer their 
question “If governments impede the way political capabilities are developed, should 
firms move more toward non-state ownership structures?” (Lawton, Rajwani, and Doh 
2013: 239). Again, whilst this research adopts a different theoretical perspective, it is able 
to demonstrate that organisations (in this case trade associations), benefit in terms of 
developing more sophisticated and structured political activities, by securing a greater 
distance and independence from institutional actors. A former trade association executive 
commented on how the inadequate political activities forced the companies to act 




I would say that the political impact was minimal, it was really 
down to the companies to look after themselves, and of course 
this reflected on the characters that run it (Interview 20, trade 
association).  
Moreover, the role of the CEO is relevant in small and large trade associations. In relation 
to the first, even though larger trade associations have structured decision-making 
processes including boards of directors, executive teams and numerous committees, 
CEOs appear to have a determining role in the definition of objectives and priorities. In 
relation to the latter, small organisations will not have the necessary resources to establish 
external affairs or government affairs departments, thus the political activities may be 
entirely defined and undertaken by the CEO as confirmed by regional trade association 
representatives:  
We have personal networks, […] our CEO, he has a very, very 
extensive network, so he knows a lot of people in BEIS and a lot 
of people in the primes, and he’ll engage with them when he is at 
the various…they create various working groups and networking 
type of opportunities where if he is going for dinner somewhere 
in London the chap from BEIS will be there, and somebody from 
the Welsh devolved administration will be there and he’ll have a 
chat, and he’ll do it in a very kind of soft way (Interview 18, trade 
association). 
On the other hand, the same trade association representative mentioned how the sole 
reliance of the trade association on the CEO could ultimately have negative repercussions 
on the entire organisation, particularly on its political role and influencing functions: 
Our fundamental weakness is our CEO because we rely so much 
on his personal relationships, he is our weakness because without 
the personal relationships the [trade association] doesn’t really 
work, so we identify this as a problem, but we don’t have a 
solution yet (Interview 18, trade association). 
Hence, the reliance on one individual to design and undertake all political activities is 
common amongst the regional trade associations, exposing them to negative outcomes, 
which the larger trade associations are generally in a better position to supersede thanks 
to their more formalised decision-making structure. Nevertheless, even within large 
organisation key actors, for example in the executive team or board of directors, will 




be impossible to replicate once the trade association’s representative has left the 
organisation. It will be then very difficult for the organisation to rebuild those connections 
in the short term (Interview 26, industry expert).  
The CEO can be thus considered as a key resource for trade association towards 
developing political activities; nonetheless, there are other resources that are key towards 
formulating political strategy. Following the role of trade associations in developing 
information, data, statistics of the industry they represent, a key resource is having in-
house personnel that can develop such knowledge. This is vital for all trade associations, 
but mostly for those that undertake a strong political and influencing function, as they 
will need the information to inform policymakers. This notion is well evidenced in the 
following of excerpt from an interview with the former managing director of a leading 
trade association: 
And one of the first things I decided even before I joined, I was 
appointed but hadn’t started, it was that it needed some research 
because there was no information no data, and as you would know 
very well yourself, if you go and persuade anybody but a 
government certainly of a case that you are putting but have no 
information, no statistics, you can’t say what we are worth 
economically and so on and so forth, really you have no case. And 
so that research had to be started, and that is why […] came 
because I wanted him to lead a group that would do that work, 
and indeed they did and it was very successful and they began to 
produce information every year on the industry, so you could go 
along to government ministers, members of parliament, to 
anybody and say look this is the industry, here are the facts and 
figures, here are the statistics, it does this, it does that, and 
gradually those numbers become the accepted numbers. In the 
end if you are successful with this process everybody says these 
are the numbers…and they are your numbers. So that is a very 
important part of any kind of lobbying process. If you like grab 
the ground of the information, so we did that and that was 
successful (Interview 21, trade association). 
 
The structure and size of the trade association is extremely important, and as previously 
mentioned the UK aerospace comprises small and larger trade associations. Larger trade 





As underlined for individual firms (Figure 9 above), the capacity of an organisation 
operating in the political environment to establish a physical presence close to 
policymakers is a key resource. Various informants underlined that the closeness with 
government and government departments facilitated the communications between 
industry and political stakeholders. As evidenced by the former CEO of a trade 
association this was a feature that would enable the organisation, and still does today, to 
interact with elected politicians and civil servants in a very quick and comprehensive 
way:  
Because our offices are close to parliament, not far from 
Westminster, they were prepared to come up over lunch, have a 
sandwich and we will talk to you about this and that and we would 
gather a half a dozen of MPs on a particular issue they were 
interested in and we wanted to tell them our view on it (Interview 
21, trade association). 
As abovementioned trade association representatives organise tours for parliamentarians 
in which they take them around the country to visit firm sites and productions plants. In 
order to do so trade associations take advantage of firm resources and use them to develop 
and strengthen their relationships with key political actors. Trade associations would be 
also in charge of organising guided visits during important trade shows such as 
Farnborough air show.  
5.3 At the heart of nonmarket strategy: shaping the institutional environment  
The preceding section has focused on analysing the environment in which trade 
associations operate and on how internal attributes and environmental conditions may 
impact trade associations’ role and formulation of political strategy. The following 
section will address how trade associations exert their influence. Specifically, it will delve 
into the political activities undertaken by the aerospace trade associations towards 
shaping the environment in which they operate, demonstrating that their activities are a 
combination of reactive and proactive approaches undertaken through a multitude of 
platforms and forums. The overarching theme of this chapter, which has emerged from 
the data, is that trade associations develop strong political ties and complex relationships 
and use other organisations and individuals to influence policy-makers and key 
institutional stakeholders. Building on Barley’s (2010) argument that firms systematically 




trade associations also build an institutional field to exert greater influence. These 
empirical contributions are conducive towards understanding how trade associations at 
different levels (i.e. national and regional) operate in the political arena and attempt to 
alter the institutional environment and the policy-making process. 
5.3.1 Strategy execution 
As mentioned in the previous section, trade associations differ in terms of size and 
structure, as well as in the functions they undertake. A trade association’s decision to 
focus on market or nonmarket functions will be in line with the overarching aims and 
objectives, as well as in the interactions with firms and institutional actors. The 
triangulation of the interview data with the information gained through the organisations’ 
websites and documentary literature highlights recurrent aims and objectives, which 
consistently with previous literature (e.g. Barnett 2013; Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 
2015) can be divided in two broad categories, namely internal and external oriented 
activities. Following the analysis of documentary sources, the internal activities can 
further be divided in business development, networking and information, whereas the 
external activities consist in lobbying, representing and influencing. Table 10 provides a 
summary of these main areas of activity.  
Table 10: Trade associations’ main areas of activity 
Main areas of 
activity 
Selected data from documentary sources 
Internally oriented aims and objectives 
Business 
development 
Business improvement and professional development services covering 
business, skills, innovation and technology 
Marketing and support services covering exhibitions, material and 
administration 
Offering a wide variety of high quality events 
The MAA team are available on an on-going basis to take specific queries, 
address issues on behalf of our members, and support you in developing 
aerospace market opportunities, identifying technology development partners 
and improving operational performance 
Supporting business development opportunities and UK manufacturing and our 
industries’ supply chains 
Increasing Member value through a range of services 
Promotion of your company’s products and services on our website, within our 
capabilities brochure and trade brochure and also in our monthly newsletter, e-
shots to members, social media postings and at events and exhibitions 




Developing funding sources for FAC and its members including membership 
services, consultancy and winning and managing Government 
projects/initiatives 
Networking 
Connectivity and networking through member and business partnerships 
Bringing industry stakeholders together to provide one cohesive community 
Helping to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the supply chain 
Organised opportunities to network with colleagues from across the Midlands 
aerospace industry at regular MAA members meetings 
Networking opportunities with Aerospace Wales Forum members and other 
organisations at member forums and events. 
Being recognised by academia and research establishments as a key route to the 
aerospace and defence industry 
Information Regular industry updates about what’s happening in the aerospace sector, along 
with discussions about relevant key issues. 
Helping SMEs understand the international and domestic market the industry 
Producing regular data on industry and reports on the issues that matter most to 
the UK’s Aerospace industry. 
We share knowledge in order to improve the market and business support 
opportunities of members. 




Championing aerospace in the South West and one of the largest aerospace 
alliances in Europe 
Representing the interests of the South West aerospace community and able to 
influence key decision makers in industry, government and academia 
Providing a voice for SMEs to ensure effectiveness in the supply chain 
academia 
Representing and uniting companies and organisations involved in the aerospace 
sector supply chain. 
Influencing the policy debates of most importance to our industries and 
enhancing the profile of our industries 
Easy access to Welsh Government Ministers through our strong relationship 
with Welsh Government 
The Aerospace Wales Forum represents the views of its members and the wider 
aerospace sector at regional, national and international levels.  It gives your 
organisation the opportunity to feed into Government policies that could affect 
your business. 
Being accepted by Government and the industry as the principal voice of SMEs 
in the aerospace and defence industries in the UK 
Establishing good communications with the media to promote the aerospace and 
defence industries. 
The MAA is very active in raising the profile of the industry and what it needs 
from government through its partnership with other aerospace clusters and our 
national body ADS, and in the MAA's meetings directly with: government 
ministers, Members of Parliament, other influential bodies 
Source: Author’s compilation from trade associations’ websites and documentary sources.  
Notwithstanding the overall objective of this thesis, which is to explore the features 
peculiar to nonmarket strategy and operations in the socio-political arena, it may be useful 
to briefly consider some of the notions that emerged from the data concerning activities 
undertaken to assist members in the market environment. Trade associations provide an 




and coherently with extant literature (e.g. Spillman 2012), several informants addressed 
these as “soft services” (Interview 20, trade association). These activities include the 
provision of training and education workshops, research and analysis of national and 
international market opportunities, assistance with product marketing, and further 
business development activities.  
A common theme throughout the interviews concerned trade associations acting as 
facilitators, given that one of the main activities is that of industry coordination, which in 
this context is intended as facilitating the connections between different actors operating 
within the same economic context as well as with actors operating in socio-political 
environments. The informants reported diverging perceptions regarding the motives of 
small and large firms’ involvement and engagement with each other: in terms of the larger 
organisations, to maintain a connection with the supply chain, whereas in terms of the 
smaller firms to gain information and find business opportunities. Trade associations are 
able to undertake these functions in different ways. They will organise networking events 
and seminars or communicate with their members through the development of specific 
search engines on their websites, as well as through the distribution of magazines, blogs 
and newsletters. In relation to intra-industry connections, Battisti and Perry (2015) refer 
to this function as an indirect role of trade associations; in contrast Spillman argues that 
developing ties is a primary role and that “networking is a native concept in association 
subcultures” (2012: 123). The findings of this research build on the latter view as 
triangulation between association documentary sources and interviews and observations 
point to substantiate the notion that producing networking opportunities is a central 
function of aerospace associations in the UK. 
It is noteworthy to underline that several functions specifically directed at facilitating 
firms’ business development, overlap with activities directed at influencing the political 
environment. For example, the organisation of trade shows or events that are intended to 
showcase the industry’s products and services, create networking platforms and boost 
sales and exports, generally produces the preconditions for the industry (i.e. individual 
companies as well as trade bodies) to interact with public officials, politicians and 
regulators. Figure 11 highlights the key activities and services directed at the market 
environment, activities directed at the nonmarket environment, and activities that may 




Figure 11: Overlap of internal oriented and external oriented activities 
 
Source: Elaborated by author  
In terms of linking industry with political institutions, activities are intended to connect 
firms with various institutional players, including local and national government, as well 
as other public and quasi-public organisations. It is noteworthy to highlight that the need 
to relate with industry or political actors that operate within the same institutional field 
may stem from both sides. From the regulatory and policymaking side, decision-makers 
may want to relate with firms to gain specific information and expertise needed to develop 
policy and regulations (e.g. Beyers 2004; Hultén, Barron, and Bryson 2012; Taminiau 
and Wilts 2006), as well as influence the business environment (Bennett 1997b), and will 
require intermediaries to facilitate the interactions with industry players. For example at 
the regional level, informants underlined how local political representatives may want to 
get in touch with large companies but will not have the necessary connections or an 
established network and will thus rely on local trade associations to foster the relationship. 
A trade association representative commented: 
When we facilitate government to the primes it tends to be local 
government or UKTI representatives, because they may need a 
connection into a specific site […] and we will do a linking event, 
or chat or introduction or things like that. […] as far as the 
government wanting to talk to our members, […] we will organise 
an event where they can come and present whatever message that 





Furthermore, several informants suggested how government or other political actors 
would want to convey a specific message or strategy to the industry and would rely on 
trade bodies to communicate it to the companies (Interview 5, firm). Informants 
underlined that sector specific trade associations are particularly valuable organisations 
that can undertake this delicate role due to their strong connections and continuous 
relations with the industrial environment as well as their ability to communicate 
effectively with both large primes and with micro-firms. 
In addition to internally oriented activities, trade associations undertake interest 
representation and political activity functions, which similarly to firms’ involvement in 
the political arena, have as objective to influence public policy decisions (e.g. Bonardi, 
Holburn, and Vanden Bergh 2006). However, a crucial difference concerns the objective 
of the political action; whilst firms generally undertake political activities to gain a 
competitive advantage over their competitors, trade associations undertake political 
activities that favour an entire industry or sector depending on the membership they 
represent. 
All the national and regional associations operating within the UK aerospace industry 
undertake some form of political activity, however there are contrasting views regarding 
the ability, effectiveness and need of regional trade associations to operate in the political 
arena. This is probably the apex of divergence between informants’ perspectives on the 
political activities of sectoral trade associations operating at different levels in the UK 
aerospace industry. As mentioned in Chapter 3, regional and national trade associations 
collaborate in the “Aerospace and Defence Federation”, to work collaboratively towards 
influencing the policymaking process. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this is 
effective, as several informants questioned its benefits and highlighted competition 
amongst associations.  
Greenwood (2002: 12) argues that “national associations are by nature political animals 
whose raison d’être is representation” and various informants underlined how the 
regional trade associations do not, or are not required to develop political activities, as 
was evidenced by a firm Head of Public Affairs: 
I think [national trade association] has a lobbying function, very 




consultations, in gathering evidence and to representing the 
industry. The regional bodies do not have this function. And they 
tend to focus more on supply chain improvement, so helping their 
members becoming more efficient (Interview 23, firm).  
Various regional trade association representatives corroborated these notions and 
underlined that they would not undertake political activities at the national level, however 
they would undertake political activities at the regional level to influence local actors as 
emphasised by a regional trade association CEO:  
I have not been involved in any of the politician related stuff, so 
things like select committees…that would be getting into [the 
national trade association’s] remit in terms of lobbying and 
influencing politicians. So I’d say we tend to let them do that on 
a national basis, we would have then meetings with local MPs on 
a regional basis with a regional strategy or initiative (Interview 
15, trade association). 
Another trade association representative underlined how in his opinion the organisation 
did not develop a structured and comprehensive political strategy and this had a clear 
impact on the political functions it would undertake, which were extremely limited. The 
association would rather concentrate on developing market-oriented activities as these 
were more visible, and valued by its membership (Interview 18, trade association). The 
political activity development would be limited to the CEO relating with key institutional 
stakeholders on an individual basis.  
In juxtaposition, several informants argued that if the trade associations did not undertake 
political functions and have a strong voice in the political arena they would cease to be 
considered as a prominent actor within the aerospace industry. It is plausible to associate 
these perspectives to the strong period of economic and political uncertainty caused by 
Brexit. It has already been stressed that trade associations may shift between their 
business and political functions, but it is reasonable to assume that their political and 
interest representation orientation increases during highly uncertain times.   
Moreover, several data sources pointed at regional bodies undertaking political functions. 
Firstly, as highlighted in Figure 11 (above) several regional associations include interest 
representation and lobbying functions in the list of core activities and services provided 
to members. Secondly, regional trade associations operating in environments 




lobbying functions as they may enjoy closer relationships with institutional actors than 
the national organisations. As one interviewee said regarding their political activities:  
[…] it is certainly liaising with sub-national elected officials, 
regional government or a city council. Obviously, they are closer 
to their businesses, so they are able to keep that more intimate 
relationship than the national organisation would. Let’s say the 
recent discussions around Brexit and the Border in Northern 
Ireland. Now [regional trade association] would be a tremendous 
source of information because of the potential impact of what 
would be proposed up there, whereas a trade association based 
here in London might not have that local knowledge and local 
contacts who can inform people on the exact opinion of 
businesses in that part of the country. So much more intimate 
interaction with small and local members and with their regional 
elected officials (Interview 28, firm). 
In line with the abovementioned argument concerning the role of the CEO, a strong 
involvement in the socio-political arena and the consequent development of nonmarket 
strategies by smaller associations may stem from the direction given by the CEO and his 
capability of developing political connections.  
One of the main functions of trade associations’ political activity that emerged from the 
data refers to developing a positive interaction between the industry and political 
stakeholders. This is evidenced by a pattern that emerged from the interviews, which 
referred to the notion that trade associations’ ultimate political goal is to “put up the 
wallpaper” as argued by the former Head of Political and Economic Affairs of a leading 
trade association (Interview 20, trade association). The following quote stresses how the 
political functions of trade associations are intended to establish the necessary conditions 
for the industry to develop a strong interaction with government and other political actors 
on a general but continuous level. Consequently, firms would then be able to interact in 
relation to more specific issues: 
[…] if you are doing anything you got to paste up the wallpaper 
first then you can stick stuff to the wallpaper, it is all about 
creating a mood, a context, then you can start being specific […] 
because the trade association is classic wallpaper (Interview 20, 
trade association). 
This is a common theme, and the majority of informants agreed that individual firms’ 




detail than the interactions developed by trade associations. Discussing this notion one 
informant with both trade association and firm experience, argued:  
[The trade association] will reinforce the same arguments again 
and again, whereas we can have more progressive discussions 
around what the impact will be on practical terms, where 
therefore do negotiations need to go beyond top-level messages 
like we want to maintain single market access. Well what does 
that actually mean, what does it look like in practice. There is a 
deeper level of interaction, which we can have at firm level, 
which a trade body couldn’t probably have (Interview 29, firm). 
A key part of trade associations’ political activities is undertaken through the 
development of political ties and “relationships with key political actors, with the aim of 
persuading them to support policy and regulatory decisions” (Mbalyohere et al. 2017). 
Sun, Mellahi, and Wright capture this by stressing “since political institutions are among 
the most difficult environmental dependencies to control, firms may seek to co-opt 
political stakeholders by developing personal and organisational linkages so that 
potentially hostile elements of environmental uncertainties can be neutralised” (2012: 70-
71).  
The findings indicate that trade associations managers’ political ties can be developed in 
several ways including asking parliamentarians to attend industry fairs, forums, specific 
workshops, gala dinners, annual conferences, organising events within parliament, and 
undertaking an entire set of activities by tapping into their member firm’s assets and 
resources. For example, associations may organise tours of firm sites as well as organise 
roundtable discussions with senior industry leaders (e.g. Department for Exiting the 
European Union 2017), which will have two main objectives. On one side, they will be 
able to inform and educate policymakers on industry issues as well as showcase the main 
production sites and products. On the other side, they will have the opportunity to 
establish strong ties with key political stakeholders. The following excerpt of an interview 
with a member of the board of directors of a leading trade association is particularly 
revealing and clearly demonstrates the level of deep personal interaction that is developed 
to cultivate strong connections with policymakers: 
We have created a tour that we take officials, and ministers on, 
advisors on, out in Filton to see GKN, Rolls Royce and Airbus. 




relaxed…and we go with them. So, whether it is special 
advisors60, or officials and we are doing it for a minister now…we 
go out on the train with them, spending time, getting to know the 
person. We are not doing the hard kind of…here is this issue, here 
is the next issue…it’s more like…where in London do you 
live…it’s getting to know people and then you are on the visit, 
and then you have that kind of follow up conversation, and they 
just become familiar and comfortable with you. You get to see 
industry…you get to introduce them to industry in a nice and easy 
way. […] we invite them to receptions, we invite them to 
Farnborough, we invite them to trade shows, our annual 
dinner…and it’s ways to get to know them, brief them and then 
hopefully get them interested and engaged in your issues 
(Interview 19, trade association).  
Moreover, trade associations are able to develop political ties and establish relationships 
with political stakeholders through the provision of information. The findings suggest 
various phases of this particular strategy: a first phase in which the organisation will 
develop broad industry information and intelligence and provide this to MPs and other 
political actors during receptions in parliament, APPGs, and other events. The second 
phase consists in providing politicians with specific information and reports that can be 
used by them during debates and other parliamentary activities. A former trade 
association Government Affairs Manager commented:  
You need to provide them with one, the initial evidence which 
gets them interested, which is all around constituency investment, 
employment, then extrapolate that nationally. Then they will start 
to come to you or will be receptive to receive from you speaking 
points, evidence for debates (Interview 29, firm). 
Even though large firms interact independently with government, trade associations may 
build and cultivate political ties in ways that individual firms are not able to because as 
previously mentioned, government officials in the UK will generally want to engage with 
organisations representing an entire industry rather than interact with firms individually. 
A firm Senior VP and Head of Government Affairs underlined the key role that trade 
associations play in term of fostering relationships: 
                                                 
60 Special Advisors, often referred to as SPADs, are counsellors to the Prime Minister and to 
senior ministers. They are extremely important political actors as they are appointed directly by 




The trade association may have contact with certain parts of the 
government we don’t have. We employ them primarily to be a 
political government relations unit, so they have maybe a bit more 
time to make many more contacts than we do (Interview 22, firm). 
Industry experts corroborated these notions and argued that trade associations’ relations 
and contacts within government and the civil service could help the industry convey a 
particular message better than firms’ development of comprehensive political strategies 
(Interview 26, industry expert). 
Additionally, various informants proposed the view that in specific circumstances (e.g. in 
the context of government change or ministerial reshuffles) trade associations are able to 
gain easier access, as one informant reported:  
Associations will have an easier time because they represent a 
sector or a range of companies they can sometimes get easier and 
more ready access in the context of political changes. Whereas 
individual firms may have to wait for that access because they are 
just presenting one perspective rather than many, that said I think 
individual companies can beyond that react more quickly to 
particular issues because you are not relying on achieving 
consensus across a range of members, its internal decisions. So I 
can provide a view on Brexit very readily whereas [the trade 
association] will take time to come up with a position and will 
usually not move beyond that position (Interview 29, firm).  
The previous quote is interesting as it highlights a crucial difference between firms’ and 
trade associations’ political activities, underlining the limits of the latter. Differently from 
trade bodies, individual companies can react quicker to issues in the political arena, as 
they are not bound to acquire consensus amongst various members.  
Furthermore, similarly to individual companies’ political activities, trade associations 
may choose to conduct a highly visible political campaign by developing comprehensive 
media and social media campaigns, whereas in other cases trade associations will want to 
operate silently behind closed doors as suggested by an informant with extensive trade 
association experience:  
The trade association didn’t make a noise externally, but it 
worked privately with the members and the government and it 
allowed a couple of the larger companies […] to speak about the 




sometimes it wants to be behind, and it depends on the situation 
(Interview 29, firm). 
Various informants from the three categories (i.e. trade association, firm and industry 
expert) argued that interacting with the media was a crucial part of their political 
activities. The findings show that trade associations interact with the media to react to 
information that might damage the industry, but more importantly to convey messages 
and support the development of a particular narrative. An informant who collaborated 
extensively in the development of the national trade association’s political strategy 
commented: 
The interactions with the media are developed through fostering 
continuous and “off the record” relationships with journalists and 
editors. It is important to develop a dialogue, specifically when 
it’s about handling sensitive news (Interview 5, firm).  
Nevertheless, another informant cautioned the use of the media, as an improper use could 
negatively impact the relationship with political stakeholders, as can be grasped by the 
following interview quote:   
[…] not using the press to lobby ministers, they hate that. Having 
the conversations in private (Interview 19, trade association). 
5.3.2 Platforms and forums for engagement 
A fundamental feature of trade association’s political activities is the combination of 
reactive and proactive activities. In line with scholars (e.g. Oliver and Holzinger 2008) 
who argue that these two approaches should be considered as complementary, the 
findings across the different organisations suggest that trade associations combine the two 
approaches depending on the specific issues they face.  
The two perspectives (i.e. reactive and proactive) have been considered as two extremes 
linked to different theoretical paradigms and analysed accordingly. The first paradigm is 
linked to institutional theories, which focus on institutional characteristics and how 
organisations are influenced by these (e.g. Geels 2014). The latter, mainly to resource-
based theories that focus on internal organisational features and how organisations can 
proactively make use of their resources and develop capabilities to influence the decision-
making process (e.g. Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013). Nevertheless, in response to 




only considers the “reactive” perspective, Scott (2008) proposes the notion that it may be 
an appropriate lens to consider business actors’ activities towards shaping their 
institutional environment. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Weidenbaum (1980) argues there 
are three main approaches in the interactions with public policy: passive reaction, positive 
anticipation and proactive public policy shaping. Several respondents confirmed that 
trade associations’ political strategy is a combination of both reactive and proactive 
activities and the findings suggest that trade associations will attempt to develop a 
combination of approaches.  
Nevertheless, it is inevitable that trade associations that demonstrate a higher knowledge 
of the political arena and mechanisms, are accustomed to developing formal and 
structured political strategies, and enjoy stronger relations with policymakers may be 
better positioned to develop proactive measures. In contrast, trade associations that do not 
have a strong political function will find it more difficult to anticipate and proactively 
influence policy development. Organisations with structured political strategies will 
undertake various activities that will enable them to anticipate decisions that will 
influence the business environment. Efficient political activity monitoring activities will 
allow trade associations to capture signals relating to a particular policy development, as 
will having organisational representatives specifically designated to be regularly involved 
in activities with MPs (Interview 12, trade association). Another measure involves 
establishing consultation meetings and roundtables with institutional stakeholders. These 
notions are clearly highlighted by a senior trade association representative: 
So we will try to do a bit of thought leadership, policy document, 
some sort of publication and take that to government, and to say 
you need to do x. because we think that the policy isn’t working, 
the current policy isn’t working for these reasons, and here is a 
practical solution to change it, and here is how much it is going 
to cost and that type of thing. And so it is very much proactive 
(Interview 19, trade association). 
Concurrently, the institutional consultation mechanisms, i.e. how policymakers decide to 
interact with business actors, will have a strong impact on the activities undertaken by 
trade associations. Government and government departments may actively require 
feedback on policy or legislative proposals to ensure that they have the necessary 




consulting process through the organisation of workshops with industry players or by 
producing green papers to which invested actors will respond to (Dorey 2014). In these 
cases, trade associations and other organisations will have to react to specific proposals 
advanced by the government and engage in the debate if they want to have a voice and 
advance specific messages. However, a senior government affairs manager commented 
that in this case organisations would have minimal opportunities to influence public 
decisions through a response and would need to anticipate it given the different stages of 
UK policymaking:  
[…] so this is where public policy or ideas from government itself 
can force business to change, but we obviously don’t like that. If 
something has gone on a green paper or white paper it is almost 
too late. Our job is to know what is even a tiny little brain thought 
into somebody’s mind, to say please think about aerospace before 
you go charging ahead with this policy. And this is what [the trade 
association] needs to be good at (Interview 22, firm). 
Hence, for trade associations to be effective, they need to operate in the early stages of 
the policymaking process, and as abovementioned the development of relationships and 
constant interaction with policymakers is particularly relevant.  
Another aspect that is closely linked to developing strong political ties and to the 
platforms through which trade associations exert their influence, relates to cooperating or 
using other actors and entities that operate within the same economic, political and social 
environments. These can be considered as indirect activities, namely the activities that 
are not directly targeted at decision and policymakers but are rather directed at a broader 
audience. Often, the reason behind these strategies is to develop a narrative on broad 
issues and to amplify a particular message. Targeting journalists, industry experts or 
political analysts in order to convey messages and develop a broader interest around a 
specific topic is a clear example of such activities.  
Hence, building on Barley’s (2010) argument that firms systematically build an 
institutional field to exert greater influence on policymakers, this study provides 
empirical evidence that also trade associations build an institutional field to exert greater 
influence. Trade associations in the UK aerospace industry develop special relationships 




sectors. This is particularly common when several industries face similar issues. In the 
UK, a clear example is proposed by the relationships between the aerospace associations 
and the automotive associations. As one informant put it:  
We didn’t see him at all [the business secretary], we didn’t talk to 
him, yet we got more money, and it’s because […] it’s others 
campaigning on our behalf that helped achieve that outcome 
(Interview 19, trade association). 
From the previous quote, it is evident that, even if in an implicit way, there is a positive 
collaboration between different organisations. This collaboration is acknowledged 
between the two parties and in turn can foster respective benefits. However, building an 
institutional field is not always based on collaborations that are acknowledged and 
accepted by the different organisations. It is common that these influencing strategies are 
not based on mutual collaborative understandings; they are rather the outcome of a 
specific political tactic developed by a trade association. In this instance, the trade 
association may exploit other trade associations: 
I use them, I don’t mind them existing and having those people 
[policy and external affairs managers] because I will use those 
organisations…similarly as I said at the beginning a big company 
might use [a trade association] to push a line that they don’t want 
to say, or to echo something, I use them [other trade associations] 
to push lines (Interview 19, trade association). 
Occasionally, trade associations will not be able to canvass direct support from other trade 
associations as they might have confrontational relationships and act competitively. 
Hence, in this circumstance an indirect activity that may be employed is having the trade 
association’s members lobby other organisations on its behalf. This is relevant when a 
sectorial trade association is not particularly strong in a given geographical area and has 
limited ties with local politicians. Another type of organisation that trade associations’ 
tap into in order to convey and amplify their messages are trade unions. The former Head 
of Policy of a large trade association highlighted how during the period in which the 
Labour party was in government, trade unions had very strong connections with leading 
officials and could help the trade association convey its messages: 
We need to reach out to the trade unions, because they are going 




usually we are on the same side. They want stable, well-funded 
industry (Interview 20, trade association). 
Within the political arena, trade associations are able to develop relationships with 
politicians that do not have to be directly involved in the policymaking process, and as 
previously mentioned these can be instrumental in supporting specific cases. Moreover, 
as mentioned by several senior trade association managers, in terms of the organisation’s 
political success, it is key to convert these individuals and organisations into entities that 
support the industry’s interests. Informants referred to these as “cheerleaders” (e.g. 
Interview 22, trade association).  Hence, trade associations organise events in parliament 
with the help of parliamentarians who will act as sponsors to the events. This is an 
effective and low-cost form of lobbying, which will attract other MPs. Moreover, sponsor 
MPs will be highly influential at conveying specific messages to other MPs who are not 
accessible to trade associations or are acting against industry interests, as mentioned by a 
trade association representative: 
You can have an influential backbench MP, or the MPs that are 
criticising the defence industry…we will never change their 
mind…I will never change their mind, [the CEO] will never 
change their mind, but they might listen to an MP that they know 
and trust…who is that MP? How do we get them on side? And 
how do we engage them all in a bigger…more constructive 
conversation? (Interview 24, trade association). 
Additionally, as previously mentioned, trade associations will convey messages through 
the media as evidenced by the numerous appearances on national and international media 
networks. Nevertheless, this is another situation in which larger trade associations will 
have the necessary human and economic resources to develop a strong and influential 
presence as underlined by a trade association CEO:  
This is an interrelated world and we all react to what is on the 
news, whether it’s on a newspaper, television, the internet and 
therefore you want your messages, the right messages to be in 
those environments and find the opportunity to put them across. 
So, we would always be available for comments, we would have 
somebody we would have a press office and we had somebody, 
we would train ourselves, I was trained as well, and I could go on 
television or on radio whatever to make the comment on whatever 
might be the issue and occasionally you know pressed to do so. 




to exert influence, introduce your message. (Interview 21, trade 
association) 
There are a variety of reasons behind trade associations using other organisations to push 
particular interests. The first and very practical reason relates to timing. Time is a very 
important factor within the context of effective business-government relations, 
particularly if a new government has been elected or if new policy is ‘about to get passed’. 
An example relates to the AGP collaborative project between the industry and 
government. In 2015 after the general election, the aerospace trade associations needed 
to make sure that the government remained committed to this collaboration within the 
context of the spending review. However, the associations did not have the opportunity 
to talk with the new business secretary and cooperated with the leaders of other 
organisations such as the CBI and the EEF who lobbied specifically for the conservation 
of the support to the AGP and the aerospace sector (Interview 19, trade association).  
As abovementioned trade associations undertake several activities that overlap between 
the market and nonmarket environments, such as the organisation of trade fairs. 
Government officials, ministers, senior civil servants and regulators will generally attend 
these events, and in particular instances participate actively. Trade associations 
endeavour to have key government officials attend these events in order to demonstrate 
that the industry has the government’s full support. The prime minister or other minsters 
representing relevant departments (e.g. BEIS, MOD, Department for Transport), will be 
invited to give keynote speeches, and will then be given VIP tours of the fair, and taken 
to company stands. Companies may do so independently as well, however, institutional 
representatives will prefer that intermediaries undertake these functions as not to be 
considered preferring or supporting specific companies. Hence, in these events there are 
abundant opportunities to network with institutional players, as evidenced on the website 
of one of the most important fairs in the world:  
This prestigious reception provides an ideal setting to informally 
meet with key decision makers, make referrals and exchange 
business leads at the very start of the busy Farnborough week. 
(Farnborough International 2016)  
Together the findings are significant in at least two major respects. Firstly, the notion that 




contexts but cannot be generalised. Undoubtedly, larger associations will have more 
access to politicians and legislators, but regional bodies may play an important role as 
well in their specific operational arenas. Secondly, the notion that even large trade 
associations may play a marginal role in relation to developing a robust political strategy 
if political activities are not a central part of their remit.  
5.4 Summary 
In line with the argumentations that trade association are to be considered key political 
actors (e.g. Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015; Traxler and Huemer 2007) this chapter 
has presented findings that support these views and offered an in-depth account of the 
political role and functions of trade associations in a specific context.  
The first section has underlined three main patterns linked to trade associations’ 
environment. Namely, why firms engage with trade associations and rely on these 
organisations to act as intermediaries and represent their interests. Additionally, the key 
institutional and organisational stakeholders, and their relationships have been 
highlighted, as well as aspects related to the political framework, institutional change and 
what can be considered as institutional gaps. Finally, the section has examined the drivers 
that influence trade associations’ political strategy. The main contribution of this section 
has been the conceptualization of trade associations’ embeddedness within their 
institutional environment and how this may impact the development of political activities, 
intermediary role and ability to operate in the political arena and influence the policy-
making process. 
The second section has focused on the nonmarket activities undertaken by trade 
associations. Specifically, it delved into the political activities undertaken by trade 
associations towards shaping the environment in which they operate. Moreover, it has 
highlighted the platforms and forums used by the trade associations and demonstrated 
that their activities are a combination of reactive and proactive approaches. The 
overarching theme of this section, which has emerged from the data, is that trade 
associations develop strong political ties and complex relationships and use other 
organisations and individuals to influence policy-makers and key institutional 




Chapter 6  Discussion  
6.1 Introduction 
This study explores the complex and dynamic field of business-government relations in 
the UK aerospace industry. Specifically, it investigates the political role and functions of 
a particular form of meta-organisation such as trade associations (Ahrne and Brunsson 
2005), in a highly politicised context. Given that trade associations are considered as one 
of the main avenues through which companies undertake collective political activities 
(e.g. Barnett 2006a; 2013) as well as key agents in influencing regulation and government 
policy (Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015), this research focuses on developing 
knowledge on what influences the political role of trade associations, as well as on how 
they develop political activities and attempt to influence and shape their political 
environment. This is done by exploring two levels of analysis: national and regional 
sectorial trade associations. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the UK political and economic 
environment and the aerospace industry are an appropriate context to explore the political 
role and activities of trade associations operating within it. Moreover, the trade 
association framework in the UK is a particularly suitable milieu given the voluntary 
system and fragmented collective activity arrangement (e.g. Bennett 1999; Bennett and 
Payne 2000). 
The following sections extend the narrative presented in the previous chapter, addresses 
the gaps in knowledge highlighted in Chapter 2, and discusses how the empirical findings 
relate to extant literature on corporate political activity and nonmarket strategy, 
contributing to their development. Moreover, this chapter underlines how this research 
embraces a multi-theoretical approach, which is developed by integrating insights from 
institutional and resource-based perspectives, and how these two lenses relate to the 
findings. Specifically, on one hand the institutional lens is helpful to highlight that 
organisations’ political actions are influenced by their institutional embeddedness, and to 
explore how social structures and relationships impact their nonmarket strategy. On the 
other hand, the resource-based theoretical perspective is beneficial to emphasise that trade 
associations’ nonmarket strategy development and execution is characterised by the 




The chapter is structured according to the three research questions advanced in the 
previous chapters of this study, which are: 
➢ RQ1: What are the determinants of trade associations’ political role? 
➢ RQ2: How is political strategy defined and exercised in trade associations? 
➢ RQ3: How do trade associations exert their influence? 
6.2 Unravelling trade associations’ political role  
The first question advanced within this study addresses the gap identified in the literature, 
which relates to the need to better understand the precise role of trade associations at the 
interface of business and society (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013; Rajwani, 
Lawton, and Philips 2015; Wilts and Meyer 2005). Specifically, this exploratory research 
contributes to the debate on understanding how trade associations play a political role and 
attempt to “influence the institutional field to affect government decisions and actions” 
(Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015: 228), by highlighting key factors that impact a trade 
association’s political role. This inquiry's rationale builds on research that argues that 
existing work on trade associations has focused on the “nature and consequences” rather 
than on the “causes of industry’s associations political activities” (Drope and Hansen 
2009: 305). This section addresses the first research question:  
➢ RQ1: What are the determinants of trade associations’ political role? 
The findings of this study are consistent with recent research (e.g. Berkowitz and Bor 
2017; Barnett 2017; Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017) in proposing that trade 
associations are undoubtedly to be considered as key agents within the intricate business-
government context. However, when unpicking the complexities concerning this specific 
organisational actor, it can be underlined that there are considerable differences amongst 
sectoral trade associations, at both national and regional level, concerning their political 
role.  
Overall, trade associations in the aerospace industry are exceptionally important 
organisations for both businesses and political institutions. This can be assumed even 




terms of the size of their membership, organisational resources, and ability to represent 
broader domains (Eising 2007). Sectorial bodies are able to emerge as a result of their 
expertise and knowledge of the industry as well as through a closer proximity to the 
specific interests of business actors (Beyers 2004). These features enable sectoral bodies 
to address matters particular to firms operating in the aerospace industry; and whilst this 
may be valid for sectoral trade bodies in other industries, the complexity of the aerospace 
industry, its closeness with government as well as its political sensitivity might be 
additional factors that contribute to the intensification of their political role. Several 
informants emphasised how in the current condition, i.e. Brexit and the need for 
policymakers to acquire information and expertise from industry actors, sectorial trade 
bodies are more effective at conveying their interests and are able to engage at a deeper 
level than peak and cross-industry associations.  
The overarching notion brought forward in this study is that all sectorial trade bodies, 
both at national and regional level may potentially undertake a political role, however 
there are certain features that enable or constrain their ability to be policy capable 
(Galambos 1988). These notions are supported by the collected data as participants 
underlined the general importance of sectoral associations as well as their inconsistent 
ability to operate in the political arena.  
Previous research (e.g. Galambos 1988; Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015; Van 
Waarden 1992) grouped trade associations in categories based on their size and functions 
they undertake. In terms of their functions, the main distinction relates to their internal 
engagement (i.e. with their membership) and external engagement (i.e. with socio-
political actors and the policy-making process). In these categorisations, associations 
belonging to the first category tend to focus on internal industry activities mainly directed 
at structuring that particular industry, whereas associations belonging to the second 
category tend to focus on the external environment and in shaping institutional norms and 
behaviour. Moreover, extant work has highlighted that larger trade associations will 
generally act as a representative body in the political arena, and given the larger 
availability of resources, will potentially be able to influence, or at least take part in the 





Whilst it is not this study’s objective to dispute these arguments, they seem to provide a 
static representation that does not grasp the subtle complexities regarding these 
organisations and how endogenous and exogenous features may influence their ‘volatile’ 
role within the business-government interaction. Instead, the findings of this study, 
propose that trade associations’ categorisations should be considered as highly fluid and 
that internal attributes and environmental characteristics might potentially alter the 
organisation’s political role and position within the intermediary field (Bell 1995). In this 
light, trade associations must be considered as extremely intricate organisations that 
operate in highly complex and dynamic environments (Oliver and Holzinger 2008), 
which will impact their ability to operate successfully in the political arena. Consequently, 
this argumentation proposes the counterintuitive interpretation that large trade 
associations who generally enjoy strong and close relations with political and regulatory 
actors and have the potential to contribute significantly to policy-making, may in given 
circumstances play a minor political role. Concurrently, small trade associations with 
extremely limited resources may in specific contextual conditions, act as key actors in 
interacting with, and shaping their specific political environment. For example, trade 
associations operating in an environment characterised by the presence of a strong form 
of political and economic authority such as a devolved administration, which manage to 
secure a strong relationship with local policy-makers.  
These notions challenge the resource-based assumptions that political action and 
operations in the nonmarket arena are especially dependent on the political resources that 
organisations possess. Instead the findings, in line with extant studies in the management 
domain (e.g. Oliver 1997), lend weight to the joint consideration of the resource-based 
lens and institutional perspectives by acknowledging the importance of organisations’ 
specific resources without neglecting the paramount role played by the institutional and 
policy framework.  
A beneficial starting point towards understanding trade associations’ political role - 
assuming that trade organisations’ functions follow on the reasons firms join them 
(Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017) - concerns the motives that drive firms to join trade 
associations. Previous work has highlighted different factors, including having their 
interests represented in socio-political and economic arenas, influencing political 




intelligence, taking part in collective bargaining, gaining external resources and having 
access to a broad range of business services (e.g. Barnett 2017; Bennett and Ramsden 
2007; Bennett and Robson 2001; Jacomet 2005; Wilts and Meyer 2005). Nevertheless, 
Baron’s (2016) recent work underlines that there is still the need to understand when 
organisations decide to delegate nonmarket action to an external organisation and/or 
when it should act individually. 
The findings of this study are consistent with extant research and as evidenced, firms join 
for a variety of different reasons, which vary consistently, and frequently in relation to 
members’ size. Findings concur with scholars (e.g. Barron 2013; Hillman and Hitt 1999; 
Taminiau and Wilts 2006) who suggest that firms generally join because of a lack of 
resources, which hinders them to influence political institutions that have an impact on 
their operations, and thus resort to external organisations that can represent their interests 
in the appropriate arenas. Moreover, in addition to interactions with policy-makers, firms 
(particularly smaller firms) seek trade associations’ assistance towards furthering their 
business operations. This is done through a whole breadth of services provided by trade 
associations, including the provision of information on market opportunities, the 
organisation of trade fairs and workshops as well as the ability to create networking 
opportunities with other firms, institutional actors and other key stakeholders.  
Similarly, large firms join for market and nonmarket reasons as well. These however, 
differ consistently from small firms’ intentions and are possibly guided more towards the 
latter. In terms of nonmarket action, large firms generally have the necessary capabilities 
to interact with, and influence policy-makers directly, or at least decide when to act 
independently or in collaboration with other firms (Jacomet 2005). Nevertheless, there 
are instances whereby large firms need to undertake political activities and pursue certain 
agendas through trade associations, and findings suggest that these are mainly to gain 
access to political arenas and to convey particularly sensitive messages that companies 
do not want their organisation to be directly associated with. The latter factor was 
considered extremely relevant in the current political discourse dominated by Brexit and 
was widely shared within informants’ answers. Moreover, trade associations may secure 
political intelligence and access to the political arena that individual firms, regardless of 




Finally, with regards to small firms, regional associations may be considered as key 
actors, as they are perceived to being closer to their businesses and able to develop more 
intimate relationships. In relation to the relations between the industry’s large firms and 
regional trade associations, the findings underlined contrasting views. On one hand, 
informants perceived them as not particularly significant entities, whereas on the other 
hand, informants presented them as crucial actors that foster the establishment of strong 
aerospace clusters that will in turn assist the development of their supply chains.  
Hence, even though trade associations’ raison d’être and stated purpose is to represent 
collective interests and operate in the political arena (e.g. Bennett and Ramsden 2007; 
Greenwood 2002), a large share of the reasons for which firms are perceived to join, 
depart substantially from this specific area of activity. This is particularly evident in 
respect to the perceived motives regarding small firms and is consistent with extant work 
(e.g. Bennett 2000; Battisti and Perry 2015; Dixon 2006). The findings suggest that small 
firms are generally guided by short term objectives and mostly seek market-oriented 
assistance, whereas large firms seem to be guided by the willingness to shape the political 
environment, which is perceived as a long-term objective. These notions are in line with 
Battisti and Perry (2015) who argue that trade associations’ diverse services offered to 
firms are potentially linked to different organisational priorities. This contraposition of 
interests inevitably creates tensions within trade associations and ultimately generates 
contrasting internal pressures regarding the role and priorities that these organisations 
should undertake. These results reflect those of Bennett (1998) who posited that 
associations with differing member sizes would encounter greater issues when 
formulating a common strategy. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned that in contraposition 
to the perception of firms’ motives, all trade association senior managers but one, and 
firm representatives involved in trade associations’ political strategy development 
stressed the importance of interest representation and lobbying activities. As previously 
mentioned the turbulent period and uncertainty stemming from Brexit might have been a 
factor that influenced the managers’ positions. 
The second insight in relation to trade associations’ political role concerns the 
institutional environment in which they operate. The collected data presented evidence 
on the perceptions firm and association managers, as well as industry experts have of the 




these impact on their political role. Previous research suggests that the political 
framework influences organisations’ role and functions in the political field (e.g. Bennett 
2000; Coleman and Grant 1985; Hillman 2003; Hillman and Wan 2005). The findings of 
this study extend these notions by underlining implications that particular features of the 
UK political environment have on the political role of sectorial trade associations. 
Specifically, these features are linked to themes that emerged in Chapter 5 and relate to 
the dominant role of central government, the presence of sub-national political 
governance bodies, and the dynamic nature of political institutions.  
The first implication is that given that policy is largely developed at national level (e.g. 
Boléat 2003; Valler and Wood 2004), the prevalence of political action is directed 
towards the national government, departments and agencies. The result is that national 
associations will effectively have the necessary requirements and resources – e.g. 
dedicated staff in government affairs departments, as well as offices in central London in 
proximity to policy arenas and the ability to interact with key policymakers on a regular 
basis - to operate at this level and retain the leading political role amongst sectoral interest 
representation organisations in the aerospace industry. This feature has thus placed 
national trade associations as the potential key interlocutor and intermediary of the 
industry’s interests amongst sectoral associations. The findings are thus consistent with 
previous research, which mentioned that “the system of business interest representation 
in Britain has largely paralleled the centralisation of economic, political, and state 
structures” (Valler and Wood 2004: 1839). Moreover, the findings are coherent with the 
argument that political activities should be directed at the “pivotal” political actors who 
have the strongest influence on the policy process in a given field (Henisz and Zelner 
2012: 42).  
Concurrently, however, the second implication concerns the transfer of authority and 
policymaking processes taking place in the UK and the role of local trade bodies, 
particularly with regards to regional associations operating in the devolved 
administrations. Participants underlined that these would potentially play a stronger 
political role than their equivalents in England, as they would enjoy a direct interaction 
with regional political institutions, which have the capacity to develop and implement 
regional strategies (refer to section 5.5.2). The capacity refers to the authority and ability 




areas do not have given the centralised approach to decision-making. Moreover, regional 
trade associations operating in the devolved administrations may benefit from a direct 
interface with the national government through their interactions with the specific 
territorial secretary of state for the devolved administration (Cabinet Office 2013). As 
previously mentioned these arguments should nonetheless keep in consideration the 
marked differences in aerospace presence across, and contributions to the various British 
regions. As evidenced, a stronger incidence of the aerospace industry in a specific context 
may result in a stronger interaction between business and political and regulatory actors.  
The third implication regarding the political environment that was emphasised by 
participants as a determinant of trade associations’ political role concerns changes in the 
political institutional environment. A common theme amongst interviewees was that 
changes in the environment required the change of the trade association. These changes 
can entail modifications in government following a general election, specific industrial 
policy and strategy decisions, as well as shifts in policy regarding regional economic 
development and devolution. Previous research has highlighted how institutional change 
affects the definition of trade associations’ role and how supranational frameworks 
beyond the political spheres to which organisations are used to, ultimately influences their 
role and political activities (Wilts and Quittkat 2004). This study extends this strand of 
literature by highlighting how change in local governance systems has an impact on trade 
associations. These notions are observable in the case presented by regional trade 
associations operating in England. Changes in policy, i.e. the establishment of RDAs, 
firstly placed the regional bodies in a position of strength to play a political role, and 
subsequently to their abolishment narrowed their ability to effectively interact with 
policymakers and develop effective political strategies. These notions build on Bailey and 
Berkeley (2014: 1811) who argue that “RDAs were often better positioned to make 
judgements about how best to offer support and to which clusters (and/or sectors) as they 
had a superior information base than central governments”. Hence, notwithstanding a 
trade association’s willingness or capability to undertake a political role, the fact that it 
operates in an environment characterised by relatively independent political institutions 
will potentially enable it to develop some kind of interaction, whereas the absence of such 




The notion behind this argument is not that political institutions are absent such as in 
environments characterised by institutional voids (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha 2005), but 
that the policymaking process, including key political actors are out of reach; in this 
specific case, policy is developed at the national level. Bennett (1995) argued that if 
government aspired to improve the effectiveness of local bodies it would have had to 
invest in institutional structures that could encourage collective action. Building on 
previous work (e.g. Medina 2016), this research argues that it is exactly the support that 
regional aerospace bodies obtained from the development of competent local governance 
systems that contributed to the development of their ‘temporary’ political role. 
Subsequently to their abolishment they shifted to proposing firm-specific services rather 
than focus on interest representation. In contrast, according to the data it appears that the 
regional bodies operating in the devolved administrations, which present stronger local 
political institutions, have retained a greater political presence. These findings broadly 
support the work of other studies, which posited that changes in the political system could 
influence the effectiveness of political activities (e.g. Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 
2013), and additionally, go beyond this argument to suggest that changes could impact 
not only specific political tactics but also trade associations’ broader role.  
6.3 The formulation of political strategy  
The second question advanced within this study addresses another gap identified in the 
literature, which concerns the under-investigated area of how trade associations define 
their agenda (e.g. Barnett 2017; Berkowitz and Bor 2017). The presented findings 
contribute to this gap by providing an in-depth and rich understanding of trade 
associations’ political strategy determinants. Hence, this section will revisit the following 
research question:  
➢ RQ2: How is political strategy defined and exercised in trade associations? 
Several key themes emerged from the findings that offer an insight into trade 
associations’ decision-making and political strategy formulation, and they can be mainly 
categorised in internal and external drivers.  
In terms of internal features, previous research has determined that large firms have an 




actors (e.g. Barnett 2013; Guèguen 2002; Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017). This study 
provides additional evidence confirming the powerful role of the industry’s large firms in 
defining trade associations’ political agenda. Although some trade associations’ top 
managers put forward the idea that their organisation would balance the interests of the 
wider membership, and that the presence of committees and advisory boards (in larger 
associations) would serve as balancing mechanisms, the majority of informants and the 
triangulation of different data sources suggested that large companies do indeed have a 
strong influence. Hence, even though extant research has advanced notions such as the 
“culture of consensus” (e.g. König, Schulte, and Enders 2012), as well as the “lack of 
hierarchy” (Berkowitz and Dumez 2015: 4) as meta-organisations’ key characteristics, it 
is difficult to disregard the dominant role played by large firms.  
Moreover, the findings indicate that consensus would be sought for in the latter stages of 
strategy development, as opposed to the initial and nascent stages that would be 
characterised by the influence of leading and powerful industry actors (refer to section 
5.2.3). In other words, the key topics and chosen approaches to these would be put 
forward by large and dominant firms, and subsequently the trade associations would seek 
a compromise amongst the broader membership. This feature is possibly intensified by 
the structure of the aerospace industry, which is characterised by a limited number of 
extremely economically and politically powerful organisations (e.g. Hartley 2014; 
Hayward 1994). As underlined in Chapter 5, large aerospace companies, specifically top 
government suppliers, have strong interactions with national political institutions (e.g. 
procurement contracts with the MOD), which enable them to gain a position of strength, 
and they may consequently translate this power in the decision-making processes of 
sectorial trade bodies 61 . The data highlights that companies and particularly larger 
companies can be considered as key resources as they contribute to trade associations’ 
physical and financial resources. For example, they may pay for special subscriptions, 
often be the main sponsors in specific projects and events, as well as contribute to the 
meta-organisations by seconding members of staff. These findings are in line with 
previous work (e.g. König, Schulte, and Enders 2012: 1325), which proposes that firm 
                                                 
61 This dominant role could possibly be evident in peak and cross-industry associations as well; 
however, it is reasonable to assume that in this situation large aerospace firms would have to 




members of meta-organisations usually enjoy a greater level or resources than the 
organisation itself.  
One unanticipated finding concerns the differences that emerged amongst large members; 
specifically, between UK companies and foreign-owned companies based in the UK, with 
the latter perceived as playing a weaker internal influencing role and an overall minor 
involvement with associations than the first. The influence of leading organisations can 
be considered as a partial account of trade associations’ political strategy development 
process, as the findings highlighted other key internal and external determinants.  
Another internal determinant, which can be considered to be a key resource and thus 
supports the RBV perspective included within the emergent theoretical framework, 
relates to the role undertaken by individuals leading the associations. Even though this 
research is broadly in accordance with Spillman’s scepticism (2012) on the true ability of 
trade associations’ staff, to be fully autonomous from member firms and be able to 
independently develop long-term policies, the findings suggest that in the contemporary 
trade association arrangement in the UK aerospace sector, top level managers are key 
actors in the definition of the organisations’ direction and political strategy (see section 
5.2.3). These notions corroborate the findings of other studies that have investigated the 
centrality of managers in business-government relations and CPA, including CEO 
commitment (Griffin and Dunn 2004), government affairs managers’ social capital 
(Barron, Pereda, Stacey 2017), managerial discretion (Hadani, Dahan, and Doh 2015), 
and MNC subsidiary executives’ role (Blumentritt 2003). Moreover, this finding is in line 
with changes in the broader UK trade association context; namely, the shift of authority 
from committees within trade bodies, to a key role of the professional managing the 
organisation (Bolèat 1997; Macdonald 2001).  
This notion is connected with the previous research question as the authority and 
discretion of the person in charge will not only have an impact on the formulation of the 
political strategy and specific tactics but also on the general orientation and role of the 
trade association, i.e. if it focuses on providing internal oriented services or external 
oriented activities such as lobbying and interest representation. As substantiated by 
information provided on their websites and/or through their promotional documents 




participants underlined that trade associations CEOs usually tend to emphasise either one 
of the two as their core function and modify the organisation’s objectives accordingly.  
These findings are in accordance with previous work (e.g. Blumentritt 2003; Hadani, 
Dahan, and Doh 2015), which emphasised the importance of managers’ orientation 
towards political activities. This study discovers that the experience and professional 
background of the executive can be considered as key factors in trade associations’ 
orientation. Informants argued that following a generalised shift from appointing CEOs 
with military or civil service backgrounds (particularly to national trade bodies), to 
appointing executives with extensive business background, the formulation of political 
strategies was perceived to have developed into more complex and multifaceted 
approaches. This may be another feature that is influenced by the external environment 
given the increasing political and regulatory pressure on business operations (Doh, 
Lawton, and Rajwani 2014), and the consequent necessity of organisations to adapt and 
innovate their political strategies.  
Moreover, the role of the CEO was perceived to have particular prominence in regional 
trade associations. Whilst at both levels, i.e. national and regional, CEOs and senior 
representatives may undertake political activities as well as “develop unique insights 
about public policy” (Hadani, Dahan, and Doh 2015: 2), such as interacting with the 
media, giving evidence through oral testimony, and establishing political ties with key 
public officials, national associations generally have a number of employees who assume 
these functions as well. In contrast, within regional bodies, political activities are 
predominantly developed and undertaken by the executive managing the association.  
In terms of external determinants, similarly to the effect on the broader political role, the 
structure of the UK political environment was perceived to have a strong impact on the 
development of specific political strategies as well, as underlined in the following 
paragraph. Hence, the findings are consistent with previous research, which has drawn on 
institutional theories to stress that the structure of the institutional context and 
institutional conditions in a particular country may define organisations’ approach to 
operating in the nonmarket environment (e.g. Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani 2012; Hillman 




One of the most recurring features concerns the necessity of trade associations to “tap 
into” government’s agenda. Findings suggest that when developing political strategies 
trade associations consider governments’ priorities, and attempt to align their strategy to 
these, endeavouring to establish a collaborative interaction. Interestingly, participants 
highlighted how the industry’s requests would always be similar (e.g. appeal for 
additional funding, R&D incentives, tax cuts, as well as export assistance and a 
favourable policy environment), but they would try and modify and adjust their requests 
according to government objectives and strategy.  
There are several motives that may explain this approach. The first concerns the 
dependency that the aerospace industry has on political institutions, for example in terms 
of military procurement contracts, R&D funding, tax credits and export support (Hartley 
2014). The second motive relates to a key difference between firms’ and trade 
associations’ political activity and particularly in relation to the interactions with 
policymakers; companies are able to pressure policy-makers by leveraging their 
contributions to the socio-political and economic environment (e.g. employment and 
investments). Even though companies do attempt to adjust their activities to conform to 
“external expectations” and align with the external environment (Meznar and Nigh 1995: 
976), if required they may undertake a more adversarial and confrontational approach as 
it will be extremely difficult for them to completely lose access to the political arena. In 
contraposition, trade associations do not provide a specific ‘tangible’ contribution and are 
extremely dependent on institutional legitimacy (e.g. De Villa, Rajwani, and Lawton 
2015), which will force them to establish continuous collaborative and constructive 
relationships if they want to be considered as a valuable intermediary organisations by 
policymakers.  
Notwithstanding policymakers’ need to obtain input in terms of industry expertise and 
intelligence to develop policy and a general positive level of interaction between the 
government and interest groups (Cowles 2001), the UK’s pluralist tradition does not 
enable organisations to acquire a formalised place in the policymaking process and the 
government is ultimately able to bar these organisations from the political arena (Eising 
2007). The result is that sectoral trade associations have to compete with a broad range 




heard and towards fostering collaborative interactions with policymakers. These notions 
are in accordance and can be associated to individual firms’ behaviour operating in 
pluralist political systems (Hillman and Wan 2005).  
Informants agreed that trade associations’ ability to operate in the political arena, and 
establish relationships is largely determined by how they are viewed by political actors. 
Legitimacy is thus one of the key determinants empowering meta-organisations to 
represent the industry’s interests and enable them to be considered as credible 
intermediaries by policy-makers. There are several ways through which legitimacy is 
gained, and scholars have argued that key factors are the ability to truly represent large 
market shares as opposed to narrow and firm-specific interests (Boléat 2003) and conform 
to institutional rules and norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995). This study’s 
findings suggest that the ability to match government’s priorities and create a shared 
agenda could also be considered as a key method to gain institutional legitimacy. The 
consequence to this required collaborative engagement may produce an elevated 
sensitivity to changes in the political environment such as a change in government policy 
or outright government change following elections.  
Previous studies have put forward the argument that trade associations protect and 
enhance the reputation of their affiliates (e.g. Barnett and Hoffman 2008; Tucker 2008). 
This study finds that trade associations’ reputation and legitimacy independently from 
their members is critical to their ability to participate in the policymaking process. These 
features are in line with notions stemming from institutional theory as “conformity to 
social expectations contributes to organisational success and survival” (Oliver 1997: 
699), and that an “organisation’s survival and growth depend on acquiring legitimacy 
from institutional actors” (Mellahi et al. 2016: 151). Moreover, Scott (1987: 498) stresses 
“organisations conform because they are rewarded for doing so through increased 
legitimacy, resources and survival capabilities”. Legitimacy is extremely relevant when 
considering trade associations because it is one of their main assets when operating in the 
political and social environment, particularly in contexts characterised by a pluralist 
approach (Hillman and Wan 2005). Being a legitimate intermediary is vital for 
associations, as this will allow them to act as a recognised intermediary and interlocutor 
operating at the interface of the political and business environments. Specifically, without 




established to foster engagement with politicians (e.g. structured meetings between 
government and industry), and as a consequence it may lose its influence on 
policymakers, the ability to convey the interests of its members and contribute to the 
policy-making process. This may happen if the trade association is not seen as credible 
or representative of a broader perspective. Powell (1991: 184) argues that “in institutional 
environments, organizations compete for social fitness rather than economic efficiency”, 
and trade associations gain social fitness through the demonstration of an adaptation - be 
it genuine or fictitious - to institutional norms and procedures.  
The above-mentioned determinants are not to be considered as an exhaustive list towards 
understanding how political strategy is formulated within trade associations, but as 
features that emerged most prominently from the collected data. Nevertheless, this study 
contributes to work (e.g. Barnett 2013) that has called to undertake a qualitative and in-
depth approach to observe and understand the different factors that direct trade 
association activity.   
6.4 The exertion of influence in the political arena 
The third research question advanced within this study delves in exploring sectoral trade 
association political activity (Hadani, Bonardi, and Dahan 2016) by revealing the 
mechanisms underlying the execution of political strategy towards shaping the political 
environment in which they operate.  The findings underlined that trade associations 
undertake a variety of political activities, and that associations that are not prominently 
involved in shaping the external environment may nonetheless undertake activities that 
can fall within the domain of political action. Hence this section addresses the following 
question:  
➢ RQ3: How do trade associations exert their influence? 
The objective of this research question was to explore how national and regional trade 
bodies attempt to interact with political actors and shape the policymaking process. 
Previous studies in the corporate political activity field (e.g. Barnett 2006a; Hillman and 
Hitt 1999; Jacomet 2005; Ozer and Lee 2009) have mainly privileged the firm level of 
analysis and investigated firms undertaking individual and collective activities. In 




as an organisation in its own right (Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017). In addition, 
diverging from studies that have focused on a specific tactic, for example lobbying (Drope 
and Hansen 2009), this research has explored the broader wealth of activities that trade 
associations can undertake. 
The findings demonstrate that trade associations exert their influence using a variety of 
different tactics. The main activities included drafting reports and consultations, 
providing evidence for parliamentary debates, testifying in front of parliamentary 
committees, developing political ties and engaging with the media and other key 
stakeholders. As mentioned in the previous section, the strong reliance on political actors 
to gain institutional legitimacy prevents trade associations to undertake extreme 
adversarial and confrontational political tactics. In contrast trade bodies rather rely on 
softer political activities such as seeking to establish relationships with policymakers as 
well as providing expertise and information to assist the development of public policy. 
Hence, the activities that emerged as the most widely utilised concern the provision of 
information and the development of networks and platforms. The first can be aligned to 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) information strategy, whereby organisations attempt to 
influence the political environment by providing specific intelligence. This feature can be 
explained by the nature of the organisation, as one of its key characteristics is to produce 
information (Berkowitz and Bor 2016), as well as by the UK’s business-government 
interaction, which similarly to the EU supranational level, is characterised by an 
“information-based lobbying system” (Barron 2017: 194). The second, namely the 
development of networks, is intended to foster the connections between the business and 
political environments. Trade associations are in a position of strength in relation to other 
intermediaries, given the strong connections and relations with the industrial environment 
as well as their ability to communicate effectively with all actors operating within the 
business community. Within previous research, establishing industry connections has 
been considered in contrasting ways, on one side as an indirect role (Battisti and Perry 
2015), on the other side, as a primary role of trade associations (Spillman 2012). The 
findings of this research empirically extend the latter view as the triangulation of 
documentary sources, interviews and observations point to substantiate the notion that 
producing networking opportunities is a central function of all associations operating in 




Previous research argued that trade associations in the UK have been characterised by a 
largely responsive and reactive approach to government rather than a proactive one (e.g. 
Grant 1983: 180). Interestingly, the findings of this research contrast or at least are 
divergent from this perspective, as informants stressed the required complementarity 
between reactive and proactive political activities. This divergence is possibly explained 
by the different context in which Grant’s research was undertaken, as well as by several 
informants highlighting that organisations’ political activities have evolved and have 
transformed to include a higher degree of proactivity.   
One of the key findings concerning how meta-organisations exert their influence extends 
Barley’s (2010) notion - that firms develop an institutional field to influence government 
- to trade associations. In line with the author’s argument, this research finds that trade 
associations build on a multitude of actors to convey their interests and attempt to 
influence the policymaking process. This is mainly done through CEOs or government 
affairs representatives who interact and relate with associations in the same sector, either 
horizontally amongst the regional bodies or vertically through the collaboration between 
the regional and national levels, for example through the Aerospace Federation (as 
mentioned in Chapter 3). Frequently collaboration is not possible given the unwillingness 
of other associations to cooperate on specific issues, and trade associations’ mangers will 
attempt to influence their counterparts through their mutual members. Moreover, 
collaborations will involve associations in other sectors, as well as a broad range of actors 
including think tanks, charities, learned societies, academia, and political actors. 
Informants underlined that the latter category play a particularly important role and can 
be considered as political cheerleaders, which will assist the trade body to convey its 
message within parliament.  
Establishing connections with political actors have been considered as a fundamental 
constituent of nonmarket strategy (Oliver and Holzinger 2008), and extant work has 
debated the value and benefits of such linkages to organisations (e.g. Frynas, Mellahi and 
Pigman 2006; Hillman 2005; Sun, Mellahi, and Thun 2010). Whilst this research does 
not undertake an extensive analysis of the intensity of political ties developed by the 
organisations, it does find that trade association managers at both national and regional 




national trade associations undertake political activities through a range of different 
individuals, the president (who is usually a key actor in the aerospace industry), the CEO, 
as well as policy, public affairs and public relations managers, whereas smaller 
organisations concentrate political activities on the CEO and possibly another manager 
who may act as deputy. 
Even though the development of political connections presents unquestionable benefits, 
in some cases they might present negative consequences in the long-term. This is 
particularly visible and problematic in small trade bodies as the reliance on a single 
individual to undertake political activities exposes the association to extensive 
vulnerability and could have negative repercussions on the entire organisation as it would 
be extremely difficult to maintain or rebuild the ties in the short term if the CEO left the 
organisation. These results reflect those of Sun, Mellahi, and Wright, who also found that 
political ties may turn into a liability, as they are “vulnerable to managerial departures  
because they are largely manager-specific ties made up of closed relationships among 
interconnected individuals” (2012: 77). Again, these aspects demonstrate the centrality 
of the CEO as emerged in section 6.3.  
This research evidenced considerable differences between the national and regional trade 
associations, and even though the previous section underlined that any trade association 
can undertake a political role, the regional bodies present evident limitations in the 
activities they are able to undertake. Similarly to the firm level of analysis where firm 
size, given the greater amount of resources enjoyed by large firms, is considered as an 
indicator towards the development of political activities (e.g. Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 
2004; Schuler and Rehbein 1997), the findings of this study, in line with the resource-
based lens, suggest that larger trade associations are more likely to have the necessary 
organisational, financial resources and political administrative expertise (Dahan 2005b) 
that will enable them to develop superior political strategies. Moreover, informants 
suggested that larger trade associations are able to incorporate external resources from 
member companies in their political tactics more efficiently than smaller organisations.  
Another key theme that emerged from the findings concerns the capacity of trade 
associations to undertake political activities and exert their influence through a broad 




to influence political stakeholders in a variety of extremely different settings. These 
comprise settings such as industry and government roundtables and partnerships (e.g. the 
AGP or DGP), events in parliament organised in collaboration with parliamentarians, 
select committee hearings, political party conferences, as well as trade shows and firm 
site visits. Moreover, it can be put forward that several platforms organised towards 
assisting firms’ economic growth, overlap with activities directed at influencing the 
political environment. For example, the organisation of trade shows creates networking 
platforms that enable both the trade association as well as the single companies to interact 
with public officials, politicians and regulators. These notions can be aligned to Funk and 
Hirschman’s (2017) study that demonstrates how firms’ market actions could produce 
changes in the political and regulatory environments. This does not mean that the 
development of such forums could directly impact the development of public policy, 
however these activities should be considered as part of the broader set of political 
activities that are aimed to gaining policy influence.  
6.5 Summary 
This chapter, which is structured according to the three research questions, has addressed 
the gaps in knowledge proposed in Chapter 2, and extended the narrative on the findings, 
discussing them in relation to extant corporate political activity and nonmarket strategy 
literature.  
The first section presented the determinants that have an impact on trade associations’ 
political role, underlining the key motivations that drive firms to join these voluntary 
organisations and act collectively. The second section considered how trade associations 
develop their political strategy. Finally, the third section offered an overview on the 
different tactics undertaken by trade associations to exert influence on decision and 
policy-makers. Together, the findings pointed towards a valuable integration between 
institutional and resource-based perspectives, and hence provided the justification for the 
adoption of a multi-theoretical framework. Finally, these sections have also offered an 
outline of how corporate political activity differs between trade associations and 




Chapter 7  Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
The following chapter concludes this thesis by offering the contributions to knowledge 
and their managerial implications. Section 7.2 indicates how the findings advance 
nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity literature as well as research on meta-
organisations. Section 7.3 provides broader theoretical implications. Section 7.4 
articulates the managerial implications for firm and trade association managers. Section 
7.5 presents implications for policymakers involved in the interaction with the business 
environment. Finally, section 7.6 concludes the chapter by discussing the limitations of 
this study and suggesting several avenues for future research. 
7.2 Contributions to nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity 
literature and to research on trade associations 
The essential contribution of this research lies in the in-depth and empirical investigation 
of trade associations in the UK aerospace industry. Specifically, this thesis explores the 
factors that determine trade associations’ political role and political strategy development, 
as well as the particular political activities undertaken towards influencing the political 
and regulatory environment. Chapter 2 underlined that there is a lamentable lack of 
research that has investigated the specific role and political activity development of trade 
associations. The contributions of this study aim to provide knowledge that can help to 
fill this gap and are set in the nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity fields.  
The literature review connects two key strands of literature that are strongly 
interconnected but that have mostly been considered independently from each other. In 
the nonmarket strategy and corporate political activity field, despite the abundant 
literature addressing the political activities of business actors attempting to shape the 
political arena, there is a marked prevalence of studies addressing the firm level of 
analysis and a dearth of research investigating the formulation of political strategy at trade 
association level (e.g. Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015; Barnett 2017: Drope and 
Hansen 2009). Notwithstanding recent work in the wider nonmarket strategy field, which 
has mostly focused on the CSR stream of inquiry (e.g. Buchanan and Marques 2017; 




predominantly centred its attention on the firm level of analysis whilst investigating 
collective action (e.g. Barnett 2006a; Jacomet 2005; Ozer and Lee 2009). In sharp contrast 
this thesis explores trade associations as independent entities and organisations in their 
own right.  
An additional contribution concerns the level of analysis as this study explores trade 
associations’ political role on two different levels: national and regional. Previous 
research has frequently examined corporate political activity at the national level, and 
studies using this level of analysis (e.g. Doner and Schneider 2000; Wilts and Meyer 
2005) have demonstrated how national trade associations are key actors in the business-
government interaction. Nevertheless, Rajwani and Liedong (2015) argue that despite an 
abundance of studies that focus on the national level, there are other levels where policy 
is developed. Notwithstanding notable exceptions that have taken into consideration the 
supranational level (e.g. Beyers 2004; Greenwood 2002) and the local level (e.g. Coleman 
and Grant 1985; Dixon 2006; Medina 2016), which have nonetheless mostly focused on 
national and cross-industry associations, the volume of research in this direction is 
lamentable. In the UK and in other national contexts around the world, there are instances 
in which policy is devolved to sub-national entities. Business actors are thus required to 
keep abreast of the function of local political institutions and be able to interact with them. 
The findings of this research underline that in these circumstances local sectorial trade 
bodies may become extremely relevant political actors. Moreover, the focus of the 
research has enabled to emphasise the consideration that local, and generally smaller, 
trade associations may be considered as proactive political actors that are able to interact 
with their socio-political environment and attempt to shape it. 
Hence, another contribution of this study is to extend research on trade associations’ 
political activity formulation and execution. This in-depth empirical investigation 
provides insights that enrich the understanding of the dynamics of trade associations’ role 
and political activities (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011). It is found that trade association 
categorisations (e.g. Galambos 1988; Rajwani, Lawton, and Philips 2015; Van Waarden 
1992) are static and frequently over simplistic representations (Bennett 2000) and trade 
associations should rather be considered as dynamic organisations in the sense that both 
large and small organisations may in specific circumstances undertake an effective 




have highlighted that size, concentration, competition and government contracts 
influence trade associations’ political activities, and this study extends this stream of 
research on trade associations by indicating other factors that enable trade associations’ 
role and functions to change rapidly. These include empirical evidence of the widely 
recognised belief that the institutional environment and political framework in which 
organisations are embedded, as well as organisation-specific internal attributes, are 
crucial determinants of their political role and strategy development (e.g. Bonardi, 
Holburn, and Vanden Bergh 2006; Dixon 2006; Hillman 2003).  
Moreover, this study has provided further evidence on how changes in the political system 
can influence political activities (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani 2013), by underlining 
that although regionalisation and devolutionary processes did not overturn the 
predominant role of central government and national trade associations, they have had an 
impact on the development of regional trade associations as well as on their political 
activity formulation. It is reasonable to argue that trade associations’ role and political 
functions might have been reinvigorated in specific contexts by the establishment or 
development of strong regional political institutions, whether in the devolved 
administrations or across some of the regional contexts in England.  
Moreover, this research contributes to recent work (Barnett 2017) that has called for a 
greater understanding of how political strategy is formulated within trade associations. 
Specifically, this study contributes to filling this gap by presenting key determinants that 
have an impact on how these organisations set their agenda. Considering trade 
associations as a unique form of meta-organisation (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008) has 
implications on their internal mechanisms that differ consistently from other 
organisational forms. Notwithstanding the consensus and member-based mechanisms in 
place within trade associations, previous research (e.g. Barnett 2013; Guèguen 2002) has 
posited that large firms have a predominant role in the development of trade association 
activity. Whilst this study empirically validates this notion, it also extends research on 
meta-organisations by underlining that, albeit its importance, this is just one of the factors 
determining a trade association’s political strategy. The findings provide evidence that at 
both national and regional level, the role of the manager leading the organisation will 
have a profound impact on the overall political direction of the organisation as well as on 




Additionally, this study acknowledges and empirically supports Barley’s (2010) 
argument that firms use several organisations and individuals to build an institutional 
field in order to influence government. This was a common theme throughout the 
interviews, and the findings highlight how sectoral trade associations are only one of the 
intermediaries or entities that operate within the business-government boundary, that are 
actively or passively used by firms to interact with political stakeholders. The 
development of the institutional map (Figure 10 above) has been extremely valuable and 
conducive towards gaining a better understanding of trade associations’ environment and 
institutional field, where they sit in relation to other intermediaries, as well as towards 
considering their relations with business and political actors. Moreover, this research 
extends these views to consider that trade associations, as independent organisations, 
undertake these functions as well. This means that they will build on, collaborate with, 
and use other organisations and/or political actors to promote their interests. Alongside 
providing information to policymakers, this was found to be one of the key tactics used, 
especially by particularly active trade associations to convey their interests and attempt 
to influence the policy-making process.  
Even though the focus and level of analysis of this research is specifically oriented on 
trade associations as organisations in their own right, there are some minor contributions 
to the firm level of analysis that should be underlined. This research further extends 
previous research on CPA and nonmarket strategy by highlighting similarities and 
differences between trade association and firm political activities. Trade associations 
undertake a breadth of proactive and reactive political activities that are extremely similar 
to those employed independently by firms, such as providing information to policymakers 
and developing relations with political and regulatory actors (e.g. Hillman and Hitt 1999; 
Sun, Mellahi, and Wright 2012). Conversely, trade associations are not able to interact 
on in-depth matters and as evidenced rather interact at a broader level (Collins and Roper 
2005). Additionally, trade bodies cannot generally rely on confrontational approaches, 
but have to rather rely on cooperative interactions. Furthermore, the study empirically 
contributes to the work (e.g. Barnett 2013; Baron 2016) that has sought to understand - 
or has called for future studies to explore – the reasons that may influence firms’ decision 




In contrast to extant research (e.g. Hillman and Hitt 1999) the findings of the research are 
in line with the argument that individual and collective political activity should not to be 
considered as dichotomous, rather they should be viewed as complementary (e.g. Jia 
2014; Jia and Mayer 2016; Minto 2016.). Nevertheless, this argument has to be taken 
with caution as it mostly refers to the larger firms within the industry who are capable of 
acting independently when required. 
Finally, in line with extant work (e.g. Bennett 1997b; Grant 2000) this research 
contributes to the understanding that trade associations are not to be considered in the 
sole perspective of business influencing political institutions, but also means through 
which government can relate with and influence the business environment, for example 
by using associations as proxies for disseminating information and self-regulatory 
mechanisms of portions of the economy. Hence, this is another example that demonstrates 
the bi-directionality of trade associations at the interface of business and government.   
7.3 Contributions to theory 
In addition to the empirical contributions, this thesis produces important theoretical 
insights that concern the trade association as a strategic organisation in its own right 
(Lawton, Rajwani, and Minto 2017). The principal theoretical implication, as evidenced 
in the visual representation of the findings (Figure 8 above) implies that trade 
associations’ political involvement and political activity development cannot be 
comprehensively understood with the adoption of a single theoretical perspective. The 
complexity of these organisations, their organisational configuration and internal 
mechanisms (which also include the interactions with their membership), as well as the 
structure and dynamic nature of the environment in which they operate must be taken into 
consideration. These notions are in line with the view that theoretical rigidity and the 
adoption of single theoretical lenses is a constrained approach, which has a limited 
explanatory power of organisations’ political action (e.g. Barron 2013; Hadani, Bonardi, 
and Dahan 2016; Mellahi et al. 2016), and that the incorporation of different lenses may 
offer a more comprehensive understanding (Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011).  
Work on organisations’ involvement in socio-political arenas and on trade associations 
undertaken within disciplines such as political science (e.g. Beyers 2004; Doner and 




2012) have been more accustomed at integrating diverse theoretical lenses than 
management studies (e.g. Doh, Lawton, and Rajwani 2012; Hillman 2003; Hillman and 
Wan 2005; Reveley and Ville 2010). In recent years this has led to numerous calls towards 
a theoretical integration and the underlining that diverse theoretical perspectives should 
be taken into consideration (e.g. Frynas, Child, and Tarba 2017; Mellahi et al. 2016). This 
study’s findings and contributions are consistent with these notions in that to fully 
investigate trade associations and offer a comprehensive illustration of their role and 
functions it is necessary to consider the environmental conditions as well as internal 
attributes. This approach is in line with Makadok, Burton, and Barney (forthcoming, 
2018: 2) who propose that contributions to theory can occur through the “combination of 
existing theories”. Hence, in this study the joint consideration of multiple lenses has been 
valuable towards acknowledging how resources, which can be internal and external (i.e. 
acquired from their members), and the socio-political and regulatory environment in 
which trade associations are embedded, can influence their role and functions.  
On one hand, resource-based views propose that an organisation’s resources and 
capabilities are central aspects towards the ability to develop and undertake political 
activity and shape the socio-political and regulatory environment (e.g. Dahan 2005a; 
Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman 2006; Oliver and Holzinger 2008). On the other hand, 
research, that has focused on institutional theory emphasises that an organisation’s 
participation in the political arena is influenced by the socio-political, regulatory and 
economic arrangements in which it operates and that in order to gain legitimacy it must 
conform to institutional expectations (e.g. Feinberg, Hill, and Darendeli 2015; Hillman 
2003; Lawton, Rajwani, and McGuire 2013; Oliver 1991).  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, institutional theories and particularly the new institutional 
perspective (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) has been employed to highlight that companies’ 
political actions are influenced by their institutional embeddedness, and to explore how 
social structures and relationships impact firms’ nonmarket strategy (John, Rajwani, and 
Lawton 2015). This thesis has used these particular perspectives employed in the CPA 
and NMS literatures and has applied them to a different organisational actor, namely trade 
associations, hence applying existing theoretical views to a different phenomenon 




beneficial towards comprehending environmental conditions discussed within this thesis 
such as: the UK’s pluralist political context; the centralism of policy development and the 
predominant role of national government; the particular role of political actors (e.g. the 
connections between MPs and their constituencies); as well as the dynamic nature of the 
political environment and shifts and transformations of the policy framework, and how 
these institutional features exert pressure on both national and regional associations’ role 
and on how they design political action. 
However, similarly to the firm level of analysis, a limitation and weakness of this 
perspective is the premise that organisations are considered as passive actors and political 
activity is merely reactive (John, Lawton, and Rajwani 2015). Nevertheless, the findings 
have evidenced how trade associations besides monitoring, scanning and responding to 
institutional pressure, undertake a wide range of activities that entail a clear proactive 
approach. Hence, having acknowledged the impact stemming from the environment in 
which business organisations operate, it must be underlined that it is not possible to 
understand the development of trade associations’ political role or explain their political 
strategies and actions by simply referring to institutional theoretical assumptions 
(Spillman 2012). Specifically, from the resource-based theoretical perspective, a key 
contribution lies in the acknowledgement that through the deployment and bundling of 
internal and external resources, trade associations design influencing strategies that are 
purposely aimed at anticipating political pressure and shaping their external environment 
(Lawton, Rajwani, and McGuire 2013). In this respect, a key difference with the firm 
level of analysis is that firms deploy resources to gain individual benefits such as 
competitive advantage over their competitors, whereas trade associations deploy them to 
gain advantages that can benefit their membership and entire industry. 
Resources that have emerged include: organisational resources, such as the role of the 
CEO, in-house public affairs/government relations staff, and the ability to produce 
information and expertise; relational, such as the ability to develop political ties and foster 
direct or indirect relationships with key organisations and political stakeholders; and 
public image and reputational, such as the ability of trade associations to develop a strong 
reputation over time. One of the key notions that emerged from the findings concerns the 




undertake political activities, as it is fundamental in conferring a trade association its 
political role. These findings lend support to previous research (e.g. Hadani, Dahan, and 
Doh 2015; Hart 2010; Griffin and Dunn 2004), which highlights that senior management 
commitment is key to securing resources that can be implemented to undertake political 
activity. A key difference between this research and extant work is that previous studies 
focus their analysis on the firm level whilst the patterns that have emerged from this 
research explore the trade association level of analysis. This distinction is particularly 
relevant as there are different dynamics between a firms’ senior management ability to 
manage a company and a trade CEO to manage a trade body. Additionally, this is even 
more relevant for trade associations if it is considered that in many instances, particularly 
in smaller trade associations (e.g. the regional bodies included in this study) the CEO is 
the only individual active in the development and execution of political activity. It could 
be argued that the same conditions apply to SMEs who do not have an organised 
government affairs practices, however the key difference is that the prerogative of interest 
representation organisations should be to interact with the socio, political and economic 
environment. 
Similarly, to the limitations of the institutional perspective, the sole reliance on resource-
based views, would have limited the understanding that resource scarce organisations, 
might in specific conditions play a key political role. Hence, only through the 
combination of these two theoretical perspectives is it possible to go beyond the 
limitations of each construct and comprehensively examine trade associations operating 
on different levels. 
Finally, it is encouraging to compare the abovementioned notions with earlier studies on 
trade associations (e.g. Beyers 2004; Dixon 2006; Valler and Wood 2004), which have 
claimed that to fully comprehend trade associations and their role it is necessary to take 
into consideration different perspectives and go beyond strict theoretical frameworks, and 
rather find a balance between focusing on structure and institutional change, and the role 




7.4 Managerial implications 
Following the scholarly contributions, this research proposes practical implications for 
firms and trade associations. First, from the perspective of both firm and trade association 
managers, this research provides an overview of key political institutions, as well as an 
array of actors with whom trade associations operating in the UK aerospace context 
interact. It is essential for business leaders to acknowledge the role of the various actors 
that have been presented, firstly because these may have a direct impact on the business 
environment through the elaboration of public policy, laws and regulation. Secondly, 
because there is a broad range of actors in both the market (e.g. firms) and nonmarket 
(e.g. other trade associations, politicians, industry experts, journalists, think tanks, 
academics) that may be extremely important to consider, for example as targets of 
political activity or in terms of co-operative action. 
Second, closely linked to the previous point, and notwithstanding that to many this might 
sound as an obvious statement, context does matter. This research has clearly evidenced 
that the environment in which trade associations operate in, has a manifest impact on their 
role in general, and specifically on their functions as key actors within the complex 
business-government interface. The specificities of not only the economic, political and 
regulatory environment, but also of the social, cultural context and historical patterns will 
have a determining effect on: a) which actors will need to be engaged; and b) how they 
must or may be engaged with.   
Third, from the perspective of trade associations, especially smaller organisations 
operating at local and regional levels, it is key that managers develop political capital, i.e. 
strong relationships with a broad range of stakeholders in the social, political and 
regulatory arenas. This is particularly important for those associations that do not possess 
a high level of organisational resources (e.g. a dedicated public affairs/government 
relations team) and thus rely on the CEO/MD to establish connections with key actors. 
Nevertheless, to avoid becoming vulnerable to managerial departure, these organisations 
should develop internal mechanisms that formalise and retain these connections once the 
CEO has left the organisation. Smaller trade associations could coordinate with large 
members to devise secondment work experiences for firm government relations and 




associations. This could enable smaller trade associations devise more formalised 
political strategies. 
Fourth, acknowledging the differences in the availability of resources, smaller trade 
associations should learn from the tactics employed by larger organisations on how to 
deal with changes in the political institutional environment. The findings of this research 
have highlighted that larger trade associations are able to anticipate, manage, or react 
(depending on the situation) to institutional change (e.g. changing government, 
departmental reshuffles, changes in policy) better that smaller associations. It is evident 
that larger trade associations retain a greater level of resources that enable the 
organisation to develop more effective political activities, such as for example monitoring 
and scanning the political environment and engaging with politicians and regulators 
regularly. However, a greater coordination amongst the smaller organisations and 
efficient collaborative approaches with national organisations may enable the resource-
scarce bodies not to be surprised by sudden or programmed changes in the political 
environment. 
Fifth, from the perspective of firm managers, this study supplements the chorus of 
research that has stressed how important it is for firms to undertake political activities 
collectively, in cooperation with other companies, specifically through trade bodies. Even 
though collective undertakings may be limited by considerations on sharing sensitive 
information with potential competitors, there are many issues within or across industries 
that can be tackled more effectively by presenting a unified and collective voice. This is 
particularly relevant during times of political and economic uncertainty when decision 
and policy-makers strive to obtain a collective input from the business environment. This 
is also valid when an industry is tackling a particularly sensitive issue, which firms do not 
want to engage with directly, as trade associations are generally able to contribute to the 
political narrative in a more outspoken and blunt approach than individual firms.  
7.5 Policy implications 
A principal implication of the research is that policy and decision makers should 
acknowledge trade associations as potentially valuable instruments for fostering 
economic development strategies. This is in line with Boléat (2017) who in a recent issue 




servants and policymakers should not underestimate the value and benefit of 
collaborating with trade associations. The business leader and former trade body chair 
argues that the civil service is under pressure in this historical period, mainly due to Brexit 
and a reduction in economic and human resources. Civil servants should rely on help 
from those trade associations that are truly representative of their sector and not 
conveyors of specific interests. This article is revealing in that civil servants and 
politicians have yet to understand the benefits and value that would ensue following a 
close collaboration with efficient interest representation organisations.  
A second implication concerns the understanding that regional trade associations do not 
enjoy the same level of resources as larger trade bodies at the national level. This notion 
is particularly important for local political institutions or entities that are required to 
design local economic strategies and develop local economic growth. This is particularly 
relevant given the philosophy outlined in the latest industrial strategy, “the tide has started 
to turn through City Deals, Growth Deals, Devolution Deals and creating Mayoral 
Combined Authorities. Power is beginning to shift from Whitehall” (BEIS 2017: 168). 
Hence, building on the findings outlined in this thesis, decision-makers should attempt 
not to duplicate local economic and industrial strategy but rather work cooperatively with 
the objective of developing shared strategies with local economic actors. This notion 
emerged from those regional trade association managers that expressed their 
powerlessness to interact effectively with a growing plurality of political or quasi-
political entities that developed a breadth of independent and unconnected strategy plans.  
7.6 Limitations and avenues for future research  
This study addresses research gaps related to trade associations and their political 
functions in the context of the UK aerospace industry. The in-depth qualitative approach 
offers an insightful tool to understand the interactions between trade associations and the 
political actors exploring how these organisations may operate to influence the policy 
environment. Whilst this research proposes contributions to knowledge and extends the 
literature on business-government relations, nonmarket strategy and corporate political 
activity, as well as research on trade associations, there are various limitations that should 




Firstly, the main limitation is in line with concerns underlined in previous studies that 
have sought to analyse organisations’ political activities, in that actions in political arenas 
are frequently sensitive and that “political behaviours are often covert in nature” (Frynas, 
Mellahi, and Pigman 2006: 326). Scholars investigating the other strand of nonmarket 
strategy, i.e. CSR, can rely on various documentary sources including sustainability 
reports, whereas organisations do not usually draft CPA reports. Inevitably, these features 
have consequences on the data collection process, as information is not readily available 
and easy to collect. Moreover, the context of the research, namely the aerospace industry 
has an additional burden as most firms deal with sensitive military matters that have made 
it even more difficult find interviewees and collect documentary data.  Consequently, 
gaining access to potential informants has been extremely challenging. 
Strictly related to the previous limitation, the researcher initially sought to include 
institutional representatives to corroborate the themes emerging from interviews with 
business representatives. Even though this was partially done with industry experts and 
through the analysis of government and parliamentary reports, the inclusion of political 
stakeholders would have surely been beneficial and added value to the research. Future 
studies could interview politicians and investigate their perceptions on the political role 
of trade associations.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, another limitation concerning the informants that were 
interviewed, related to those that did not agree for the interview to be recorded. These 
entailed only a couple of participants, however the researcher had to take hand-written 
notes. Notwithstanding the benefits gained in terms of the richness of the data, as 
informants would have not shared such insights otherwise, it is inevitable that several 
notions and points might have been missed during the interview.  
Moreover, the study explored trade associations’ role and activities in a single industry 
and was limited to one specific national environment. Whilst this allowed an in-depth and 
rich investigation of this context it presents limitations. As it is fair to state that some of 
the findings may be applicable to different contexts, it must be put forward that 
generalizability to other contexts is rather restricted, which is relatively common in 
qualitative research (Blaikie 2009; Sarantakos 2009). As pointed out in Chapter 2, 




(e.g. Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman 2006), and thus the findings will not be directly 
transferable to other business sectors across the UK. However, it may be assumed that 
trade associations that operate in industries that exhibit similar characteristics (e.g. in 
terms of regulation, government dependence, level of collective activity and the presence 
of a restricted number of dominant large firms), will possibly demonstrate similar patterns 
that have been evidenced in this study. After having understood the complexity and 
specific dynamics of such a unique industry, a future avenue of research could be a 
comparative study between different industries, similarly to extant work such as Schaefer 
and Kerrigan’s (2008) analysis of CSR activities of associations operating in different 
industries. The comparative study could also go beyond national borders and entail 
associations operating in different political environments.  
Given that the data collection was undertaken during Brexit, an exceptionally turbulent 
period, the information gained from the interviews could be influenced by the extreme 
economic and political uncertainty that befell on the industry. This feature is particularly 
relevant if the perception on the political role or required political role of trade 
associations is considered. It could be assumed that in a different period characterised by 
a higher level of stability the answers concerning the need for trade associations to be 
politically active might have been different. Nevertheless, this is in line with scholars 
(e.g. Barnett 2006b) who argue that the prominence of trade associations is higher during 
unstable times.  
Future studies could also delve deeper in the analysis of the individuals managing the 
meta-organisations. Scholars could investigate if trade association managers engage in 
political activities, for example by developing political ties, in order to gain private 
benefits. 
Moreover, the findings strongly suggest that trade associations’ political strategy is 
influenced by competing pressures. Consistent with previous studies which have 
underlined that internal and external pressures influence organisations’ strategy (e.g. 
Hillman and Wan 2005), and studies that have examined competing institutional 
incentives (e.g. Barron and Trouille 2016), this study’s findings point towards the notion 
that trade associations face competing pressures. On one side, they face an internal 




the environment on their behalf. On the other side they face an external pressure 
stemming from the political environment as they have to conform to broad institutional 
pressure and to specific requests from political actors, which will enable them to maintain 
relationships and be involved in the decision-making process. These conflicting pressures 
cannot be ignored because of the need to gain legitimacy from both business and political 
actors. Future research could explore these institutional logics in more detail to 
understand how trade associations are able to manage these competing pressures, and if 
there are specific instances in which one of them prevails over the other. Hence, whilst 
keeping in consideration the various contributions that this investigation has provided, 
this study suggests that more in-depth research is needed towards shedding light on such 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide  
THEMES QUESTIONS PROMTS 
   
General 1. In your opinion, why do firms 
act individually or collectively 
in terms of government 
relations? 
– What are the main 
motivational factors for the 
association to engage with 
decision/policy makers?  
– Is it mainly a political role 
or a business-oriented role? 
Do you think this has 
changed over time? 
Intermediaries 2. Who are the key 
intermediaries in the business-
government relationship? 
What is their role? How and 
why do you relate with them? 
3. How would you describe the 
role and functions of the 
various associations (national 
and regional) in the UK 
aerospace industry? 
4. What are the main differences 
between sectorial 
associations’ approaches to 
relating with institutions 
compared to other 
intermediaries’ approaches? 
– E.g. Think tanks, academia, 
learned societies, other 
associations 
– National vs. regional 
associations vs. associations 
operating in devolved 
admins. 
Institutions 5. Who are the key institutional 
stakeholders? Why do firms 
and associations relate with 
them? 
6. How do you think institutional 
change impacts the 
development of associations’ 
political strategy? Does it 
have a different impact on 
firms? 
7. How are associations 
(national and regional) able to 
anticipate/adapt/react to 
institutional change? 
– E.g. Brexit, RDA regional 
level, Budget, change in 
government. 
– Ask about institutional gaps 
– RDAs >LEPs 




8. How do trade associations 
exert their influence? 
9. How do firms’ interactions 
with decision-makers differ 
from associations’?  
– Compliance, matching 
agenda, leverage 
– Role of primes, role of CEO 




10. Do you think that associations 
have to align their strategies 
to government’s agenda more 
than firms do?  
11. In your opinion what are the 
key factors that determine an 
association’s political 
strategy?  
12. Have associations increased 
their political activities in 
relation to the activities 
undertaken by firms? 
13. In your opinion, how do 






14. Finally, how would you 
describe the impact that 
associations have on shaping 
their external environment? 
 





Appendix 2: Selected interview excerpts  





Representative Data/ Selected evidence 
Firm engagement 
 
Lack of resources  For the smaller companies, you don’t have the resources, so it is actually very useful to have the trade 
association push them, to represent the SMEs because without them you don’t have the resources to affect 
government policy, and potentially it will be tilted towards the bigger companies who do have the resources 
and the louder voice (Interview 19, trade association). 
The smaller companies do not have resources, time or people and most of the times it is up to the CEO or top 
managers to undertake political activities (Interview 12, trade association). 
Economic self-interest  
 
That is why people pay their subscriptions to […] it’s because they think there will be some commercial benefit 
from being a member (Interview 19, trade association). 
They are for me sort of a marketing vehicle and a resource of information (Interview 14, industry expert). 
Intelligence gathering 
and information sharing 
 
So sometimes the trade bodies makes us aware of issues that we are concerned about. So for example at the 
moment, [trade association] is having regular meetings with the secretary of state on Brexit, and the secretary 
of state says I want to meet the sector. I don’t just want to meet [company]. So they are there, acting as a bridge, 
fulfilling their important role, where they are informing us about what the issues are and we are using them as 
a channel to use our issues (Interview 23, firm). 
The [trade association] is vital towards information and intelligence sharing…obviously very helpful when 
they have their conferences (Interview 7, firm). 
Being part of a club 
 
I think it is about being member of a club […] it is being part of something bigger than just running your own 




For some companies it’s better to be part of the community, and to be seen to be part of the community 




Trade associations are fundamental in this respect, namely the development of the supply chain (Interview 8, 
firm). 
[The association] is very strong, encouraged in part from (company name) for obvious reasons, they saw it as 
a useful tool to manage their supply chain. (Interview 20, trade association) 
Sector specific issues 
and collective voice 
 
Sometimes there are messages that you want to get across to government that you do not want your company’s 
name associated with, and its easier to have someone else deliver that message (Interview 19, trade association). 
There are a lot of issues, which sit across the industry as a whole and often it is better to collaborate with your 





[The charity is] an independent organisation, non-commercial, not for profit and […] has to report to the charity 
commission. [The charity] can’t lobby but can be influential and can bring people together, sometimes with 
politicians and civil servants, but it will also bring those individuals who work for companies and facilitate 
their interaction with civil servants (Interview 16, industry expert).  
[…] so companies that are active in aerospace but not necessarily totally wedded to aerospace’s business their 
sole source of income…it is important for those companies to have different sets of voices, not just trade 
associations but alongside those trade associations there are the professional associations and there are the 
organisations that are established to help the development of future products and systems (Interview 14, 
industry expert) 
Institutional stakeholders We don’t have a single entity, that is not the way government policy is formed, it is not the way it works. Many 
people have a voice, […] the treasury has a voice, the defence has a voice and the rest of the political machine 
has a voice (Interview 14, industry expert). 
Government impact on 
the industry 
The government creates the environment for the industry, whether you are a company or a person, you have to 
respond to your environment (Interview 14, industry expert). 
Pretty much wherever you go in the world and see an aerospace industry, that is actually because government 




long timescales, very high risk, very high technology and the barriers to entry are huge. (Interview 15, trade 
association). 
Role of MPs In the UK the way politics works is that there is of course a government with ministers who make the national 
decisions, but they are essentially influenced by members of parliament who may be in the government, but 
may not be (Interview 20, trade association). 
MPs that represent constituencies with a high number of aerospace companies play a great role. As SMEs are 
scattered across the country, firms and associations can use these features as resources to lobby MPs (Interview 
13, firm). 
Perception of 
institutional change and 
institutional gaps 
An organisation like mine, which is only a small trade association, does not have the capacity now to go and 
do what it used to do with a Regional Development Agency with five different Local Enterprise Partnerships, 
we can’t go and have the same conversation five times, we can’t go and influence the same initiative five times 
(Interview 15, trade association). 
The size of the public sector has shrunk, years ago you used to have easy access to civil servants, they would 
be glad to take a meeting from you. [Now] it’s much more difficult, it is becoming such a crowded environment 





Political and fiscal events drive [the association’s] policy strategy (Interview 5, trade association). 






 [The association] will tap in government priorities and agenda and try to align its strategies and aims to that 
(Interview 12, trade association).  
We would look very carefully at what their political, overall strategy was to see how we could take what we 
wanted and say this fits, because it is much harder, almost impossible to persuade government to do something 
which isn’t in its strategy at all (Interview 19, trade association). 





It’s generally the prevailing interest of the prime that goes through, we don’t try to align…we try to find 
overlapping interests, which tend to be from the primes’ perspectives (Interview 18, trade association). 
Role of CEO I think our CEO does an inordinate amount of working in…he is very passionate about SME representation, 
he does a lot of approaching MPs, he does a lot of approaching people that he thinks have some influence, and 
he is very, very active. Now […] can afford to be very active because he is kind of self-financing (Interview 
18, trade association). 
I would say that the political impact was minimal, it was really down to the companies to look after themselves, 
and of course that reflected the characters that run it, they tended to be ex RAF (Interview 20, trade association). 
 Political resources Because our offices are close to parliament, not far from Westminster, they were prepared to come up over 
lunch, have a sandwich and we will talk to you about this and that and we would gather a half a dozen of MPs 
on a particular issue they were interested in and we wanted to tell them our view on it (Interview 20, trade 
association). 
I employed people that were ex civil servants to come and work, because they would use the language and the 
format that would work inside the department, not the same I might have used in industry for example 
(Interview 21, trade association). 





Representative Data/ Selected evidence 
Strategy execution 
Market activities  
 
Over ten years we have done over £20m worth of supplier development programs, so whether that is skills, 
innovation or supply chain improvement, we’ve done all of those types of activities to help our members’ 
businesses (Interview 15, trade association). 
The supply chain improvement programs, SC21, that is where we are trying to improve productivity make the 
UK more competitive, the trade body ADS has been instrumental in making that happen, and having those sort 




Nonmarket activities Go to the party conference, hold a breakfast, parliamentary teas, that was another good one as you get a MP 
sponsor and you go there and have a tea party in the house, if you were lucky you would get a dozen MPs sign 
up and it was always a hit and miss (Interview 21, trade association). 
You are going to get some that are better than others, and they are going to have some strengths depending on 
what their strategy is. Some may not be ultra public, and not be in the press a lot but they may have very good 
civil service contacts, that means they can get stuff done quite easily (Interview 13, firm). 
Platforms and forums 
for engagement 
Reactive and proactive 
engagement 
We needed to be a bit more systematic and continuous, you couldn’t simply be reactive, ‘oh there is a crisis, 
project cancelled, what do we do, write a paper?’ No that was not good, you had to forge relationships 
(Interview 20, trade association). 
It was really my job in part to anticipate what we might need to do, you don’t just wait for the question to come 
from government ‘so what do you want to do about this or whatever?’ You say ‘I think we are going to be 
asked this and we would have to be good enough to know what was going to be expected from us. So that we 
could have a position and I could know what to say on behalf of the industry (Interview 21, trade association).  
Cheerleaders and 
activists  
Instead of going direct, I tried direct but it did not work. I got to their board, I knew members of their board 
and got their board to support us. I got my members, who are members of [trade association] to lobby the 
regional directors and the regional directors went in to the chief executive of [trade association] saying the 
same thing as the board was saying (Interview 19, trade association) 
The sponsoring department for the industry was then DTI now BEIS, we went to them and said look this is 
important, we need your help inside Whitehall. We had occasionally some help from the individual members 
of parliament who were ministers or particularly interested in the industry. We got across the message. 
(Interview 21, trade association). 
Personal networks and 
political capital 
We have personal networks, […] who is our CEO, he has a very, very extensive network, so he knows a lot of 
people in BIS and a lot of people in the primes, and he’ll engage with them […], they create various working 
groups and networking type of opportunities where if he is going for dinner somewhere in London the chap 
from BIS will be there, and somebody from the Welsh devolved administration will be there and he’ll have a 
chat, and he’ll do it in a very kind of soft way of…”oh you might want to think about this, or nobody is helping 




It was nice to have two guys that I knew well from a different context in government. So we would go and talk 
to them about general stuff. It was very useful (Interview 20, trade association). 
Structured engagement One thing we try to do and it does exist, is to create regular forum through which industry and government can 
meet, discuss and engage on issues, and that is across all levels of companies and across all the sectors 
(Interview 19, trade association). 
We are probably one of the most organised business sectors in the UK, So we have had the AGP since 2010, 
so our industry has met to discuss the key issues that it faces every month since 2010 (Interview 15, trade 
association). 
Informal engagement We would use that as our annual opportunity to “I call it unprotected lobbying” because that is where ministers 
wouldn’t have civil servants, they would be there as party officials, parties, so they wouldn’t be surrounded by 
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Appendix 4: Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Study title: “Aerospace is Politics with Wings on it”. Exploring the Role and 
Political Function of Trade Associations in the UK Aerospace Industry. 
Information about the project/Purpose of the project 
This interview is part of a study investigating the complex and dynamic field of 
business-government relations in the aerospace industry. The purpose of the study is 
to explore the role of trade associations in the context of business-government 
relations in the UK aerospace industry. Furthermore, an important aspect is to 
consider associations’ embeddedness within the UK’s institutional framework.  
I am interested in gaining a deeper understanding about these organisations by 
having discussions and undertaking interviews with senior firm, association and 
political representatives. 
This interview will be conducted to gain insights in the interaction between firms, 
business associations and political, legislative and regulatory institutions by 
understanding participants’ perceptions and experiences. 
Why have I been chosen? 
For the purposes of this study I intend to interview senior representatives of 
companies, associations who work in public affairs, government affairs, public 
relations and related areas, as well as political actors and industry experts who have 
extensive experience in the aerospace industry.  
Do I have to take part? 
No. The participation is voluntary and it is your individual decision to take part in 
the interview. No disadvantages will arise for you in case you do not take part. If 
you decide to withdraw, you can contact me using the contact details below. After 
withdrawal from the study, your data will be destroyed and not used in the study.  
What is the duration of the interview?  
This interview lasts approximately one hour. 
What do I have to do if I take part? 
You will be asked to take part in a semi-structured interview at the company’s 
premises. The interview will take place between September 2016 and March 2018. 
You will be asked about the interactions between firms and trade associations with 
local/national political institutions and your perceptions on how relations are 




recording equipment. You will be asked to sign a consent form to confirm that you 
understand the purpose of the research and agree to participate in this study. 
What are the risks associated with this project? 
The interview does not include intimate or other questions of private nature. The 
questions refer only to the activities that firms and associations undertake to relate 
with public institutions such as governmental departments or other associations. 
Any personal or controversial information shared by you will remain confidential at 
all times. This research is undertaken following Coventry University ethics 
standards. I can assure that this research will not cause any harm or discomfort to 
you. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
There will be benefits of taking part in this research for participants of political 
institutions as well as for representatives of associations and companies, as the 
research aims at developing a better understanding of the interactions that 
characterise the complex arena of business-government relations, and how to deal 
with political and regulatory uncertainty. The notions that will be developed during 
this study will be highly significant towards the formulation of efficient and 
effective industrial policies as well as towards the development of the competitive 
dynamics of the aerospace industry. It is intended that the findings from this 
research may be able to feed into policy learning about the future engagement of 
government with the aerospace sector, as well as provide managers (both at firm and 
association level) with an overview of political strategies developed within the 
industry.  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Participants will remain under anonymity in all stages of this investigation. 
Information received from every participant will be stored securely in password 
protected electronic files. All references to individuals will be removed or given 
pseudonyms if data is to be included within the submitted study, unless express 
permission has been given. Various data collected will be demolished on submission 
and completion of the research project. 
What if something goes wrong?   
If you do not wish to be involved in the interview process anymore, you may 
withdraw at any time. If things go wrong, or you wish to complain, you can contact 
the project supervisor or myself. Contact details are given below. 
What will happen with the results of the study? 
The results of the study will be used for the researcher’s PhD thesis. At a later point, 
parts of the thesis may be published in peer reviewed academic journals. The results 
of the study may also be presented at academic conferences. 




The research is being organised by Alessandro Stuart Di Bona, a PhD student at the 
Centre for Business in Society (Faculty of Business and Law) at Coventry 
University. The Centre for Business in Society is funding the research. 
Who has reviewed this study? 
The project supervisor and a Faculty Research Ethics Leader, as part of the 
University Applied Research Committee (UARC).   
 
Thank you very much for your participation!  
Contact for Further Information 
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Alessandro Stuart DI Bona 
  
Centre for Business in Society 
Faculty of Business and Law   
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Research Fellow & PGR Director 
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I agree to take part in this interview under the conditions explained to me above: 
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